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Chapter 1
Introduction
Should the “arrival” of “the” new innovation be dated from its first appear-
ance, or from the time it has gained legitimacy? and: is the legitimation
of a new innovation any less fundamental than the act of invention which
brings it about? These two questions suggest that the real problem may not
be understanding how the process of diffusion unfolds, but understanding how
it starts. Geroski (2000, 621)
1.1 On technological demand: the basics
The current thesis deals with and merges three different research lines linked
by their respective analyses of the optimal information acquisition processes
of rational decision makers. In particular, the information gathering algo-
rithm defined in this thesis relates to the consumer choice literature, the
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economic one studying fads and herding phenomena, and the decision theo-
retical branch of operations research dedicated to study the optimal choice
of technology by firm managers.
Consider the problem faced by a rational decision maker regarding what
information to gather given a limited capacity to do so. The consumer choice
literature studies this problem mainly from a psychological perspective, in
particular when dealing with the strategic side of the information trans-
mission process defining the choices made by consumers. In this case, this
research line focuses on how the information given to decision makers can be
strategically designed to affect their final choice in a way that some prede-
termined options appear more attractive than others.
Some empirical phenomena identified by this research line include, among
many others, the existence of context effects allowing for modifications in
the preference formation process of decision makers (Novemsky et al., 2007),
guided search mechanisms implemented through screening tools, used, for ex-
ample, in electronic shopping (Diehl, 2005), and the generation and transmis-
sion of superfluous information (Ariely, 2000), with its corresponding addi-
tional processing requirements on the decision maker. These effects, together
with the limited cognitive ability of decision makers to assimilate informa-
tion, allow for choice modifications to be induced through their information
gathering process.
The previous research line sets the empirical base for the development
of the corresponding search theoretical economic models that analyze fads
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and herds as rational phenomena, following the seminal works of Banerjee
(1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). These models deal with the influence
that informative signals have on the optimal (and rational) behavior of the
decision makers receiving them. However, studying the influence that infor-
mation transmission processes, and signals in particular, have on the optimal
information gathering behavior and choice structures of decision makers re-
mains outside the main scope of this research line, refer to Chamley (2004)
for a comprehensive review of the literature.
In summary, the effect that information transmission processes [signals]
have on the choice [strategic] behavior of decision makers within a given
equilibrium system has been empirically [formally] analyzed by the consumer
choice [economic] research line. The design and study of algorithmic infor-
mation acquisition processes remains outside their scope but within that of
the operations research literature, which, at the same time, tends to overlook
the strategic implications that different signaling and preference manipula-
tion strategies have for the information gathering and choice behavior of
decision makers.
As a matter of fact, the management/operations research literature has
been considering the optimal information gathering problem of firm man-
agers for quite some time, in particular when analyzing the acquisition of
a new technology. In this regard, the seminal models of McCardle (1985)
and Lippman and McCardle (1991) limited their scope to return functions
that were both convex increasing and continuous, a constraint removed by
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the most recent research models within this area, such as Ulu and Smith
(2009). However, and despite the inclusion of Bayesian learning mechanisms
into their algorithms, even the most recent models omit the strategic choice
effects inherent to the information transmission process. This research line
remains focused on the importance that search costs have in limiting the in-
formation processing capacity of generally risk neutral decision makers when
deciding whether to continue or stop their search within settings defined by
the adoption of a given technology.1
At the same time, the decision theoretical branch of operations research
has recently extended this type of models to allow for comparisons between
different technologies. In particular, Paulson Gjerde et al. (2002), as well
as Cho and McCardle (2009), emphasize the cumulative and interdependent
character of technological evolution. However, while the former authors un-
derline the ability of decision makers to regress to a previous technological
state in order to enhance a given product by improving some of its features,
the latter ones concentrate on the existence of scale and scope economies
1For example, Shepherd and Levesque (2002) develop an information gathering algo-
rithm designed to evaluate a business opportunity of unknown profitability. In their model,
the decision maker is implicitly endowed with basic memory capacities that allow her to
compare the evolution of the expected technological profit between time frames and then
use a heuristic decision rule to define the corresponding acceptance and rejection regions.
Though their intuition remains valid in our case, it lacks a strategic component in the
information transmission process and does not allow for comparisons between competing
technologies.
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among interdependent technologies and their influence on the adoption of
new ones. A more economic related approach is followed by Kornish (2006),
who models the influence that network effects via market composition have
on the choice of a given technology between two competing ones.
In all these cases, the whole set of technological features is observable and
its stochastic evolution defined by a known probability function. Therefore,
the strategic effects resulting from signals received regarding the value of un-
known technological characteristics as well as those derived from influencing
the preferences of decision makers are not analyzed by this branch of the
literature.2
Consider a situation where a decision maker is allowed to check a num-
ber of characteristics from a set of possible multidimensional choice goods.
The search must therefore be at the same time both “between-attributes”
and “between-alternatives”. As Bearden and Connolly (2007) summarize,
a decision maker must “continuously decide when to stop searching within
an option - to get a better estimate of its value - and when to stop search-
ing between options - to find one of high value. Striking a balance between
depth (within-option) and breadth (between-option) search presents a com-
plex problem.”
2It should be noted that strategic considerations are developed within the game theoret-
ical branch of the operations research literature, refer to the seminal model of Reinganum
(1981), that concentrates on the strategic incentives implicit behind the adoption and dif-
fusion of technology but does not deal with the information gathering process affecting
technology adoption decisions.
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The second and third sections of the thesis formalize and study the op-
timal information acquisition behavior of a rational decision maker when
choosing among multidimensional goods defined by vectors of characteris-
tics. We analyze in detail the case where the decision process is based on
the possibility of collecting two pieces of information. This case, commonly
considered to be straightforward, is usually overseen by the literature. The
evolution of the information acquisition process depends directly on the val-
ues of all the characteristics observed previously, which prevents the use of
dynamic programming techniques in the design of the algorithm. We show
that the decision of how to allocate the second available piece of information
depends on two well-defined real-valued functions. One function describes
the utility that the decision maker expects to derive from continuing acquir-
ing information on the first good, while the other defines the expected utility
obtained from starting checking the characteristics of a second good.
In addition, section four extends the information gathering structure de-
fined in the previous sections so as to account for the existence of publicly
observable signals within a standard Bayesian learning setting. The introduc-
tion of signals within the current multi-dimensional information gathering
framework allows for possible generalizations of Banerjee’s (1992) “restau-
rant” herding model with sequential moves and publicly observable signals
to start being considered. Though important differences exist with respect to
Banerjee’s model, in particular regarding the quality of the signals received,
the introduction of multidimensional goods and a second decision variable al-
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lows us to account explicitly for the effects that different risk attitudes, types
of signals and learning processes have on the optimal information gathering
behavior of decision makers. Signals will be introduced on the second charac-
teristic space in order to intuitively separate the role played by observations
from that played by expectations.
These introductory sections provide the basis for the development of a
demand-based general equilibrium structure allowing us to analyze the intro-
duction, stability and evolution of technologically superior products through
the creation of the niche markets that newcomer firms must monopolize in
order to survive.
1.2 Linking demand to supply
The economic concept of quality ladders, Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Gross-
man and Helpman (1991), has inspired a large literature on industrial evolu-
tion mainly developed from the perspective of the supply side, where demand
plays a standard representative agent nominal role, see, for example, Grupp
and Stadlerb (2005). However, little has been written on the demand incen-
tives to acquire a newly developed technology, with few recent exceptions
such as Aversi et al. (1999), Malerba et al. (2003, 2007), Klepper and
Malerba (2010) and the papers on the special number to which the latter ref-
erence serves as introduction. That is, the neoclassical general equilibrium
approach to technological selection and diffusion tends to ignore the explicit
12
role played by the demand side of the market.3 It has been the [Schum-
peterian] evolutionary branch of the theory the one emphasizing, from its
very beginnings, the importance of market demand when considering the
evolution of technological cycles, see Mowery and Rosenberg (1979).
Demand theoretical models dealing with the acquisition and assimilation
of new technology have been mainly developed by the operations research
and management literatures.4 These research branches concentrate on op-
timal stopping problems regarding the acquisition of information and im-
plementation of a new technology, see Ulu and Smith (2009) for a recent
example. As a result, these disciplines tend to ignore the supply side of the
economy, which, while of partial importance from a management perspective,
is crucial for economists. Once again, the supply side remains the object of
study for neoclassical scholars since Reinganum (1981) opened this line of
research for economists. However, the general equilibrium approach required
to generate the necessary economic intuition remains an recent evolutionary
3Consider, for example, the model of Tse (2001), who uses the dispersion [heterogeneity]
of the demand for quality among consumers to justify the presence of different quality
sellers [natural oligopolies] coexisting within a quality ladder industrial structure. Even
though his model emphasizes the importance of demand for the technological evolution
of an industry, it concentrates on the aggregate [strategic] responses that consumption
heterogeneity induces on market suppliers. The same type of supply-biased viewpoint is
generally exhibited by the literature on industrial dynamics, see Malerba (2007).
4Porter (1990) and the recent literature on global value chains, see Gereffi et al. (2005),
constitute an important exception when the demand of firms for industrial and interme-
diate goods is considered.
13
phenomenon.
As emphasized by Malerba (2007), a formal analysis of demand and its
effects on the development of new technologies, i.e. the incentives of firms to
increase their R&D expenditures and innovative efforts, and the structure of
a given industry seems to be long overdue. Besides, he argues that such an
approach should go beyond the classical industrial organization literature,
i.e. Sutton (1998), where demand has a passive role and does not affect the
rate of innovation or the direction of technical change.
The current thesis examines the effect that different types of consumers
and demand structures may have on the patterns of innovation and indus-
trial dynamics, establishing a explicit link among market demand, firms and
technology dynamics. As Malerba (2007) states “... the insertion of demand
in the analysis of the relationship between industrial dynamics and innova-
tion is still in its infancy”. Consequently, a formal analysis of demand and
its effects on the development of new technologies, i.e. the incentives of firms
to increase their R&D expenditures and innovative efforts, and the structure
of a given industry seems to be long overdue. Moreover, as emphasized by
Malerba (2007), such an approach should go beyond the classical industrial
organization literature, i.e. Sutton (1998), where demand has a passive role
and does not affect the rate of innovation or the direction of technical change.
Malerba (2007) highlights two key aspects of demand that are relevant
for innovation in industries, namely, consumer behavior [including imperfect
information with respect to new products and technologies, as well as iner-
14
tia and habits concerning existing products and technologies] and consumer
capabilities [absorptive capabilities and their distribution among consumers
and users]. We develop and formally analyze these aspects within a sequential
information gathering process that defines the optimal behavior of rational
decision makers/consumers when facing different sets of multidimensional
goods to choose from.
Four different features of consumer behavior and capabilities will be stud-
ied and used to build the formal structure constituting the demand side of
the market.
(i) The existence of imperfect information implies that decision makers
will have to gather the required information about the goods offered
by a firm before purchasing one. We will define a sequential information
gathering algorithm based on the decision maker being able to gather
two pieces of information from a set of multidimensional goods. This
limit is imposed to account for existing information processing costs,
either pecuniary or cognitive, and to allow for a simple numerical anal-
ysis illustrating the theoretical results obtained.5 The preferences and
absorptive capabilities of decision makers will be shown to determine
5In addition, the literature usually concentrates on a small number of attributes when
describing the products available to consumers, i.e. performance and cheapness in the
case of Malerba et al. (2003, 2007) and variety and quality in the case of Bohlmann et al.
(2002). Bearden and Connolly (2007) survey the literature on multidimensional consumer
choice, while Gaines (2003) provides a review at the organizational level.
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their willingness to continue searching within a given market for better
expected products. In particular, we will illustrate numerically how the
willingness to search of decision makers depends on their degree of risk
aversion and how it is influenced by the reception of signals defined on
the distribution of unobserved characteristics.6
Moreover, the presence of habits and consumption inertia, i.e. the
ability of firms to build [educate] a consumer base expecting a mini-
mum quality level among the goods it offers to be guaranteed, will be
shown to determine the continuity of the expected utilities derived from
a given search and generate different reversible information gathering
continuation areas when searching within a market.
(ii) The introduction of technologically superior products may be signaled
by firms. It will be assumed that only those decision makers who are
sufficiently experimental will update their beliefs and demand thresh-
olds when gathering information and choosing a product from a firm.
Experimental decision makers are defined by Malerba et al. (2003,
6In a related theoretical scenario, Vergari (2005) investigates how the economic en-
vironment, i.e. government preferences, affects the efficiency of technology choice in a
setting where firms choose sequentially between a safe old technology and a risky new one.
Vergari (2005) incorporates government preferences in the form of a noisy public signal to
the information externalities that define standard herding environments in order to obtain
a smaller bias against the adoption of new and superior technologies. In our model, it is
indeed the credibility of the noiseless signals observed what induces stricter acceptance
criteria on the set of technologically superior products among decision makers.
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2007) as those who crave new technologies in existing products or look
for completely new products in new demand segments. We will refer
to this type of consumers as perfect foresight ones, while myopic deci-
sion makers, on the other hand, will be those whose behavior remains
unaffected by the signals of firms.
(iii) Inertia and habits with respect to existing products and technologies
will determine the ability of decision makers to shift their information
gathering processes between different product markets. In the words
of Malerba et al. (2003), “customers are very sophisticated and won’t
buy a new model computer unless it is as good as or better than the
old model ones” (pg. 8). Hence, the incentives for a decision maker to
shift between different product markets must depend on whether or not
the technological development introduced allows her to improve upon
the existing product characteristics.
(iv) The preferences and absorptive capabilities of decision makers will de-
termine their willingness to continue searching within a given market
for better expected products. In this sense, we will illustrate numeri-
cally how risk neutral decision makers are less averse to search among
the goods within a given market than risk averse ones.
The multiple characteristics approach that we follow is not only typi-
cal of the consumer choice literature, see Bearden and Connolly (2007), but
has also been employed to measure technological evolution in the economic
17
one, see Saviotti (1982), Alexander and Mitchell (1984), and Saviotti and
Metcalfe (1984). These authors based their empirical approaches on sets of
characteristics describing the technology implicit in a given product and tried
to develop indicators to measure the effects of technological innovation and
change, i.e. sophistication, on the characteristics and valuation of the prod-
uct. The main problem faced by these authors was to consider the relative
weights of the characteristics when defining the product. As Saviotti points
out in the abstract of his (1982) paper, “These indicators can be applied
only to multicharacteristic products with easily quantifiable characteristics.
However, products that satisfy these requirements account for a very large
share of the market for industrial goods.”
These ideas, based on the demand analysis of Lancaster (1966),will be
formally applied here to define the information gathering process of rational
decision makers. Note, however, that we are not implying that two charac-
teristics, or two classes of them, suffice to account for the complex nature
of the technology inherent to a product. Indeed, trying to do so would miss
most of the technological changes incorporated within a given product, see
Alexander and Mitchell (1984). However, despite the apparent simplicity of
the decision algorithm, the resulting choice environment [defined by decision
makers] will be far from trivial and allow for the design of a demand struc-
ture that accounts for signaling and learning phenomena while being based
on relatively straightforward technical assumptions.
We are aware of the behavioral limitations displayed by the branch of
18
decision theory based on expected utility maximization, under risk or uncer-
tainty, and the lack of empirical validity exhibited by the main axioms of
expected utility, see Di Caprio and Santos-Arteaga (forthcoming). However,
we will model the behavior of decision makers using these axioms and the
corresponding economic intuition, while trying to accommodate the main
behavioral properties highlighted by Aversi et al. (1999), by considering the
simplest non-trivial information gathering and choice environment that may
be faced by a decision maker. That is, we aim at smoothing the frontier be-
tween the behavioral endogenous preference approach of Aversi et al. (1999)
and the decision theoretical setting on which this thesis is based. In order to
do so we abstract from context, temporal and social effects both in the order
of the characteristics and the shape of the utility function, see Aversi et al.
(1999: 356).7
Our information gathering process leads an almost lexicographic choice
structure to emerge from a set of continuous preference relations defined
on multi-dimensional objects.8 This type of choice pattern is in accordance
with the properties of consumption described by Aversi et al. (1999: 365),
who state that “micro-consumption patterns are likely to be characterized by
7Note, however, that these effects could be assumed to shape or directly determine the
order defined by the decision makers both within and among characteristics.
8Formally, this type of behavior does not constitute a problem since lexicographic
choices can be shown to follow from continuous preferences and to be representable by
continuous utility functions in environments with incomplete information as the current
one, see Di Caprio et al. (2010).
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roughly lexicographic patterns of consumers selection over hedonic attributes
and goods.”
In an intuitively related setting, Tripsas (2001) argues that it is a discon-
tinuous change in the preferences of decision makers what usually drives the
adoption of new technology in an industry. Our analysis of demand will also
exhibit discontinuities in the choice process of decision makers emerging as a
result of changes in technological evolution. Moreover, in our setting it is the
receptivity of decision makers to a credible signal, a common approach in the
economic literature on herding phenomena, what drives this discontinuous
(though emerging from continuous preferences) behavior.
Even though the choices made by decision makers will determine the
survival of some products and technologies but not others, we will not provide
them with the required sophistication so as to become users in the sense
of Von Hippel (1988) and Rogers (2003), where product users are able to
interact with suppliers to develop and improve the goods that are initially
consumed. 9
9When considering consumer behavior and modeling how consumers decide whether
or nor to accept an innovation and how this decision affects its diffusion, the literature
generally shifts towards a marketing approach, which tends to concentrate on the process
of diffusion, see Mahajan, Muller, and Bass (1990). For a survey of the literature on the
diffusion of process technologies see Baptista (1999), who emphasizes the existing simi-
larities between the diffusion of industrial processes and that of new consumer durables.
Note, however, that if the dynamics of technological innovation are interpreted in the
way proposed by Abernathy and Utterback (1975), there may exist important differences
20
That is, our model is not so ambitious so as to account for a demand-
based generation of new technological paradigms, a possibility illustrated by
van den Erde and Dolfsma (2005), or of completely new markets, see Geroski
(2000).10 The question we try to answer initially is a simpler one: if a new
technologically superior (set of) product(s) becomes available, as is required
for the development of a new market, see Abernathy and Utterback (1978),
and its existence could be credible signaled by firms, would they do so based
on the expected reaction of consumers?
Thus, we are more interested in the microeconomic properties of the
choice process between products with different levels of technological develop-
ment faced by decisions makers than in the dynamic trend of the technological
process itself, an approach followed by the stochastic learning structures of
Stoneman (1981), Aversi et al. (1999), Fatas-Villafranca and Saura-Bacaicoa
between the initial phases of technological emergence, before a dominant design arises,
and the following ones based on an established (dominant) design. De facto, product
innovation is much more important in the initial phases while process innovation gains
relevance afterwards, as the (surviving) incumbent firms exploit the corresponding scale
and scope economies. This type of evolutionary pattern has also been emphasized by
Pavitt (1984) and Malerba and Orsenigo (1997). Brown and Greenstein (2000) identified
econometrically the lead users that helped creating niche markets for new technological
products within the computer industry using data on the demand for speed and memory
[two main characteristics] of mainframe computers during the second half of the eighties.
10In the latter case, a set of psychology and cognitive science micro-foundations for
market generation by expert entrepreneurs is presented by Dew et al. (2011) as a critic
to the standard rational decision theoretical approach.
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(2004), and Malerba et al. (2007).11 That is, following Geroski (2000), we
will concentrate our efforts in analyzing the technological transition behavior
of decision makers at the most basic microeconomic level instead of consid-
ering the dynamic [diffusion] trend of the process.
In this regard, three different formal settings will be considered through
Sections 4 to 7, respectively, each analyzed both theoretically and numeri-
cally.
The first setting [described in Section 4] illustrates the idea of performance
thresholds described by Adner and Levinthal (2001). Decision thresholds
arise naturally within our theoretical environment and allow us to analyze
how consumer preferences affect the emergence of disruptive technologies,
which, in our case, have already been developed but must be introduced in
the market, see Adner (2002). Indeed, a superior distribution of [desirable]
variants of the product characteristics will be generated, as is required for
the development of a new market, see Abernathy and Utterback (1978). We
show how the willingness to search of decision makers depends on their de-
11These papers consider the evolution of technology adoption as a stochastic process
defined within a [diffusion] difference/differential (depending on the paper) equation, al-
lowing for a macroeconomic approach to the study of technology diffusion. Stoneman
(1981) accounts for the ability of decision makers to learn in a Bayesian manner and in-
corporates the corresponding stochastic process to the design of diffusion patterns. Aversi
et al. (1999), Fatas-Villafranca and Saura-Bacaicoa (2004), and Malerba et al. (2007) pro-
vide sophisticated computable versions based on the intuitive history-friendly behavioral
micro-foundations of demand.
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gree of risk aversion, a result already developed by Di Caprio and Santos
Arteaga (2009), and how it is influenced by the reception of signals defined
on the distribution of unobserved characteristics. In doing so, we reach the
same type of conclusion as Jensen (1988), Cho and McCardle (2009), and Ulu
and Smith (2009) regarding the effect that first order stochastic dominance
improvements on expected revenue/utility have on the incentives of decision
makers to adopt a new technology. That is, signaling the development of a
more advanced technology does not necessarily lead to faster adoption. We
illustrate how a positive credible signal on the development of a technology,
or a choice good, leads to stricter continuation criteria in terms of the char-
acteristic threshold value required to be observed in order to accept the more
advanced technology. Applications to knowledge management and decision
support systems follow immediately from the specified framework.
The intuition giving place to the second setting [described in Section 5]
follows from Christensen and Rosenbloon (1995, 238) and relates directly to
their analysis of nested hierarchies and value networks
“The viewpoint that differences in firms’ market positions drive differ-
ences in how they assess the economics of alternative technological invest-
ments is rooted in the notion that products are systems comprised of compo-
nents which relate to each other in a designed architecture [...] Furthermore,
the end-product may also be viewed as a component within a system-of-use,
relating to other components within an architecture defined by the user. In
23
other words, products which at one level can be viewed as complex archi-
tected systems act as components in systems at a higher level.”
In particular, when evaluating the product attributes considered to be
central for the network the list of characteristics reduces to two or three per
product, see Christensen and Rosenbloon (1995, 239). Specifically, Chris-
tensen and Rosenbloon (1995, 240) state that associated with each network
is a unique rank-ordering of the importance of various performance attributes,
whose rank-ordering differs from that employed in other value networks. In
this sense, our decision makers will [subjectively] account for the expected
relative performance of their most preferred attributes when determining
their information gathering incentives.
The third and final decision theoretical setting [described in Section 6]
relates to the classical representation of technological competition described
by Foster (1986) and restated by Adner and Snow (2010), which focuses on
the ability of old technology incumbents to recognize plausible threats and
manage the adoption of the new technology on time.12 We will therefore be
considering our decision theoretical structure from a supply side perspective,
since, after all, it is firm’s managers who decide whether or not to introduce
(adopt) a technologically superior product in (from) the market. We will also
indirectly account for the remarks made by Geroski (2000) when referring to
12Antonelli (1993) illustrates the pervasive effects derived from being locked-in into a
large base of the [old] inferior technology so that high costs from switching to the [new]
superior one are faced.
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the creation of a new market and the fuzziness involved in the demand of
decision makers for the corresponding innovation due to their little practical
knowledge or experience of the innovation itself.
The assumed generality of the decision theoretical model presented al-
lows for our decision makers to be interpreted as either firm managers or
consumers, depending on the degree of sophistication imposed on them. For
example, as emphasized by Adner and Snow (2010), the innovation literature
has long recognized that technology presents incumbent firms with a set of
challenges triggered by technology induced discontinuities. The effectiveness
of the incumbent reactions to technological discontinuous threats depends on
a host of factors that contribute to the long term viability of firms, ranging
from the perception of threats and the subtlety of the change to the impact
on the competences and dominant customers of the firm, see Adner and Snow
(2010) for a review of the literature on this topic.
On the other hand, Tripsas (2001) argues that the timing of transition
between different technology generations is determined as much by the evolu-
tion of the demand-side user preferences, in particular, preference discontinu-
ities, as by the evolution of technology, and provides empirical evidence from
the typesetter industry to illustrate her point.13 This evidence constitutes
a direct criticism of the technology life cycle literature, where it is implic-
itly assumed that preferences evolve with technology but do not shape it,
13Tripsas (2001) relies on either new preferences or discontinuities in the current pref-
erences of consumers to account for he adoption of a new technology within an industry.
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as they remain constant while technological progress evolves within a given
trajectory.
We will show in Section 7 that discontinuous technology demand patterns
do not necessarily emerge from preference discontinuities. Indeed, perfectly
rational and continuous preferences may give place to discontinuous behav-
ioral patterns in the information gathering [and choice] process[es] of decision
makers.
Our basic initial approach to the information gathering process of decision
makers imposes habits and consumption inertia implicitly, leading decision
makers to expect a minimum quality level or certainty equivalent good to
be guaranteed from a random purchase. However, a more complex decision
theoretical structure results if habits and consumption inertia are excluded
from the information gathering process of decision makers and it is assumed
that decision makers do not purchase a good unless its observed character-
istics deliver a higher expected utility than those of the reference certainty
equivalent good.
The intuition for the latter approach follows from the previously cited
work of Christensen and Rosenbloon (1995) on nested hierarchies and value
networks. These authors consider products as systems comprised of compo-
nents which relate to each other in a designed architecture. Specifically, as
emphasized before, Christensen and Rosenbloon (1995) state that associated
with each network is a unique rank-ordering of the importance of various per-
formance attributes that differs from those orderings employed in other value
26
networks. However, despite the complex structure of the value networks de-
fined by these authors, when evaluating the product attributes considered
as central to the network the list reduces to two or three characteristics per
product.
In this regard, it could be assumed that the ability of a firm to credibly
guarantee decision makers a given [quality level] certainty equivalent good
depends on its position within a given network architecture or hierarchic sys-
tem.14 Therefore, a well established incumbent should have a clear advantage
over an unknown newcomer when guaranteeing a certainty equivalent good to
potential consumers. We will indeed illustrate in Section 7 how being unable
to guarantee a minimum certainty equivalent good decreases significantly the
ability of firms to introduce their products in a given market. This will be
the case even if they signal the existence of technologically superior products
and despite the credibility of the signal issued. These results help empha-
sizing the importance that consumer education, habits and inertia have in
smoothing the behavior of decision makers when considering the acquisition
14This assumption is similar to the money back guaranteed one generally imposed in
the industrial organization literature, see Nizovtsev and Novshek (2004) for a review of
the literature on this topic. Nizovtsev and Novshek (2004) also illustrate how money back
guarantees may constitute an optimal experimentation strategy among firms in markets
for experience goods with repeated purchases. In this regard, the results obtained in the
current thesis could be easily extended to complement those of Nizovtsev and Novshek
(2004), since the second unobserved characteristic defining the information gathering al-
gorithm behaves as an experience component of the good under consideration.
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of products within different technologically developed markets.
1.3 Technological transition
Sections 9 and 10 present a basic formal model of decision making and choice
under risk where the transition process between goods with different levels
of technological sophistication takes place absent improvements in the old
technology, consumption inertia and any other possible market friction, as
those integrated by De Lisoa and Filatrellab (2011) in their memory effect
variable.15
We will illustrate how, even without market frictions, the initial rejection
probability assigned by rational well informed decision makers to a newly
introduced technologically superior set of goods increases. As a result, the
worst available version of a new technologically superior product will be used
to generate the corresponding signal-induced monopolistic market, since any
improved version would lead to lower expected revenues for the signaling
firm. This will be the case despite the fact that an improved distribution of
variants of one of the main characteristics composing the goods is generated
and credibly signaled by firms. In this sense, the basic transition model
merges the main ideas from the economic literature on signaling and rational
15Similar frictions were considered by Geroski (2000) when referring to the creation of
a new market and the fuzziness involved in the demand of agents for the innovation, due
to their little practical knowledge or experience of the innovation being introduced.
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herds, see Chamley (2004), with the behavioral approach to technological
demand developed by Malerba et al. (2007).16
As stated in the previous subsection, our empirical counterpart would be
given by Brown and Greenstein (2000), who, using the demand for speed
and memory (two main characteristics) of mainframe computers during the
second half of the eighties, identified econometrically the set of lead users that
generated the technological niche markets for the new computer products.
Indeed, the motivation for their paper followed from the fact that despite
the decline in quality adjusted price during the period of analysis, consumers
did not make the corresponding shift from small computer systems to larger
ones.17
Furthermore, while the existing delays in innovation acquisition and dif-
fusion have been widely documented by the economic literature, Geroski
(2000), and formally analyzed by the operations research one, the strate-
16It should be noted that the importance of knowledge and learning as crucial economic
forces when dealing with innovation and economic transformation processes was already
emphasized by Lundvall and Johnson in 1994. However, these forces have been mainly
analyzed from the supply side of the economy, where their vital role for technological
development and economic growth has been repeatedly stated, see Lundvall and Borra´s
(1997) and Lundvall (2004). See also Lundvall (1988) for an exception to this trend,
where user-producer interactions are accounted for as a main determinant of innovation
processes.
17Besides, adding to the similarity with our technological transition environment, their
product space was assumed continuous due to the large number (variety) of memory and
speed characteristics that could be chosen by consumers.
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gic incentives of firms to introduce technologically superior products remain
oblivious to the decision patterns defining the demand side of the (market)
system, see Beath et al. (1995). The technological transition sections intro-
duce a strategic general equilibrium approach to the process of technologi-
cal diffusion. It will be shown how the stricter signal-induced continuation
criteria that delay the adoption of technologically superior goods (by the
demand side) would also constraint their introduction (by the supply side)
unless sufficiently high monopolistic rents are guaranteed to the signaling
firm. However, even if this were the case, technological improvements would
not necessarily lead to higher expected revenues for the firms introducing
them.
These sections provide the starting point and basic intuition required for
the development of the general equilibrium structure studied through the
remaining of the thesis.
1.4 On technological supply: the basics
Given the demand determinants described in the previous subsections, firms
will have to decide strategically whether or not to signal the introduction of
a technologically superior good. As a result, the optimal and rational choices
made by decision makers will be determined by their degree of risk aversion,
their receptiveness and assimilation of signals, their ability to shift choices
between markets and the signaling decisions made by firms.
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The supply side of the economy will be modeled through a three time
periods duopoly where two types of signaling equilibria, based on the as-
sumed information transmission structure, will be considered. A standard
Nash equilibrium scenario will be used to force firms to commit to their ini-
tial period signaling strategy while a subgame perfect equilibrium will allow
them to retrieve interim observations regarding the signaling strategies of
their rivals and act accordingly. The latter type of equilibrium is defined to
allow for habits and consumption inertia in the information gathering pro-
cess of decision makers and to illustrate how the coordinated creation of niche
markets, where newly introduced technologically superior products may ini-
tially survive, takes place.18 In other words, we will identify the conditions
required for technological niche markets to emerge and relate them to the
type of equilibrium and the properties of demand under consideration.
In Section 11, we formalize the intuitive argument presented by Malerba
et al. (2003, 2007), who state that the successful introduction of a radically
18Rahman and Loulou (2001) consider both types of equilibria in an intuitively related
environment, where they model a firm’s technology adoption decisions in a duopoly. These
authors justify the Nash pre-commitment equilibrium as relevant for technologies that
take a long time to acquire and install, while subgame perfection would be relevant when
technologies can be acquired and installed quickly and the rival’s decisions are observable
right after they are made. We allow for habits and consumption inertia in order to account
for the fact that the existence of a technologically superior set of goods does not imply an
immediate transition to the market defined by the newly introduced technology, see, for
example, Geroski (2000) and the literature cited within it.
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new technology in an industry, with a dominant design and a small collection
of dominant firms that have emerged using the older technology, may be
dependent on the presence of a group of experimental customers, on diverse
preferences and needs among potential users, or on them both.19 However,
while Malerba et al. (2003, 2007) simulate a behavioral evolutionary general
equilibrium model of the firm, we follow a game theoretical approach based
on the rational choices made by decision makers when gathering information
on the sets of goods offered by firms.20
It should be noted that we are aware of the reliance placed on the pa-
pers of Malerba (2007) and Malerba et al. (2003, 2007). This has been
done due to the fact that, as already stated in the introductory section,
the demand approach to technology adoption is usually undertaken from an
operational research perspective, which concentrates more on the optimal
stopping properties of the corresponding decision algorithms than on the re-
sulting consequences for economic equilibria, a particularly relevant approach
19Indeed, if all decision makers are myopic, and in accordance with the conclusions
reached by Malerba et al. (2003, 2007), new firms signaling the existence of a techno-
logically superior product would be unable to stay around long enough so as to become
viable.
20Malerba et al. (2003, 2007) justify their reluctance to follow a game theoretical ap-
proach due to the various types of limitations that these models impose formally, ranging
from cognitive biases to organizational factors. We aim at illustrating that a rational
[decision theoretical] demand environment coupled with a game theoretical supply setting
may indeed lead to their same conclusions.
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when studying this phenomenon from a strategic point of view. The oper-
ational research and management theoretical literature on the demand for
new technology can be classified as game theoretic, a research line started
by Reinganum (1981), or decision theoretic, following Jensen (1982). Both
approaches were initially developed within the economic literature but taken
over by the management/operational research one, leading to two separate
and clearly differentiated streams of research. Decision theoretical models
defining demand are based on stopping criteria determining the introduc-
tion or dismissal of a new technology, refer to the seminal papers of Jensen
(1982) and McCardle (1985). On the other hand, game theoretical mod-
els are mainly concerned with the diffusion of technology, see Beath et al.
(1995). Hence, the lack of interaction, at a formal level, between the strate-
gic diffusion of technology by firms and its demand creation by consumers
is a problem that the general equilibrium approach so commonly used in
economics should help solving.
We illustrate how, in accordance with the results of Ireland and Stone-
man (1986), perfect foresight [regarding expected rapid technological change]
causes a slow-down in the adoption of the currently available [unsignaled]
technology relative to myopia. That is, the introduction of a technologically
superior set of goods may not lead to its immediate acquisition by consumers.
This will be the case despite the fact that, when purchasing a good, if any,
the basic reference characteristics considered by decision makers will be as-
sumed to be given by the certainty equivalent values delivered by the set of
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goods defined within the current unsignaled market. This assumption keeps
the section in line with the intuition behind the quality ladder literature,
where technological improvements are defined with respect to the currently
available version of the good.
Given the properties defining the demand side of the market and the
type of decision makers composing it, we present a game theoretical analysis
of a duopoly facing the strategic decision of whether or not to signal the
existence of a technologically superior good. The set of equilibria obtained
are used to determine the dynamic behavior of the industry. In particular, the
model highlights the importance that stable monopolistic technological rents
and perfect foresight decision makers have for the generation of technological
niche markets where firms signaling the existence of a technologically superior
good may survive.
Section 12 shows how, given the set of natural constraints and assump-
tions introduced to define the behavior of both decision makers and firms,
the generation of technological niche markets may also depend on the abil-
ity of decision makers to reverse their information gathering processes and
compare the goods observed in both markets before making a choice. In
particular, decision reversibility is necessary, but not sufficient, for the emer-
gence of technological niche markets. The credibility of the signals observed
and the subsequent Bayesian updates of the information gathering processes
prevent us from requiring the existence of consumers with large preferences
for experimentation, as Malerba et al. (2003, 2007) do, for the creation of
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niche markets to take place.
Finally, it is known that the Arrow effect provides a theoretical justifi-
cation for the dynamic behavior of industries where incumbent firms have a
lower pecuniary incentive than newcomers to develop and introduce techno-
logical improvements over the currently existing set of products. However,
the Arrow effect is unsuited to explain recent empirical phenomena such as
vintage effects, see , or the retreat strategy of firms described by Adner and
Snow (2010). We illustrate how the decision of not signaling the existence
of a technologically superior set of goods may arise as an optimal subgame
perfect equilibrium within the demand based environment defined in the sec-
tion. That is, we obtain subgame perfect equilibria where the introduction
of technologically superior products and subsequent generation of niche mar-
kets, i.e. climbing the technological quality ladder, is suboptimal for the
signaling firm.
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Chapter 2
Demand
2.1 Basic notations and main assumptions
Given the range of influences and applications defined in the previous in-
troductory section, the thesis may be considered under the scope of any of
the described research lines. However, we will bias our notation towards
the consumer choice and economic sides and express the search algorithm
in utility terms. This notational choice is made to differentiate our model
from the value functional forms required by the dynamic programming and
operations research literature. Due to formal reasons that will become ev-
ident below, the current demand model cannot be defined in the standard
dynamic programming terms commonly considered within this branch of the
literature.
That is, the demand algorithm described through the thesis must be
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redefined after each observation is gathered by the decision maker and re-
calculated in terms of all previously observed variables, their sets of possible
combinations and corresponding expected payoffs, which prevents the use of
standard dynamic programming techniques applied by the operations re-
search literature. This requisite is justified by the low dimensionality of the
model and the memory capacity with which decision makers are endowed
when comparing goods in basic information evaluation scenarios. While such
an assumption may become prohibitive in larger dimensional settings, it is
imposed here to account for the satisficing capacity constraints defined by
Simon (1997) within a fully rational environment.
Let X be a nonempty set and % a preference relation defined on X.
A utility function representing a preference relation % on X is a function
u : X → R such that:
∀x, y ∈ X, x % y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y).
The symbol ≥ denotes the standard partial order on the reals. When X ⊆ R
and % coincides with ≥, we say that u is a utility function on X.
Let G denote the set of all goods and fix n ∈ N. For every i ≤ n, let
Xi represent the set of all possible variants for the i-th characteristic of any
good in G and X stand for the Cartesian product ∏i≤nXi. Thus, every
good in G is described by an n-tuple 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 in X. Xi is called the i-th
characteristic factor space, while X stands for the characteristic space.
Following the classical approach to information demand by economic
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agents, see Wilde (1980), we restrict our attention to the case where each Xi
is identified with a compact and connected non-degenerate real subinterval
of [0,+∞). The topology and the preference relation on each Xi are those
induced by the standard Euclidean topology and the standard linear order
>, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we work under the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. For every i ≤ n, there exist xmi , xMi > 0, with xmi 6= xMi ,
such that Xi = [x
m
i , x
M
i ], where x
m
i and x
M
i are the minimum and maximum
of Xi.
Assumption 2. The characteristic space X is endowed with the product
topology τp and a strict preference relation .
Assumption 3. There exist a continuous additive utility function u
representing  on X such that each one of its components ui : Xi → R,
where i ≤ n, is a continuous utility function on Xi.1
Assumption 4. For every i ≤ n, µi : Xi → [0, 1] is a continuous
probability density on Xi, whose support, the set {xi ∈ Xi : µi(xi) 6= 0}, will
be denoted by supp(µi).
2
1Let % be a preference relation on
∏
i≤nXi. A utility function u :
∏
i≤nXi → R
representing % on
∏
i≤nXi is called additive (Wakker, 1989) if there exist ui : Xi → R,
where i ≤ n, such that ∀〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈
∏
i≤nXi, u(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) = u1(x1) + · · ·+un(xn).
2The results introduced through the thesis are derived for continuous µ1 and µ2 prob-
ability densities. The remaining cases, quite similar to the continuous one, are left to the
reader.
38
The probability densities µ1, . . . , µn must be interpreted as the subjective
“beliefs” of the decision maker. For i ≤ n, µi(Yi) is the subjective probability
that a randomly observed good from G displays an element xi ∈ Yi ⊆ Xi as
its i-th characteristic.3
Following the standard economic theory of choice under uncertainty, we
assume that the decision maker elicits the i-th certainty equivalent value
induced by the subjective probability density µi and the utility function ui
as the reference point against which to compare the information collected on
the i-th characteristic of a certain good.
Given i ≤ n, the certainty equivalent of µi and ui, denoted by cei, is a
characteristic in Xi that the decision maker is indifferent to accept in place of
the expected one to be obtained through µi and ui. That is, for every i ≤ n,
cei = u
−1
i (Ei) , where Ei denotes the expected value of ui. The existence
and uniqueness of the i-th certainty equivalent value cei are guaranteed by
the continuity and strict increasingness of ui, respectively.
2.2 Expected search utilities
The set of all goods, G, is identified with a compact and convex subset of the
n-dimensional real space Rn. In the simplest non-trivial scenario, G consists
3The probability densities µ1, . . . , µn are assumed to be independent. However, the
algorithm allows for subjective correlations to be defined among different characteristic
within a given good.
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of at least two goods and the decision maker is allowed to collect two pieces of
information, not necessarily from the same good. That is, once the value of
the first characteristic from one of the goods becomes known to the decision
maker, she has to decide whether to check the second characteristic from
the same good, or to check the first characteristic from a different good.
Henceforth, we denote by J and K the two goods that can be randomly
checked by the decision maker.
We show below that the decision of how to allocate the second available
piece of information depends on two real-valued functions defined on X1. The
decision maker considers the sum E1 + E2, corresponding to the expected
utility values of the pairs 〈u1, µ1〉 and 〈u2, µ2〉, as the main reference value
when calculating both these functions.
Assume that the decision maker has already checked the first characteris-
tic from good J and that she uses her remaining information piece to observe
the second characteristic from J . In this case, the expected utility gain over
E1 + E2 varies with the value x1 observed for the first characteristic. For
every x1 ∈ X1, let
P+(x1) = {x2 ∈ X2 ∩ supp(µ2) : u2(x2) > E1 + E2 − u1(x1)}
and
P−(x1) = {x2 ∈ X2 ∩ supp(µ2) : u2(x2) ≤ E1 + E2 − u1(x1)}.
P+(x1) and P
−(x1) define the set of values for the second x2 characteristic
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from good J such that their combination with the observed first x1 charac-
teristic delivers a respectively higher or lower-equal utility than a randomly
chosen good from G.
Let F : X1 → R be defined by:
F (x1)
def
=
∫
P+(x1)
µ2(x2)(u1(x1) + u2(x2))dx2 +
∫
P−(x1)
µ2(x2)(E1 + E2)dx2
F (x1) describes the decision maker’s expected utility derived from check-
ing the second characteristic x2 of good J after observing that the value of
the first characteristic is given by x1. Note that, if u2(x2)+u1(x1) ≤ E1+E2,
then choosing a good from G randomly delivers an expected utility of E1+E2
to the decision maker, which is higher than the expected utility obtained from
choosing good J , that is, u2(x2) + u1(x1).
Note, however, that despite the formal postulates of expected utility the-
ory, rational decision makers are not obliged to choose randomly from the
set of available goods. That is, despite their expectations, decision makers
are aware of the fact that the certainty equivalent good is not guaranteed as
the result of a random choice. Indeed, it seems plausible to assume that if
the information gathering (search) process does not provide decision makers
with a good whose expected utility is higher than E1 +E2, then they refrain
from making a random purchase from the set of available goods. If this were
the case, the expected search utilities defined above should be modified to
account for the respective changes in the expected utilities derived from the
corresponding search processes.
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In order to simplify the presentation we will refer to the case defined
above as the guaranteed certainty equivalent scenario (g.c.e.s.), where deci-
sion makers decide to choose randomly within the set of available goods if
the search process does not deliver a good whose expected utility is higher
than the one provided by the certainty equivalent good. However, decision
makers may also refrain from making a random purchase, a case which will
be referred to as the refused certainty equivalent scenario (r.c.e.s.).
The F (x1) function defined by decision makers within the r.c.e.s. simpli-
fies to
F (x1|rf) def=
∫
P+(x1)
µ2(x2)(u1(x1) + u2(x2))dx2,
where the P+(x1) set is identical to the one defined within the g.c.e.s. Indeed,
F (x1|rf) is simply F (x1) without the second right hand side expression.
Consider now the expected utility that the decision maker could gain over
E1 + E2 if the second available piece of information is employed to observe
the first characteristic from good K. For every x1 ∈ X1, let
Q+(x1) = {y1 ∈ X1 ∩ supp(µ1) : u1(y1) > max{u1(x1), E1}}
and
Q−(x1) = {y1 ∈ X1 ∩ supp(µ1) : u1(y1) ≤ max{u1(x1), E1}}.
Q+(x1) and Q
−(x1) define the set of values for the first y1 characteristic
from goodK such that they deliver a respectively higher or lower-equal utility
42
than the maximum between the observed first x1 characteristic from good J
and a randomly chosen good from G.
Define H : X1 → R as follows:
H(x1)
def
=
∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)(u1(y1)+E2)dy1+
∫
Q−(x1)
µ1(y1)(max{u1(x1), E1}+E2)dy1.
H(x1) describes the expected utility obtained from checking the first char-
acteristic y1 of good K after having already observed the value of the first
characteristic x1 from good J . If u1(y1) ≤ max{u1(x1), E1}, then the de-
cision maker must choose between J and a randomly chosen good from G,
delivering an expected utility of E1.
The corresponding H : X1 → R function defined by decision makers
within the r.c.e.s. is given by
H(x1|rf) def=
∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)(u1(y1)+E2)dy1+
∫
Q−(x1|rf)
µ1(y1)(u1(x1)+E2)dy1,
with
Q+(x1) = {y1 ∈ X1 ∩ supp(µ1) : u1(y1) > max{u1(x1), E1}}
and
Q−(x1|rf) = {y1 ∈ X1 ∩ supp(µ1) : u1(y1) ≤ max{u1(x1), E1} ∧ x1 ≥ ce1}.
The second right hand side term of H(x1|rf) together with Q−(x1|rf)
illustrate the main differences with respect to the g.c.e.s. Decision makers
will only purchase a good and account for the corresponding expected utility
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if x1 ≥ ce1. That is, the expected utility derived from X1 realizations below
the certainty equivalent value equals zero.
Finally, note that the domain of all the F and H functions is the support
of µ1.
Pointwise comparisons between the functions cannot be undertaken an-
alytically due to the variety of possible domains and functional forms that
may define their behavior. However, for a given set of probability densities
and utilities, changes in the curvature of the F (x1) and H(x1) functions (de-
gree of risk aversion) and their effect on the optimal information gathering
behavior of decision makers can be analyzed numerically, see Di Caprio and
Santos Arteaga (2009). In the current thesis, we will also illustrate numeri-
cally how changes in the degree of risk aversion of decision makers affect their
optimal information gathering behavior within a r.c.e.s. It should be already
emphasized that the resulting F (x1|rf) and H(x1|rf) functions describe a
more complex choice environment than F (x1) and H(x1), due mainly to the
discontinuities generated by H(x1|rf).
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Chapter 3
The functions H(x1) and F (x1)
The function H(x1) is always constant on the interval [x
m
1 , ce1] and its
value is always above the sum of the expected values of u1 and u2. That is,
for every x1 ≤ ce1,
H(x1) =
∫ xM1
ce1
µ1(y1)u1(y1)dy1 + E1
∫ ce1
xm1
µ1(y1)dy1 + E2 > E1 + E2.
The first and second derivative functions of H(x1) are given by
d
dx1
H(x1) =
 0 if x1 ≤ ce1,d
dx1
u1(x1)µ1([x
m
1 , x1]) if x1 > ce1.
d2
dx21
H(x1) =
 0 if x1 ≤ ce1,= d2
dx21
u1(x1)µ1([x
m
1 , x1]) + µ1(x1)
d
dx1
u1(x1) if x1 > ce1.
where µ1([x
m
1 , x1]) stands for the cumulative probability of the set [x
m
1 , x1],
while µ1(x1) is the value of µ1 at the point x1.
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Since u1 is strictly increasing,
d
dx1
u1(x1)µ1([x
m
1 , x1]) is positive provided
that x1 > ce1, which, at the same time, implies that H(x1) is strictly increas-
ing on the interval (ce1, x
M
1 ]. However, the concavity/convexity of H(x1) on
this interval cannot be determined analytically since it depends on the par-
ticular utility and probability functions defining the corresponding expected
search utility.
The function F (x1) is constant and equal to E1 + E2 on the interval
[xm1 ,min{x1 ∈ X1 : P+(x1) 6= ∅}) if P+(xm1 ) = ∅. If P+(xm1 ) 6= ∅, then, for
every x1 ∈ X1
d
dx1
F (x1) =
(
d
dx1
u1(x1)
)∫
P+(x1)
µ2(x2)dx2,
d2
dx21
F (x1) =
(
d2
dx21
u1(x1)
)∫
P+(x1)
µ2(x2)dx2+u
′
1(x1)
(
d
dx1
∫
P+(x1)
µ2(x2)dx2
)
.
Therefore, F (x1) is strictly increasing on X1, if P
+(xm1 ) 6= ∅. However,
as was the case with the function H(x1), the concavity/convexity of F (x1)
depends on the particular utility and probability functions that define it.
Consider the behavior of H(x1) and F (x1) at x
m
1
H(xm1 )
def
=
∫ xM1
ce1
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) +E2)dy1 +
∫ ce1
xm1
µ1(y1)(E1 +E2)dy1 > E1 +E2.
F (xm1 )
def
=
∫
P+(xm1 )
µ2(x2)(u1(x
m
1 ) + u2(x2))dx2 +
∫
P−(xm1 )
µ2(x2)(E1 + E2)dx2
It is easy to show that F (xm1 ) ≥ E1 + E2, with F (xm1 ) = E1 + E2 when
P+(xm1 ) = ∅. Thus, F (xm1 ) < H(xm1 ) when P+(xm1 ) = ∅.
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3.1 Existence of optimal thresholds
Clearly, the expected utility functions F and H guide the decision maker’s
optimal information gathering process. Assume that the information search
on good J has produced x1 as first result. Then, the decision maker will
choose to continue checking good J or switching to good K according to
which function, either F or H, takes the highest value at x1. It may also
happen that she is indifferent between continuing with J and switching to K.
It is reasonable to think of these indifference values as optimal information
gathering thresholds.1 Thus, X1 turns out to be partitioned in subintervals
whose values induce the decision maker either to continue checking the initial
good J or to switch and start checking K.
Di Caprio and Santos Arteaga (2009) illustrate how the existence of op-
timal threshold values, or reversing points, in the decision maker’s informa-
tion gathering process can be guaranteed under common non-pathological
assumptions within the g.c.e.s. For example, it can be easily shown that
H(xM1 ) ≤ F (xM1 ), with H(xM1 ) = F (xM1 ) if and only if u1(xM1 ) + u2(xm2 ) ≥
E1 + E2. Therefore, u1(x
M
1 ) + u2(x
m
2 ) < E1 + E2 suffices to guarantee the
existence of at least one threshold value whenever P+(xm1 ) = ∅.
On the other hand, the u1(x
M
1 ) + u2(x
m
2 ) < E1 + E2 condition does not
suffice to guarantee the existence of an optimal threshold value within the
1It should be noted that our definition of information gathering threshold values does
not include the xm1 and x
M
1 domain limit points since no switch in the information gathering
behavior of decision makers can be guaranteed at these points.
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r.c.e.s. If this condition is imposed, we would obtain F (xM1 |rf) < H(xM1 |rf).
It is easy to show that F (xm1 |rf) < H(xm1 |rf) whenever P+(xm1 ) = ∅. How-
ever, H(xM1 |rf) = F (xM1 |rf) if and only if u1(xM1 ) + u2(xm2 ) ≥ E1 + E2.
Thus, we have that F (xM1 |rf) ≤ H(xM1 |rf). As a result, the existence of
a threshold value within the r.c.e.s can only be guaranteed if we assume
u1(x
M
1 ) + u2(x
m
2 ) < E1 + E2 and impose F (x
m
1 |rf) > H(xm1 |rf).
The numerical simulations will help shedding some light on the main
differences between the information gathering thresholds generated by both
scenarios.
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Chapter 4
Signals and learning
We proceed now to analyze the effect that positive signals regarding the
distribution of characteristics on X2 and the resulting learning process have
on the optimal information gathering behavior of rational decision makers.
Signals are introduced on the second characteristic space in order to intu-
itively separate the role played by actual observations from that played by
expectations.1 Consider, as the basic reference case and without loss of gen-
erality, the optimal information gathering behavior of the decision maker
1This assumption brings the model closer to the basic theoretical foundations of herd-
prone environments. Decision makers will be able to compare realizations, but their be-
havior depends also on an unobservable variable on which credible signals are received. In
this regard, the credibility or strength of the signal could be assumed to depend on the
reputation or any other characteristic defining the information sender, which would allow
for a strategic approach to the information transmission process and the resulting choice
environment.
49
when uniform probabilities are assumed on both X1 and X2.
2
We will assume that receiving a credible positive signal, θ, regarding
the distribution of characteristics on X2 implies that the probability mass
accumulated on the upper half of the distribution doubles, while that on the
lower half halves. Thus, given the distribution of X2 characteristics defined
by µ2(x2) =
1
β−α for x2 ∈ [α, β], with α, β ≥ 0 and α < β, the corresponding
conditional density function is given by
pi(θ|x2) =

3
2(β−α) if x2 ∈ (α+β2 , β]
1
2(β−α) if x2 ∈ [α, α+β2 ]
After receiving a positive signal, rational decision makers update their
initial beliefs, given by µ2(x2), following Bayes’ rule. Therefore, if a signal is
2Even though we will only analyze the effect that the first-order stochastic dominance
resulting from the signal has for the uniform density case defined in the thesis, the analysis
could be generalized to any other density function, see Chapter 6 in Mas-Colell et al.
(1995). A formal analysis of the effect that observing a positive signal has on the optimal
information gathering behavior of rational decision makers can be found in the appendix
to the current demand section.
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received, i.e. θ = 1, the updated beliefs of decision makers will be given by3
µ2(x2|θ = 1) = pi(θ|x2)µ2(x2)∫
X2
pi(θ|x2)µ2(x2)dx2
The corresponding [Bayesian] updated F (x1) and H(x1) functions defined
by decision makers after receiving a credible signal within the g.c.e.s. are
given by
F (x1|θ = 1) def=
∫
P+(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2|θ = 1)(u1(x1) + u2(x2))dx2+
∫
P−(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2|θ = 1)(E1 + E2|θ=1)dx2
and
H(x1|θ = 1) def=
∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E2|θ=1)dy1+∫
Q−(x1)
µ1(y1)(max{u1(x1), E1}+ E2|θ=1)dy1
with
P+(x1|θ = 1) = {x2 ∈ X2 ∩ supp(µ2) : u2(x2) > E1 + E2|θ=1 − u1(x1)},
P−(x1|θ = 1) = {x2 ∈ X2 ∩ supp(µ2) : u2(x2) ≤ E1 + E2|θ=1 − u1(x1)}
3This process can be assumed to continue as rational decision makers keep on updating
their beliefs using Bayes’ rule after receiving further signals. For example, a second signal,
providing decision makers with the same qualitative information, i.e. θ = 2, would lead to
a second Bayesian updating process and the following distribution of beliefs on X2
µ2(x2|θ = 2) = pi(θ|x2)µ2(x2|θ = 1)∫
X2
pi(θ|x2)µ2(x2|θ = 1)dx2 .
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and the same Q+(x1) and Q
−(x1) sets as those defined in the unsignaled
case, since X1 and µ1(X1) remain unaffected by the signal received.
It can be easily shown analytically that if µ2(x2|θ = 1) first-order stochas-
tically dominates µ2(x2), then both F (x1|θ = 1) ≥ F (x1) and H(x1|θ =
1) ≥ H(x1). Note that, if µ2(x2|θ = 1) first-order stochastically dominates
µ2(x2), then, by definition, E(2|θ=1) ≥ E2. This is the effect that the updated
µ2(x2|θ = 1) density generated by the signal has on the F (x1) and H(x1)
functions through the new induced value E(2|θ=1). It trivially follows that
dH(x1)
dE2
= 1 > 0.
Therefore, the direct dependence of H(x1) on E2 leads to an upward shift
of the function if the value of E2 increases after the signal is received.
Regarding the F (x1) case, the increase inE(2|θ=1) results in the set P+(x1|θ =
1) shrinking with respect to P+(x1), while µ2(x2|θ = 1) ≥ µ2(x2) over the
newly defined P+(x1|θ = 1) interval. Applying Leibnitz’s rule to dF (x1)dE2 while
keeping µ2(x2) fixed would allow us to isolate the effect that changes in the
E2 value have on the F (x1) function. It follows that
dF (x1)
dE2
∣∣∣∣
µ2(x2)
=
∫ u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))
xm2
µ2(x2)dx2 > 0,∀x1 ∈ X1, iff P−(xM1 ) 6= ∅.
Thus, coupling a signal-based increment in E2 with a first-order stochastic
dominance spread on µ2(x2) would lead to an increase of the F (x1) function
∀x1 ∈ X1. Note that, if either E(2|θ=1) ≥ E2 or P−(xM1 ) = ∅, or both, the first
order stochastic dominance on µ2(x2) guarantees that F (x1|θ = 1) ≥ F (x1)
for all x1 values in X1.
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The [Bayesian] updated F (x1|rf) and H(x1|rf) functions defined by de-
cision makers after receiving a credible signal within the r.c.e.s. follow di-
rectly from F (x1|θ = 1) and H(x1|θ = 1) in the exact same way F (x1|rf)
and H(x1|rf) followed from F (x1) and H(x1). However, the effect that the
updated µ2(x2|θ = 1) density has on the F (x1|rf) and H(x1|rf) functions
differs significantly from that of the g.c.e.s. Once again, it is trivial to show
that
dH(x1|rf)
dE2
=
∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)dy1 +
∫
Q−(x1|rf)
µ1(y1)dy1 ∈ (0, 1).
However, the effect that the signal has on F (x1|rf) is slightly more cum-
bersome. Once again, applying Leibnitz’s rule to the definition of F (x1|rf)
while keeping µ2(x2) fixed allows us to isolate the effect that changes in the
E2 value have on the F (x1|rf) function
dF (x1|rf)
dE2
∣∣∣∣
µ2(x2)
=
−[µ2(u−12 (E1 + E2 − u1(x1)))(E1 + E2)]
d
dE2
[u−12 (E1 + E2 − u1(x1))] < 0.
Note that the initial shock induced by the signal on F (x1|rf) is negative.
That is, an increase in the value of E2 has a negative effect on the incentives
of decision makers to gather the next piece of information from the good
whose first characteristic has been observed. The intuition for this result is
straightforward. Requiring relatively higher X2 realizations to compensate
for the higher value of E(2|θ=1) constitutes a serious drawback when the cer-
tainty equivalent good is not guaranteed. This is the case despite the first
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order stochastic dominance exhibited by the µ2(x2|θ = 1) probability func-
tion. This negative effect will become evident in the corresponding numerical
simulations, where further intuition will be provided.
4.1 Climbing the quality ladder
Decision makers shift from unsignaled to signaled markets in order to try to
improve upon an observed good through their information gathering process.
That is, given the existing technology, to which the decision maker has grown
accustomed to in the unsignaled market, her incentives to shift the informa-
tion gathering process to the signaled market depend on whether or not the
technological development introduced allows her to improve upon the exist-
ing product characteristics. In this regard, Eng and Quaia (2009) present
a review of the literature illustrating how continuous customer learning and
education are essential as firms need to communicate the benefits of a new
product or technology to customers and reduce their perceived risks and un-
certainties of an innovations. More precisely, when modeling sophisticated
customers within the computer industrial structure, Malerba et al. (2003:
8) refer to them as those customers who “won’t buy a new model computer
unless it is as good as or better than the old model ones”.
As a result, three different types of decision processes will be analyzed
when defining the transition between markets. Each process leads to its
own H : X1 → R functional form based on the improvement upon the
observed characteristics that may be attained when decision makers shift
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their information gathering processes between markets.
4.1.1 Decision irreversibility
In this case, if the decision maker shifts her information gathering process
to the signaled market, she will have to forego any information obtained
in the unsignaled one. Hence, a shift to the signaled market constitutes an
irreversible decision, and her final choice, if any, must be made within the set
of goods available in the signaled market. The corresponding H(x1) function
is given by the expected value derived from observing one characteristic in
the signaled market, endowed with a higher E2 than the unsignaled one,
H(x1|nr) def=
∫ xM1
E1
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E2|θ=1)dy1 +
∫ E1
xm1
µ1(y1)(E1 + E2|θ=1)dy1.
Note that the integration intervals differ with respect to the H(x1) case
defined previously for the unsignaled market. That is, the decision maker
aims at observing a characteristic above E1 in the signaled market or choosing
randomly within it otherwise, and is unable to guarantee a given x1 value
due to the irreversibility assumption and the unique observation she has left.
If signals are not technologically neutral, then ∂H(x1)
∂E2
> 0, implying that
H(x1|nr) > H(x1), ∀x1 ≤ ce1. However, as the numerical simulations will
show, this effect does not suffice to generate a shift to the signaled market
for all x1 values in X1. The utility loss caused by the irreversibility effect
dominates the transition incentives triggered by a higher E2 value for large
x1 realizations.
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4.1.2 Guaranteed improvement
The second scenario combines the previous decision irreversibility framework
with an explicit guarantee, issued by the signaler, of providing a good whose
first characteristic is at least as high as that observed in the unsignaled
market, i.e. x1|θ=1 ≥ x1, if the decision maker shifts her information gathering
process to the signaled one. If the decision maker is aware of and trusts such
an announcement, then the corresponding H(x1) would be given by
H(x1|fg) def=
∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E2|θ=1)dy1+
∫
Q−(x1)
µ1(y1)(max{u1(x1), E1}+ E2|θ=1)dy1.
Clearly, this function constitutes an expected utility improvement upon
the H(x1) defined in the unsignaled market ∀x1 ∈ X1 due to the E2|θ=1 > E2
effect. Other than that, its structure and interpretation are identical to those
of the H(x1) defined for the unsignaled market.
4.1.3 Reversibility
The third scenario assumes that the transition of the information gathering
process between markets is reversible. That is, after gathering an observation
from the unsignaled market the decision maker may shift her information
gathering process to the signaled one and, if the observation attained in this
market is not sufficiently good, return to the unsignaled market, where the
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observed x1 is guaranteed [though coupled with a lower E2 value].
4 This
assumption leads to the following H(x1) function
H(x1|r) def=
∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E2|θ=1)dy1+
∫
Q−(x1)
µ1(y1) max{(max{u1(x1|θ=1), E1}+E2|θ=1), (max{u1(x1), E1}+E2)}dy1.
Note that the integration intervals are identical to those of H(x1) in the
unsignaled case, since the point of reference defining the Q+(x1) and Q
−(x1)
sets remains the observed x1 value in the unsignaled market.
The first expression on the right hand side of H(x1|r) resembles the one
defined for H(x1) in the unsignaled market. In this case, if the decision maker
observes a first characteristic in the signaled market higher than the x1 from
the unsignaled one, then, since E2|θ=1 > E2, she will shift her information
gathering process to the good observed in the signaled market [and purchase
it].
The second right hand side expression states that the decision maker
prefers [to gather information on] the good whose first characteristic has been
observed in the signaled market as long as its expected utility value remains
above that of the good whose x1 has been observed in the unsignaled one. If
its expected utility falls below, the decision maker will shift her information
4The ability of decision makers to compare the goods observed in the signaled and
unsignaled markets when designing their information gathering algorithms may be inter-
preted as a property partially reflecting the “frustrated memory” characteristic of the
genetic algorithm defined by Aversi et al. (1999).
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gathering process to the unsignaled market. This expression requires some
additional explanations.
Consider the case where the first characteristic observed in the unsignaled
market is below ce1. If this were the case, then the good that the decision
maker expects to observe in the unsignaled market [if she uses her second
piece of information to gather an observation from this market] provides her
with an expected utility given by
H(x1|nru) def=
∫ xM1
ce1
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E2)dy1 +
∫ ce1
xm1
µ1(y1)(E1 + E2)dy1,
which is lower thanH(x1|nr).5 Therefore, if the x1 observed in the unsignaled
market is below ce1, the decision maker has an incentive to shift her infor-
mation gathering process to the signaled one.6
Consider now the case where the first characteristic observed in the unsignaled
market is above ce1. If this were the case, gathering a first observation from
the signaled market, denoted by x1|θ=1, such that
u1(x
∗
1|θ=1) = u1(x1) + E2 − E2|θ=1,
would leave the decision maker indifferent between gathering an additional
piece of information from either the signaled or the unsignaled market. Ob-
serving a x1|θ=1 value (below) above x∗1|θ=1 would shift her gathering process
5Note thatH(x1|nr) defines the expected utility derived from the good that the decision
maker expects to observe in the signaled market [if she uses her second piece of information
to gather an observation from this market].
6In this case, H(x1|r) = H(x1|nr).
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towards the (un)signaled market. Clearly, the higher expected utility derived
from the second signaled characteristic generates an interval defined by the
difference E2|θ=1−E2 such that any u1(x1)−u1(x∗1|θ=1) distance smaller than
this difference would not suffice to compensate for the signal effect and would
lead the decision maker to bias her information gathering process towards
the signaled market.
In summary, if the decision maker observes x1|θ=1 > x1, then she should
continue gathering information in the signaled market. If, on the other hand,
x1|θ=1 < x1, then she should proceed according to the maximum expected
value derived from either remaining in the unsignaled market, with a higher
x1 and a lower E2, or shifting to the signaled one, with a lower x1|θ=1 but a
higher E2|θ=1.
4.2 Numerical simulations: credible signals,
information gathering herds and stricter
continuation criteria
Decision theoretical models, mainly in their economic and operational re-
search variants, generally assume risk neutral decision makers. Even though
the analytical simplifications derived from such an assumption are substan-
tial, the consequences are far from innocuous. Therefore, simulations will be
provided for both risk neutral and risk averse decision makers, while keep-
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ing in mind that a potentially large set of possible scenarios can be studied
numerically following the theoretical setting introduced through the thesis.
The numerical sections of the thesis will present several simulations that
illustrate the behavior of the optimal threshold values as decision makers
receive credible signals indicating the existence of a technologically superior
set of goods while being subject to the information gathering constraints
imposed within each respective subsection. Throughout the simulations, de-
cision makers will be assumed to have a well-defined preference order both
within and among characteristics. That is, the first characteristic will be
assumed to be more important for decision makers and, therefore, lead to
a higher expected utility than the second one.7 Besides, in order to facili-
tate comparisons among the threshold values generated by different numbers
of signals and types of decision makers, the support of all the probability
functions will be kept unchanged through the simulations.
In all two dimensional figures the horizontal axis represents the set of
x1 realizations that may be observed by the decision maker, with the corre-
sponding subjective expected utility values defined on the vertical axis and
the certainty equivalents explicitly identified through a vertical line.
Figure 1 illustrates the one and two signals cases, denoted by 1s and 2s,
7In other words, rational decision makers subject to information acquisition constraints
of any type will be assumed to base their information gathering process on the subjec-
tive importance of the characteristics that can be observed. The intuition justifying this
assumption follows from the consumer choice literature dealing with multi-attribute se-
quential search processes, see Bearden and Connolly (2007).
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respectively, and the evolution of the corresponding threshold values within
a basic risk neutral scenario. Points A, B and C identify the threshold val-
ues defined by decision makers when gathering information on a set of goods
located within the unsignaled, one signal and two signals markets, respec-
tively. Figure 2 illustrates the same environment as Figure 1 but within a risk
averse setting, where the utilities with which decision makers are endowed
have been shifted from basic linear functions to square roots.
Clearly, positive signals generating first order stochastic dominant beliefs
lead to higher expected utility levels for all possible x1 values. However, in
doing so, signals shift the respective optimal threshold values towards higher
x1 realizations.
The intuition arising from these results states that positive signals should
generate immediate herds of consumers towards the subset of goods on which
they are defined, but, at the same time, decision makers, who expect a higher
E2 value to be guaranteed from their information gathering process, become
less search averse within the corresponding subset, i.e. the area where the H
function remains above the F one increases for relatively low x1 realizations.
As a result, decision makers would require relatively higher realizations from
the first characteristic space in order to continue gathering information on
the observed good.
Such an effect can also be observed in the risk averse setting illustrated
in Figure 2. Note, however, the increase in search aversion relative to the
linear risk neutral case, an effect already described by Di Caprio and Santos
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Arteaga (2009). Thus, as risk aversion increases, an increase in the informa-
tion gathering continuation area follows. Other than that, the signal effects
are identical to those observed in the risk neutral case.
The main implicit assumptions defining the current setting, i.e. signal
credibility, and the absence of both search frictions and consumption inertia,
have been imposed to reflect the frictionless environment required for deci-
sion makers to generate an information gathering herd after becoming aware
of the existence of a set of technologically superior products.8 However, the
presence of search frictions and basic consumption inertia implies that the
information gathering transition between markets is not necessarily guaran-
teed, even if signal credibility is maintained. The following section illustrates
this type of theoretical setting.
8We have just seen that, even in this case, the resulting herd does not necessarily lead
to faster adoption within the set of signaled goods.
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Chapter 5
Search and matching frictions
The previous subsection has analyzed numerically the effects that posi-
tive signals and changes in the curvature of the utility function assigned to
the decision maker have on her optimal information gathering behavior. The
resulting search aversion derived from increments in the risk aversion coef-
ficient of decision makers was obtained absent search frictions of any type.
However, the existence of search and matching frictions is known to condition
the optimal search behaviour of decision makers. Even though the effect that
frictions may have on the behavior of H(x1) is intuitively clear, this section
provides the theoretical basis for its posterior simulation.
Consider a decision maker who has just checked the first characteristic of
a given good, x1, and must decide whether to check the second characteristic
from the same good or start searching for a second good on which to gather
information. It will be assumed that the probability that retrieving the next
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observation from a new good pays off, meaning that at least l within m
available goods satisfy the inherent search parameters fixed by the decision
maker, is given by the following cumulative binomial distribution
ψ (m, l, f) =
m∑
j=l
(
m
j
)
f j (1− f)m−j ,
where f represents the probability assigned by the decision maker to the fact
that a good satisfies her subjectively defined requirements.
Even though the search process allows the decision maker to observe the
current [observable, as redundant as it may be] characteristics of a good, other
inherent characteristics remain directly unobservable and will either become
apparent after purchasing the good or must be subjectively forecasted by the
decision maker. The former problem was identified by Nelson in 1970. He
stated that while prices are directly observable, other characteristics defining
the overall quality of goods require consumption. Search processes must
therefore be defined by price and experience components, the latter requiring
the actual consumption of the good to be observed, see Nelson (1970). The
latter problem relates to the existence of network, lock-in and bandwagon
effects in the consumption process of goods, see Geroski (2000) for a review
of the literature. That is, while current goods have a established network of
connections and are largely compatible with other existing products, newly
introduced products may fail to develop such a quality.
Given the large variety of products available to observe and purchase,
the decision maker must add to her search process a matching probability
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accounting for her expectation of what percentage from the newly introduced
goods will indeed satisfy her future network requirements, i.e. f would be
the subjective probability associated by the decision maker to any of the new
goods achieving the status of or becoming as widespread [diffused] as the
currently available ones. Given this probability, the decision maker requires
a minimum percentage of the newly introduced goods expected to develop
[achieve] a sufficiently large network [diffusion] to become available during the
search process.1 These effects are particularly important when considering
the evolution and diffusion of increasingly complex technological products.
A basic recent example would be given by the set of available e-books and
the respective formats they are compatible [and incompatible] with.
Thus, the probability of finding a second good that matches the required
inherent characteristics defined by the decision maker is given by ψ (m, l, f).
The expected payoff obtained from remaining checking the first good is F (x1),
while that of starting gathering information on a second signaled good must
consider the search and matching frictions defined above and is therefore
given by ψ (m, l, f)H(x1|·). As a result, the transition between unsignaled
1Note that ψ (m, l, f) combines the standard textbook approach to technology spreads
and learning from Aghion and Howitt (1998), given by the cumulative binomial form of
the function, and a matching process commonly used in the economic search literature, see
McCall and McCall (2008). In this way, the subjective diffusion expectations implicitly
defined within f are separated from the minimum friction requirements imposed on the
search process via l and m.
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and signaled markets will be based on the following comparison
F (x1) ≷ ψ (m, l, f)H(x1|·).
The numerical simulations introduced through the following subsection
will combine changes in both search and matching frictions to illustrate the
main transition results obtained. Clearly, the interpretation of the results
differs depending on the friction effect that one wants to emphasize. We
will refrain from doing so and concentrate on the general effect that mar-
ket frictions have on the optimal information gathering behavior of decision
makers.
5.1 Numerical simulations: search frictions,
consumption inertia, multiple thresholds
and decision reversibility
The current search and matching frictions setting has been explicitly designed
to capture the effects that habits and consumption inertia have in the infor-
mation gathering process of decision makers. That is, the existence of search
and matching frictions provides a natural framework for decision makers to
also exhibit inertia, a condition much harder to justify intuitively within
the previous [pure] herding environment, where the H(1s) function remains
above F (ns) for all x1 ∈ X1. In this sense, observing a signal whose inten-
sity or strength is weakened by the existing frictions, such that the resulting
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H(1s) function crosses F (ns) at some x1 ∈ X1, allows for a straightforward
justification of the inertia assumption.2 In the current setting, such an as-
sumption implies that despite the recognized technological superiority of the
set of signaled goods, decision makers may be initially reluctant to shift their
information gathering processes to the signaled market and, therefore, they
gather their first observation from the unsignaled one.
We allow for habits and consumption inertia in order to account for the
fact that the existence of a technologically superior set of goods does not nec-
essarily imply an immediate transition to the market generated by the newly
introduced technology, see, for example, Geroski (2000) and the literature
cited within it. Moreover, as emphasized by Malerba et al. (2003), the intro-
duction of a new product within a given industry relies on the existence of
experimental consumers that may allow for its survival through the creation
of specialized niche markets. In this sense, the degree of experimentation
exhibited by a consumer could be assumed to be implicitly defined within or
approximated by ψ (m, l, f).
The following results summarize our main numerical findings regarding
the effects that search and matching frictions together with consumption
2The existence of network effects could also provide the required intuition, as it is always
challenging for decision makers to be among the first consumers of a new technology while
abandoning an already established one. The next theoretical setting will analyze this
possibility in further detail. Note, however, that the rational sophistication required from
decision makers in order to account for the dynamic evolution of different sets of goods
will make the analysis more plausible if it is considered from the supply side.
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inertia may have on the optimal information gathering behavior of decision
makers.
Lemma 5.1.1 If the information gathering process of decision makers is
subject to search and matching frictions, then the information gathering tran-
sition between markets may not occur. This is the case even if the signaling
firm guarantees the x1 characteristic observed within the unsignaled market.
Lemma 5.1.2 If multiple transition equilibria exist, the signaling firm may
be forced to guarantee relatively high x1 values to trigger the transition be-
tween markets. In this case, a market reversal in the information gathering
process may take place for relatively high x1 values.
The results described in these lemmas follow from Figures (3) to (7),
where different friction intensities have been simulated for a given identical
signal. These simulations illustrate how if, for example, brand education
helps reducing (or creating) search frictions, see Eng and Quaia (2009), then
incumbent firms may have a considerable advantage over newcomers when
the latter try to introduce a technologically superior product in the market.3
Note that this is the case despite the fact that the definition of H(x1|θ =
3Similarly, frictions affecting the strength or intensity of the signal could be assumed
to be a function of the reputation of the firm signaling, which would provide well reputed
incumbents with a considerable advantage over relatively unknown newcomers. Indeed,
as the simulations show, the [information gathering] transition probability to the signaled
market should be a non-increasing function of these frictions.
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1) assumes implicitly that the signaling firm provides the decision maker
with a good whose first characteristic is at least as high as that observed
in the unsignaled market, i.e. x1|θ=1 ≥ x1, if she shifts her information
gathering process to the signaled one. When compared with the basic herding
setting defined in the previous section, we see that search frictions or their
absence, lock-in effects or preference for diversified information, and customer
education or learning bounds, could all be respectively assumed to bias the
information gathering process of decision makers in favor of the current or
the previous setting, respectively.4
Two main conclusions follow from these simulations. The first one has
already been stated in the latter Lemma. That is, the existence of search
and matching frictions may force newcomers to improve upon very high x1
characteristics displayed by the set of incumbent goods in order to enter the
market [with a set of technologically superior products]. The second one is
the fact that a set of mediocre products offered by the incumbent may sur-
4Fontana and Guerzoni (2007) illustrate empirically how if interacting with customers
helps reducing uncertainty, then firms with a high propensity to interact are more inno-
vative and tend to introduce product innovations. These findings help emphasizing the
importance of consumer education in reducing search and matching frictions among deci-
sion makers. In a related environment, Corrocher and Zirulia (2010) consider innovations
in mobile communication services and show how demand provides both incentives to in-
novate and information about the behavior of users when innovating within an uncertain
context. In particular, they find that the customer base plays an important role in shaping
firm’s strategies in terms of the number and characteristics of new tariff plans.
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vive the entry of technologically superior ones, an equilibrium phenomenon
that worsens with the strength of the frictions. That is, if the decision maker
observes a x1 characteristic in the unsignaled market located just above or
below ce1, then she may have an incentive to remain gathering information
within this market independently of the technological improvement intro-
duced by the signaling firm. In this case, frictions constitute such a serious
drawback for the decision maker that the higher E2|θ=1 value expected within
the signaled market does not compensate for their negative effect on her in-
formation gathering process. Once again, this occurs despite the signaling
firm guaranteeing a good with a x1 characteristic at least as high as the one
observed in the unsignaled market. On the other hand, the E2|θ=1 and guar-
anteed x1 effects may prevail over the search frictions one if relatively high
x1 realizations are observed, leading to the information gathering reversals
described in Lemma 5.2.
Finally, note that Figures 3 and 6 illustrate how identical search frictions
may generate multiple transition equilibria within the risk neutral case but
not within the risk averse one. This type of result follows from the stricter
continuation criteria that risk neutrality gives place to relative to risk aver-
sion, an effect that we defined as search aversion in the previous section.
We have illustrated how their sets of available goods may provide incum-
bent firms with a significant advantage over newcomers due, among others, to
lock-in, bandwagon, network and reputation effects.5 However, these effects
5Bandwagon and network effects are also formally discussed and incorporated by
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have been assumed to be implicitly defined within a subjective cumulative
probability function, ψ (m, l, f), lacking the explicit dynamic diffusion prop-
erties that these effects generally account for, see Geroski (2000). The follow-
ing section studies the influence that network (bandwagon and reputation)
effects and the corresponding diffusion processes have on the acquisition and
the introduction of technologically superior goods within a given market.
Malerba et al. (2003) in their behavioral evolutionary model of demand.
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Chapter 6
Technology diffusion and
network effects
The third type of basic setting analyzed numerically considers the market
introduction of technologically superior products from the point of view of
the supplier.1 The intuition justifying this change in perspective follows
from the fact that, after all, it is firm’s managers [and not simply firms,
1Alternatively, this setting could also be interpreted as the acquisition of technologically
superior products by highly sophisticated decision makers, i.e. users in the sense of von
Hippel (1988). If we were to follow this alternative interpretation, it should be emphasized
that the psychological and sociological characteristics of the environment affecting the
preferences of and choices made by decision makers change as the product evolves, a
problem accounted for in marketing and sociology, but seldom by the economic literature,
with exceptions from its evolutionary branch such as Aversi et al. (1999), Rogers (2003),
Fatas-Villafranca and Saura-Bacaicoa (2004), and Malerba et al. (2007), among others.
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as the industrial economics literature seems to insist upon] the theoretical
entities who, based on their available information, decide whether or not to
introduce a given technology in the market, a fact that the recent literature
on knowledge economics and management recognizes and accounts for, see
Foray (2004) and Holsapple (2003) for a review of the respective literatures.2
Moreover, the evolutionary economic literature has also started to delve into
the strategic choices directly faced by firm’s managers within the existing
markets for technology and knowledge, see Arora et al. (2001a).
Therefore, diffusion processes and network effects will be considered from
the point of view of a manager deciding whether or not to introduce a tech-
nologically superior good in the market based, for example, on the market
share or the compatibility with the products developed within other mar-
ket sectors that the good is expected to attain within a given time frame.
In this case, the expectations of decision makers (managers) regarding the
type of diffusion process under consideration and their forecasted evolution of
possible complementary or substitute products become extremely important.
The current setting has been developed to illustrate an important point
2In this regard, when analyzing the adoption of a new product within their demand
based model, van den Ende and Dolfsma (2005, 87) assign the decision making role to
a firm. The authors justify their choice as follows: “Final consumers are different from
firms which choose to acquire a product, even if it is the same product. Decision-making
processes of firms are more rational, as for firms more time lapses between a decision and
the actual behaviors. Still, the perceived rationality of decision-making processes in firms
should not be overestimated.”
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made by Geroski (2000) when analyzing the main patterns generally believed
to determine the behavior of diffusion processes and the crucial importance
that initial conditions and choices have on the evolution of the technological
diffusion path: “When the initial choice between A and B is made quickly
and clearly and when A is clearly superior to the existing technology, then
diffusion is likely to be rapid (quick and decisive decision making will quickly
stampede the herd into action). If, however, these early choices are muddled,
then the processes which generate and swell an information cascade are likely
to be fragmented and weak”, see Geroski (2000, 620).
We will consider two main diffusion [epidemic] processes, widely employed
both in biology and by the evolutionary economic literature, used by Geroski
(2000) to analyze the apparently slow speed at which firms adopt new tech-
nologies. One of them is based on a central diffusion source while the other
relies on a word of mouth non-centralized communication process.
(i) Out of a normalized population of potential users, denote by Ψa(t) the
percentage of decision makers who have either adopted the technolog-
ically superior product at time t or are aware of its existence, while
those who have not yet adopted it or are unaware of its existence are
defined by Ψn(t) = 1−Ψa(t). Assume that information is transmitted
from a central source, reaching a percentage α of the population who
has not yet adopted the technology or is unaware of its existence at
time t. If information is received over the time interval ∆t, adoption
or awareness increases by an amount ∆Ψn(t) = α(1−Ψa(t))∆t during
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this period. The solution of this difference equation as ∆t→ 0 is given
by (see any textbook on the subject, for example, Braun (1983))
Ψa(t) = 1− e−αt, t ∈ [0, T ]
Geroski (2000) relates this type of diffusion process to the transmission
of information regarding the existence of, for example, a new hard-
ware. However, he emphasizes the fact that this type of process may
not be accurate when accounting for the information flows about the
associated software. In this case, a word of mouth information diffusion
process must be considered.
(ii) Assume that each adopter or decision maker aware of the existence of
a technologically superior product contacts a non-adopter or unaware
decision maker with probability β. The probability that contact is
made with any non-adopter [unaware decision maker] at time t is given
by βΨa(t). Thus, the percentage of adopters [aware decision makers]
increases over the ∆t time interval by the amount ∆Ψa(t) = βΨa(t)(1−
Ψa(t))∆t. The solution of this difference equation as ∆t → 0 is given
by
Ψa(t) =
(
1 +
(
1
Ψa(0)
− 1
)
e−βNt
)−1
, t ∈ [0, T ]
where Ψa(0) is the proportion of adopters or aware decision makers
existing at time zero and N is the total number of decision makers
composing the market.
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Consider now the effects that different types of diffusion processes may
have on the optimal information gathering and choice behavior of decision
makers. In particular, a sophisticated decision maker must decide whether
or not to proceed with the introduction or the adoption of a technologically
superior product based on the factors defining the speed and type of diffusion
process under consideration. Following a similar intuitive description to the
one used in the search and matching frictions scenario, the information gath-
ering transition between markets will be based on the following comparison
F (x1) ≷ Ψa(t)H(x1|·), t ∈ [0, T ].
Clearly, different dynamic forecasts resulting from different diffusion pro-
cesses would lead to different threshold reference values and to goods being
accepted or rejected depending on their expected [market] spread velocity.
That is, relatively faster spreads imply that H(x1|·) surpasses F (x1) for all
x1 ∈ X1 within relatively shorter periods of time.
An obvious alternative interpretation of Ψa(t) could be made in terms of
the expected compatibility of the product under consideration with the set of
complementary [and substitute] goods existing within other market sectors.
In this regard, Arora et al. (2001b) emphasize the importance that markets
for technology have for the strategic management of firms.
Finally, note that the current setting provides an alternative theoretical
framework to the generalized Polya urn decision theoretical environment de-
fined by Kornish (2006) when analyzing the effect that different network and
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diffusion processes have on the choice and timing of technology.
6.1 Numerical simulations: diffusion and net-
work effects
The numerical simulations presented in Figures 8 and 9 illustrate how differ-
ent expected diffusion patterns determine the decision of whether or not to
introduce [acquire] a technologically superior product in [from] the market.3
Thus, depending on the expected type of diffusion [compatibility] process
under consideration, some firms may decide to introduce [acquire] a prod-
uct or wait for further suppliers [adopters] to take on the technology and
then proceed. Clearly, highly educated consumers in the sense of Eng and
Quaia (2009) may be assumed to promote faster spreads and guarantee higher
profits during longer periods of time due to educational lock-in and brand
loyalty effects. As a consequence, subjective forecast differences among de-
cision makers regarding the evolution of Ψa(t) would be responsible for the
emergence and stability of technological niche markets within the current
theoretical setting.4 In other words, the emergence and stability of techno-
3Note that these figures constitute a dynamical version of Figures 3 to 7.
4Dolfsma and Leydesdorff (2009) emphasize the pervasive effects of lock-in and exem-
plify how if network externalities among adopters are reinforced by the market, then the
development of a new generation of technologies may be irrelevant to the techno-economic
system which prevails. Together with markets and technology, these authors consider po-
litical decision making as a third selection mechanism that may allow for breaking-out
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logical niche markets [introduction and prevalence of a product] within the
current environment could be intuitively justified in several ways.
First, as Malerba et al. (1999, 2001) illustrate, the main advances in
component technologies driving the evolution of the computer industry were
developed by newcomer firms that managed to survive by supplying exper-
imental consumers in technological niche markets. In this regard, Malerba
et al. (2003, 2007) highlight the fact that incumbents have been shown by
the descriptive literature to be subject to cognitive biases and organizational
factors that play a major role in accounting for the fatal lag in their re-
sponse when the new technology succeeds in getting a foothold. That is, an
incorrect estimation of Ψa(t) and the corresponding gains derived from intro-
ducing [acquiring] a technologically superior product by the incumbent firm,
i.e. miscalculating the payoffs and, therefore, the stability of the technolog-
ical niche market, could lead to the creation of stable technological niche
markets by a newcomer with a different estimation of Ψa(t) and its dynamic
evolution. Accounting for network and bandwagon effects [as our decision
makers are assumed to do] requires defining several possible diffusion pro-
from a given technological trajectory. Though the explicit introduction of decision makers
brings our model closer to theirs, there exists a fundamental difference between both. That
is, Dolfsma and Leydesdorff (2009) state that their main argument does not depend on
assumptions about the characteristics of a technology, nor on the extent to which agents’
knowledge is perfect or complete. Besides, they do not account for the possibility of de-
cision makers responding to their [social] environment, while our model implicitly allows
for this type of scenario.
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cesses subjectively, which may greatly differ between firms and significantly
modify their expected payoffs and subsequent decisions.
Second, the existence of vintage effects, see Bohlmann et al. (2002),
implies that later entrants utilizing improved technology can face lower costs
and reach higher quality levels than the pioneer signaling firm. These authors
show that pioneers in categories with high vintage effects tend to have lower
market shares and higher failure rates. Moreover, they find key relationships
between the magnitude of the pioneer advantage [or disadvantage] and the
consumer valuation of product attributes such as variety and quality. In
particular, their empirical results illustrate how pioneers do better in product
categories where variety is more important and worse in categories where
product quality is more important. In this regard, we could argue that
differences in the communication and diffusion patterns determining Ψa(t)
may arise depending on the type of attribute under consideration, as Geroski
(2000) did at the product level when defining the hardware versus software
example described above.
Third, if instead of using the percentage of potential adopters as the
main variable defining the diffusion equation, we use the technological devel-
opment level of either competitors or subsidiaries, we could allow for a formal
representation of the strategic interactions existing behind the formation of
markets for technology, see Arora et al. (2001b). Similarly, we could assume
that Ψa(t) represents the expected development of the technological require-
ments that must be mastered by a firm or its competitors in order to enter
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a market. Both these interpretations must be based on the heterogeneously
formed expectations of firm’s managers, which will result in different Ψa(t)
being considered when defining the strategies of the corresponding firms.
Finally, note that Ψa(t) could also be assumed to reflect the influence
that different types of policies have on the decision making processes [and
incentives] of both firm’s managers and consumers. For example, fiscal poli-
cies could be used to discriminate among products or to establish an early
product demand base in order to guide the market in a particular direction.
Moreover, sectoral characteristics may also determine the adoption process
of technological change. These features would range from the capacity to
reap the rewards arising from technological progress, which varies among
technological regimes, to the existence of intermediaries between the supply
and demand sides, such as doctors within the market for prescription drugs.
Clearly, these, and many other environmental features, may be included to
account for possible changes in the behavior of Ψa(t) and their effect on the
evolution of technological niche markets.
80
Chapter 7
Guaranteed versus refused
certainty equivalents
7.1 Numerical simulations: basic decision en-
vironment
Consider, as the basic reference case, the optimal information gathering be-
havior that follows from the standard risk neutral utility function represented
in Figure 10. Figure 14 illustrates the same environment as Figure 10 but
within a risk averse setting, where the utilities with which decision makers
are endowed have been shifted from basic linear functions to square roots.
Clearly, as the degree of risk aversion increases, the support area on which
the function H(x1) remains above the function F (x1) vanishes. Thus, the
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degree of risk aversion does not only affect the calculation of certainty equiv-
alent values but also the willingness to search of rational decision makers.
That is, as the coefficient of relative risk aversion increases, decision makers
become more reluctant to start a new search for a good better than the one
whose first characteristic has already been observed.
The optimal behavior described in Figures 10 and 14 corresponds to the
guaranteed certainty equivalent scenario. Figures 11 and 15 illustrate how
when considering the refused certainty equivalent scenario the set of X1 re-
alizations such that F (x1) > H(x1), i.e. such that decision makers prefer to
remain gathering information on the good whose first characteristic has been
observed instead of starting gathering information on a new good, becomes
a proper subset of the one defined within the g.c.e.s.. Note also that refusing
to make a random purchase from the set of available goods generates three
different information gathering subintervals and a discontinuity in the H(x1)
function within both the risk neutral and risk averse scenarios. The main
conclusion that may be initially derived from this basic environment is that
any [endogenous or exogenous] constraint preventing decision makers from
making a random purchase generates a much stricter set of continuation cri-
teria among the corresponding set of goods. The signaling setting described
in the following section will allow us to elaborate on this result.
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7.2 Numerical simulations: market signals
Figure 1 illustrates once again the one and two signals cases, denoted by 1s
and 2s, respectively, and the evolution of the corresponding threshold values
within a basic risk neutral g.c.e.s..1 Clearly, positive signals generating first
order stochastic dominant beliefs lead to higher expected utility levels for
all possible x1 values. However, in doing so, signals shift the respective
optimal threshold values towards higher x1 realizations. As already stated,
the intuition arising from these results states that positive signals should
generate immediate herds of decision makers towards the subset of goods on
which they are defined, but, at the same time, decision makers, who expect
a higher E2 value to be guaranteed from their information gathering process,
become less search averse within the corresponding subset of goods, i.e. the
area where the H function remains above the F one increases for relatively low
x1 realizations. As a result, decision makers would require relatively higher
realizations from the first characteristic space in order to continue gathering
information on the observed good. Such an effect can also be observed in the
risk averse setting illustrated in Figure 2 together with the increase in search
aversion relative to the linear risk neutral case, an effect already described
in the previous sections of teh tehsis. Thus, as risk aversion increases, an
increase in the information gathering continuation area follows. Other than
that, the signal effects are identical to those observed in the risk neutral case.
1The basic unsignaled case described in the previous section is denoted by ns.
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Consider the r.c.e.s. described in Figures 12 and 16. The same effects
on the optimal information gathering behavior of decision makers as those
described in the previous subsection can be observed in these figures.2 In
this case, however, the main result derived from these simulations relates to
the optimum number of signals that may be issued by a firm. Note that
the incentives to continue gathering information on the first good observed
decrease after two positive [and credible] signals are received. Moreover, this
decrement is relative to both the one signal and the unsignaled settings.
Thus, a firm may face a constraint on the number of positive signals that
it may issue despite their credibility. Educational and [subjective] quality
constraints, together with the bandwagon and lock-in effects emphasized by
Geroski (2000), indicate that, if a firm is unable to guarantee minimum qual-
ity levels, stricter acceptance criteria will [optimally] arise among decision
makers when considering the set of products offered by the firm.
7.3 Numerical simulations: diffusion and net-
work effects: decision irreversibility
The simplest way to mitigate the effect triggered by the r.c.e.s. on the infor-
mation gathering incentives of the good whose first characteristic has been
2The negative effect of E2 on F (x1|rf), derived analytically in the previous section,
can also be observed in these figures. Note how as the observed realizations of X1 improve
they manage to compensate for the initial negative shock on F (x1|rf).
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observed is to assume search and market frictions large enough so as to pre-
vent decision makers from returning to the goods observed previously once
they have discarded them. In this case, if decision makers were to start
gathering information on a new good, different from the one whose first
characteristic has been observed, they would have to forego any information
obtained. Hence, gathering information on a new good constitutes an ir-
reversible decision. This type of constraint brings the model closer to the
sequential search and choice processes defined in the operational research lit-
erature, where, once a product is rejected, it is no longer considered as part
of the available choice set of decision makers, see Ulu and Smith (2009).
Consider, for example, the g.c.e.s. after one signal is observed. As al-
ready illustrated, decision irreversibility has no effect on the behavior of the
F (x1|θ = 1) function. The corresponding H(x1|θ = 1) function would be
given by the expected utility value derived from being able to observe one
characteristic from the set of available goods
H(x1|nr) def=
∫ xM1
ce1
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E2|θ=1)dy1 +
∫ ce1
xm1
µ1(y1)(E1 + E2|θ=1)dy1.
Note that the decision maker aims at observing a characteristic above ce1
in the signaled market or choosing randomly within it otherwise, and is un-
able to secure a given [observed] x1 value due to the irreversibility assumption
and the unique observation she has left.
Abusing notation, the version of the one signal irreversible case defined
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within the r.c.e.s. would be given by
H(x1|nr) def=
∫ xM1
ce1
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E2|θ=1)dy1
Figures 13 and 17 illustrate this function, denoted by H(nr), for the one
signal r.c.e.s..3 Clearly, sufficiently large search and market frictions may
improve the ability of firms to introduce their products in a given market. A
reference to the previously highlighted educational, quality and bandwagon
constraints could be easily made to justify the existence of this type of fric-
tions.
3The unsignaled and two signal cases, as well as the corresponding settings defined
within the g.c.e.s., follow trivially.
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Chapter 8
Demand Appendix
This section analyzes the effect that observing a positive signal has on the
behavior of the expected search utilities of rational decision makers. Consider
the F (x1) function in the first place. Intuitively, one may infer that the
updated Bayesian density µ2(x2|θ = 1) should lead to a higher expected
utility value on the X2 interval, i.e. E(2|θ=1) ≥ E2, which should, at the same
time, result in the set P+(x1|θ = 1) shrinking relative to P+(x1). In addition,
the type of positive signal received implies that µ2(x2|θ = 1) ≥ µ2(x2) over
the newly defined interval P+(x1|θ = 1). Thus, receiving a positive signal
leads to a stricter P+(x1) interval displaying a larger probability mass than
its presignal counterpart. The intuitive effect of the signal on the F (x1)
function remains ambiguous.
Regarding the H(x1) function, note that the Q
+(x1) and Q
−(x1) intervals
do not depend on E2 and are therefore not affected by the signal. However,
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the direct dependence of H(x1) on E2 should lead to an upward shift of the
function if the value of E2 increases after the signal is received.
In order to verify the previous intuitive description a formal treatment of
the signal effects on both the F (x1) and H(x1) functions is provided. The
following definition and proposition, taken from Mas-Colell et al. (1995), are
required for the subsequent analysis.
Definition A.1 [Definition 6.D.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995)] The distri-
bution F (·) first-order stochastically dominates G(·) if, for every nondecreas-
ing function u : R→ R, we have∫
u(x)dF (x) ≥
∫
u(x)dG(x).
Proposition A.1 [Proposition 6.D.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995)] The
distribution of monetary payoffs F (·) first-order stochastically dominates the
distribution G(·) if and only if F (x) ≤ G(x) for every x.
Therefore, given the updated definition of both the F and H functions
F (x1|θ = 1) def=
∫
P+(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2|θ = 1)(u1(x1) + u2(x2))dx2+
∫
P−(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2|θ = 1)(E1 + E(2|θ=1))dx2
H(x1|θ = 1) def=
[∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)(u1(y1) + E(2|θ=1))dy1+∫
Q−(x1)
µ1(y1)(max{u1(x1), E1}+ E(2|θ=1))dy1
]
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and the corresponding E(2|θ=1) =
∫
X2
µ2(x2|θ = 1)u2(x2)dx2 value, the
following propositions can be stated
Proposition A.2 F (x1|θ = 1) ≥ F (x1).
Proposition A.3 H(x1|θ = 1) ≥ H(x1).
whose respective proofs are presented below.
Proof of proposition A.2. We will make use of the following Lemmas
to illustrate Proposition A.2.
Lemma A.1 µ2(x2|θ = 1) first-order stochastically dominates µ2(x2).
Proof. Consider the basic learning model defined in the thesis. The
decision maker, who is assumed to have a [subjective] uniform probability
density function defined on X2, receives a signal halving the probability mass
allocated to the lower half density values while reallocating the subtracted
mass uniformly among the upper half ones. That is, the initial uniform
density, the signal received and the corresponding Bayesian updating rule
defining the learning process of the decision maker are respectively given by
µ2(x2) =
1
β − α if x2 ∈ [α, β]
pi(θ|x2) =

3
2(β−α) if x2 ∈ (α+β2 , β]
1
2(β−α) if x2 ∈ [α, α+β2 ]
µ2(x2|θ = 1) = pi(θ|x2)µ2(x2)∫
X2
pi(θ|x2)µ2(x2)dx2
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Thus, the following updated density results from applying Bayes’ rule
after receiving a signal
µ2(x2|θ = 1) =

3
2(β−α)2
1
(β−α)
= 3
2(β−α) if x2 ∈ (α+β2 , β]
1
2(β−α)2
1
(β−α)
= 1
2(β−α) if x2 ∈ [α, α+β2 ]
Clearly, x2 variants situated on the upper half of the distribution are
assigned
∫ β
α+β
2
µ2(x2|θ = 1)dx2 = 3/4 of the total density while those on the
lower half are endowed with the remaining
∫ α+β
2
α
µ2(x2|θ = 1)dx2 = 1/4.
In order to illustrate the first order stochastic dominance of µ2(x2|θ = 1)
over µ2(x2) it must be shown that
∫ β
α
µ2(x2|θ = 1)dx2 <
∫ β
α
µ2(x2)dx2, for all
x2 ∈ [α, β]. Therefore, the resulting distribution functions must be calculated
and compared for both codomains within [α, β].
(i) Consider first the x2 ∈ [α, α+β2 ] codomain. Clearly, µ2(x2|θ = 1) first
order stochastically dominates µ2(x2) if and only if (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995)∫ α+x
2
α
µ2(x2)dx2 =
x− α
2(β − α) >
∫ α+x
2
α
µ2(x2|θ = 1)dx2 = x− α
4(β − α) .
∀x ∈ [α, β]. This inequality is satisfied whenever x > α. Thus,
µ2(x2|θ = 1) stochastically dominates µ2(x2) for every x > α, that
is, ∀x2 ∈ [α, α+β2 ].
(ii) Consider now the x2 ∈ [α+β2 , β] codomain. Once again, µ2(x2|θ = 1)
first order stochastically dominates µ2(x2) if and only if∫ x
α+β
2
µ2(x2)dx2 +
∫ α+β
2
α
µ2(x2)dx2 >
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∫ x
α+β
2
µ2(x2|θ = 1)dx2 +
∫ α+β
2
α
µ2(x2|θ = 1)dx2
∀x ∈ [α+β
2
, β]. In the case under consideration the above inequality
corresponds to
2x− α− β
2(β − α) +
β − α
2(β − α) >
6x− 3α− 3β
4(β − α) +
β − α
4(β − α)
which simplifies to
x− α
β − α >
3x− 2α− β
2(β − α) .
This inequality is satisfied for every β > x, that is, ∀x2 ∈ [α+β2 , β].
Therefore, µ2(x2|θ = 1) first-order stochastically dominates µ2(x2) for
every x2 ∈ [α, β]. A similar proof can be used to illustrate the first-order
stochastic dominance of µ2(x2|θ = 2) over µ2(x2|θ = 1).
Even though we have only verified the first-order stochastic dominance
resulting from the signal for the uniform density case defined in the thesis, the
analysis could be generalized to any other density function whose probability
mass is redistributed to generate higher expected utilities, refer to Chapter
6 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
Lemma A.1 together with Definition A.1 imply directly that
Corollary A.1 E(2|θ=1) ≥ E2.
The signal received affects the F (x1) function both through the new in-
duced value of E2 and the updated µ2(x2|θ = 1) density. While the previous
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corollary describes the effect that signal-induced changes in the µ2(x2) den-
sity have on expected utilities, the following one concentrates on the effect
that changes in the E2 value have on F (x1) for a given constant µ2(x2). If the
latter effect is positive, then coupling a signal-based increment in E2 with a
first-order stochastic dominance spread on µ2(x2) would lead to an increase
of the F (x1) function.
Lemma A.2 dF (x1)
dE2
∣∣∣
µ2(x2)
> 0,∀x1 ∈ X1, if and only if P−(xM1 ) 6= ∅.
Proof. We start by expressing F (x1) as a function of E2
F (x1)
def
=
∫ xM2
u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))
µ2(x2)(u1(x1) + u2(x2))dx2+
∫ u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))
xm1
µ2(x2)(E1 + E2)dx2
Applying Leibnitz’s rule to the above definition while keeping µ2(x2) fixed
allows us to isolate the effect that changes in the E2 value have on the F (x1)
function.
dF (x1)
dE2
∣∣∣∣
µ2(x2)
=
∫ xM2
u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))
∂
∂E2
[µ2(x2)(u1(x1)+u2(x2))]dx2+[µ2(x
M
2 )(u1(x1)+u2(x
M
2 ))]
dxM2
dE2
−
[µ2(u
−1
2 (E1+E2−u1(x1)))(u1(x1)+u2(u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))))]
d
dE2
[u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))]+∫ u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))
xm2
µ2(x2)dx2+
[µ2(u
−1
2 (E1+E2−u1(x1)))(E1+E2)]
d
dE2
[u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))]−[µ2(xm2 )(E1+E2)]
dxm2
dE2
=
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0 + 0− [µ2(u−12 (E1 + E2 − u1(x1)))(E1 + E2)]
d
dE2
[u−12 (E1 + E2 − u1(x1))]+∫ u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))
xm2
µ2(x2)dx2+
[µ2(u
−1
2 (E1 + E2 − u1(x1)))(E1 + E2)]
d
dE2
[u−12 (E1 + E2 − u1(x1))]− 0 =∫ u−12 (E1+E2−u1(x1))
xm2
µ2(x2)dx2.
Therefore, increments in E2 have a strictly positive effect on F (x1), ∀x1 ∈
X1, iff P
−(xM1 ) 6= ∅.
Corollary A.1 and Lemma A.2 imply that if P−(xM1 ) 6= ∅ and the signal
received leads to E(2|θ=1) > E2, then F (x1|E(2|θ=1)) > F (x1). This result
together with Lemma A.1 provide the required conclusion, i.e. F (x1|θ =
1) ≥ F (x1) for all x1 values in X1. In particular, if either E(2|θ=1) ≥ E2 or
P−(xM1 ) = ∅, or both, then
F (x1|θ = 1) def=
∫
P+(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2|θ = 1)(u1(x1) + u2(x2))dx2+
∫
P−(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2|θ = 1)(E1 + E(2|θ=1))dx2 ≥
F (x1|E(2|θ=1)) def=
∫
P+(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2)(u1(x1) + u2(x2))dx2+∫
P−(x1|θ=1)
µ2(x2)(E1 + E(2|θ=1))dx2 ≥
F (x1)
def
=
∫
P+(x1)
µ2(x2)(u1(x1)+u2(x2))dx2+
∫
P−(x1)
µ2(x2)(E1+E2)dx2.
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Proof of Proposition A.3. The result follows directly from Corollary
A.1 and the fact that
dH(x1)
dE2
=
∫
Q+(x1)
µ1(y1)dy1 +
∫
Q−(x1)
µ1(y1)dy1 = 1 > 0.
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Chapter 9
Technological transition: the
basics
Given the behavior of the optimal threshold values identified in the pre-
vious demand section, a basic strategic structure can be defined to model the
introduction of technologically superior products. In this case, the technolog-
ical superiority of a set of products is reflected by its stochastically dominant
distribution of X2 characteristics. The information acquisition incentives of
the decision maker are illustrated by her expected utilities, which, at the
same time, define the revenues expected to be obtained by the firms. That
is, given the available distribution of product characteristics that may be
displayed by a firm, its expected revenues depend on its ability to provide
the characteristics required by the decision maker.
In other words, decision makers would be reluctant to purchase an ob-
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served good whose expected utility value is lower than the one delivered by
the certainty equivalent good defined within the corresponding market. That
is, if the characteristics observed after gathering both pieces of information do
not deliver an expected utility higher than E1 +E2 in the unsignaled market
or E1 +E2|θ=1 in the signaled one, then decision makers should refrain from
making any purchase. Consequently, the following proposition summarizes
the first basic [technological] transition finding of the thesis
Proposition 9.0.1 Firms will optimally signal the product with the lowest
available quality when generating technological signal-induced monopolistic
markets.
Thus, the worst available version of a new technologically superior prod-
uct will be used to generate the corresponding signal-induced monopolistic
market. Signaling an improved version would trivially lead to lower expected
revenues for the monopolistic firm, given identical production costs.
On the other hand, the ability of decision makers to resort to a randomly
chosen good provides an explicit reference point against which markets may
be compared when defining their corresponding search strategies, which pro-
vides us with an important simplifying assumption when presenting the re-
sults obtained. Therefore, we will be assuming a g.c.e.s. throughout the rest
of the thesis, that is, the current section and the forthcoming supply-based
one.
Consider a standard symmetric economic duopoly. The strategies avail-
able to each identical firm consist of either signaling the introduction of an
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improved set of X2 product characteristics, 1S, or not signaling it, NS. De-
note by E[r(µ2(x2))]A the current expected revenue obtained by each firm
if none of them signals and both must compete for decision makers with
respect to threshold A, refer to Figures 1 and 2. Similarly, E[r(θ)]B corre-
sponds to the expected revenue obtained by a firm from unilaterally signaling
and facing less search averse decision makers at threshold B.
The following definition divides the set of possible game theoretical sce-
narios in two main different categories.
Definition 9.0.2 Signaling an enhanced set of characteristics is a techno-
logically neutral strategy if E(2|θ=1) = E2, and it is not technologically neutral
if E(2|θ=1) > E2.
If signaling an enhanced set of characteristics is technologically neu-
tral, then the expected revenues obtained by firms would be independent
of their signaling strategies. In this case, all entrances composing the corre-
sponding Technological Transition matrix would be, by definition, equal to
E[r(µ2(x2))]A, and transition between technologies become purely random
events. However, if signaling is not a technologically neutral strategy, then
the resulting transition game between technologies would be given by
Basic Technological Transition Game
1S NS
1S (< E[r(θ)]B), (< E[r(θ)]B) E[r(θ)]B, 0
NS 0, E[r(θ)]B E[r(µ2(x2))]A, E[r(µ2(x2))]A
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Clearly, if both firms signal the improvement, they must compete for con-
sumers in the corresponding market, leading to a strictly smaller expected
payoff, denoted by (< E[r(θ)]B), than in a monopolistic environment where
only one firm has signaled the improvement. The following results are im-
mediate.
Proposition 9.0.3 If E[r(θ)]B > E[r(µ2(x2))]A (resp. E[r(θ)]B = E[r(µ2(x2))]A),
the technological transition game has a unique Nash equilibrium, where sig-
naling is a strictly (resp. weakly) dominant strategy for both firms.
Proposition 9.0.4 If E[r(θ)]B < E[r(µ2(x2))]A, the technological transition
game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (1S, 1S) and (NS,NS).
Proposition 9.0.5 If E[r(θ)]B < E[r(µ2(x2))]A, the technological transition
game has a mixed strategy equilibrium.
The mixed strategy equilibrium is defined by the set of probability pairs
{(P ∗i (1S), P ∗i (NS))}i=1,2, given by the solutions to
(< E[r(θ)]B)
E[r(µ2(x2))]A + (< E[r(θ)]B)− E[r(θ)]B = P
∗
i (NS)
E[r(µ2(x2))]A − E[r(θ)]B
E[r(µ2(x2))]A + (< E[r(θ)]B)− E[r(θ)]B = P
∗
i (1S)
where Pi(NS) is the probability that firm i, with i = 1, 2, does not signal the
existence of a technologically superior product and Pi(1S) = 1− Pi(NS).
Corollary 9.0.6 Technological transition takes place in mixed strategies if
Pi(1S) > P
∗
i (1S), with i = 1, 2, while it does not if Pi(1S) < P
∗
i (1S).
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9.1 Basic transition analysis
The main purpose of this section has been to illustrate how even in an envi-
ronment with perfectly rational decision makers, credible signals, and without
consumption inertia or any other market frictions, firms do not necessarily
have an incentive to trigger the transition between markets unless sufficiently
high monopolistic rents are guaranteed, and that, even in this case, techno-
logical improvements do not necessarily lead to higher expected revenues for
the firms introducing them.
Technological transition may be fostered through the introduction of per-
durable technological monopolies that increase the E[r(θ)]B payoff relative
to E[r(µ2(x2))]A, as the standard economic literature suggests, see Tirole
(1988). However, the adoption of technologically superior goods by decision
makers would be subject to stricter selection criteria. That is, the exis-
tence of technological monopolistic rents may guarantee faster introduction
but not faster adoption. On the other hand, if sufficiently perdurable tech-
nological monopolies cannot be guaranteed, i.e. E[r(θ)]B < E[r(µ2(x2))]A,
transition does only occur in mixed strategies. In this case, ∂P
∗(1S)
∂E[r(θ)]B
< 0,
∂P ∗(1S)
∂(<E[r(θ)]B)
< 0 and ∂P
∗(1S)
∂E[r(µ2(x2))]A
> 0, implying that an increase in either
E[r(θ)]B or (< E[r(θ)]B), or a decrease in E[r(µ2(x2))]A would lead to a
larger set of P ∗(1S) values for which signaling constitutes an equilibrium
strategy.1
1It should be remarked that the introduction of technological monopolistic rents re-
sulting in E[r(θ)]B > E[r(µ2(x2))]A may lead to a standard prisoner’s dilemma matrix
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The same type of analysis can be performed and similar conclusions are
reached when considering the possibility of firms sending more than one
signal. The following section studies in detail the two signals case and all
the possible subcases arising within such a setting, and sets the basis for
developing scenarios based on further signaling capabilities.
if (< E[r(θ)]B) < E[r(µ2(x2))]A. In this case, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies where both firms signal the improvement even if a decrease in expected
revenues results from following such a (dominant) strategy. An intuitively related result
is obtained by Fatas-Villafranca and Saura-Bacaicoa (2004), who design a differential dy-
namic macroeconomic structure to identify technological diffusion patterns. These authors
illustrate the spontaneous emergence of recession periods engendered during apparently
prosperous situations. In other words, technological improvements do not necessarily im-
ply higher revenues for the firms introducing them or lead to higher consumption levels,
as is the case in the current setting.
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Chapter 10
Technological transition:
general analysis
This section illustrates the set of equilibria arising when more than one
signal may be sent by firms. It allows for a simple generalization of the analy-
sis introduced in the main text to an environment with multiple technological
improvements available to be signaled. Even though we will constraint the
analysis to the two signals’ case, additional scenarios accounting for further
signaling possibilities can be easily inferred from the theoretical settings de-
veloped below. Throughout this section the firm will be represented as the
upper matrix player, while the rival will be defined by the left one.
Consider first the case where either one or two signals may be sent by a
firm but the rival is constrained to send a maximum of one signal.
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Technological Transition Game (AI)
2S 1S
1S 0, E[r(θ)]C (< E[r(θ)]B), (< E[r(θ)]B)
NS 0, E[r(θ)]C 0, E[r(θ)]B
Clearly, the [weakly] dominant strategy of the rival consists of signal-
ing. In this case, the strategy of the firm depends on the relative values of
(< E[r(θ)]B) and E[r(θ)]C . The former denotes the expected revenue ob-
tained when both firms compete at B, while the latter refers to the monop-
olistic revenue derived from unilaterally signaling at C. Thus, even though
an equilibrium with 1S is immediately guaranteed, an equilibrium with 2S
requires (< E[r(θ)]B) < E[r(θ)]C , a condition that will appear repeatedly
through the coming games.
Note, as a corollary, that if the rival does not have any technological
improvement to signal and the firm has an incentive to become a sole mo-
nopolist, i.e. E[r(θ)]B > E[r(µ2(x2))]A, then only one signal will be sent by
the firm, since signaling twice leads to E[r(θ)]C < E[r(θ)]B.
1 In this sense,
consider the incentives of firms to signal when both of them have access to
the same technological improvements and must decide how many signals,
either one or two, to issue.
1That is, as the number of signals sent by a firm increases, the expected revenues
derived from remaining as the sole signaling monopolist in a technological niche market
decrease.
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Technological Transition Game (AII)
2S 1S
2S (< E[r(θ)]C), (< E[r(θ)]C) E[r(θ)]C , 0
1S 0, E[r(θ)]C (< E[r(θ)]B), (< E[r(θ)]B)
The strategic structure of this game is identical to the one of the game
analyzed in Section 9. In particular, both firms will signal if (< E[r(θ)]B) <
E[r(θ)]C , while reversing this inequality leads to two Nash equilibria in pure
strategies, i.e. (1S, 1S) and (2S, 2S), and a mixed one.
Consider now the case where a firm must choose whether or not and
how many signals to issue when the rival cannot reach its same amount of
technological improvements. That is, if the rival is able to issue only one
signal, should the firm send two signals if available, or may a not signaling
equilibrium prevail?
Technological Transition Game (AIII)
2S 1S NS
1S 0, E[r(θ)]C (< E[r(θ)]B), (< E[r(θ)]B) E[r(θ)]B, 0
NS 0, E[r(θ)]C 0, E[r(θ)]B E[r(µ2(x2))]A, E[r(µ2(x2))]A
The equilibrium structures of this and the following game are quite similar
in terms of signaling incentives.
(i) If E[r(θ)]B > E[r(µ2(x2))]A, then signaling is a [weakly] dominant
strategy for the rival. Therefore, the firm sends at least one signal,
with the final equilibrium depending on
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[(ia)] (< E[r(θ)]B) > E[r(θ)]C : the firm sends a unique signal and
the equilibrium would be given by (1S, 1S).
[(ib)] (< E[r(θ)]B) < E[r(θ)]C : the firm sends two signals and the
corresponding equilibrium would be (2S, 1S).
(ii) If E[r(θ)]B < E[r(µ2(x2))]A, then we have a mixed equilibrium similar
to the one defined in Section 9. In addition to the (NS,NS) and
(1S, 1S) equilibria illustrated in the main text, we must also account
for both (2S, ·) possibilities, where two signals are sent by the firm and
none or one by the rival.
The technological transition enhancing incentives described in (i) and (ii)
are identical to those presented in the main text. That is, favoring monopo-
listic payoffs via E[r(θ)]B increases the probability of the rival signaling, an
action that guarantees at least a 1S equilibrium. If monopolistic incentives
are also provided for the firm via E[r(θ)]C , then an equilibrium with 2S will
be promoted.
Finally, consider the general case where firms must decide whether or not
and how many signals to issue when both of them have access to the same
amount of technological improvements.
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Technological Transition Game (AIV)
2S 1S NS
2S (< E[r(θ)]C), (< E[r(θ)]C) E[r(θ)]C , 0 E[r(θ)]C , 0
1S 0, E[r(θ)]C (< E[r(θ)]B), (< E[r(θ)]B) E[r(θ)]B , 0
NS 0, E[r(θ)]C 0, E[r(θ)]B E[r(µ2(x2))]A, E[r(µ2(x2))]A
(i) If E[r(θ)]B > E[r(µ2(x2))]A, then not signaling is a [weakly] dominated
strategy for both firms. The final equilibrium depends on the relative
values of E[r(θ)]C and (< E[r(θ)]B) as follows
[(ia)] (< E[r(θ)]B) > E[r(θ)]C : both firms face a mixed equilibrium
identical to the one defined in the Technological Transition Game (AII),
with the corresponding pure equilibria given by (1S, 1S) and (2S, 2S).
[(ib)] (< E[r(θ)]B) < E[r(θ)]C : both firms send two signals and the
equilibrium would be given by (2S, 2S).
(ii) If E[r(θ)]B < E[r(µ2(x2))]A, then we have a mixed equilibrium similar
to the one defined in the Technological Transition Game (AIII). The
pure strategy Nash equilibria would be given by (NS,NS) and (2S, 2S).
In addition, depending on the relative value of the E[r(θ)]C and (<
E[r(θ)]B) payoffs, we may have the following equilibria
[(iia)] (< E[r(θ)]B) > E[r(θ)]C : an additional pure strategy Nash
equilibrium would be given by (1S, 1S).
[(iib)] (< E[r(θ)]B) < E[r(θ)]C : an additional pure strategy Nash
equilibrium would be given by (2S, 1S).
105
Once again, the technological transition enhancing incentives described
in (i) and (ii) are identical to those presented in [the previous game and]
the main text. That is, favoring monopolistic payoffs via E[r(θ)]B increases
the signaling probability of both firms, an action guaranteeing at least a 1S
equilibrium. Besides, if monopolistic incentives are provided for both firms
via E[r(θ)]C , then an equilibrium with 2S could be easily attained in both
the (i) and (ii) subcases.
We are now ready to study the supply side of the economic system and the
subsequent equilibria that result from the corresponding general competitive
equilibrium analysis.
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Chapter 11
Supply: consumer myopia and
technological transition
This section and the following one will start by introducing several numer-
ical simulations that illustrate the behavior of the optimal threshold values as
the number of signals received by decision makers indicating the existence of
a technologically superior set of goods increases. These simulations maintain
the very same characteristics defined within the previous demand sections
but will be used to emphasize the properties of demand that become partic-
ularly important for the signaling strategies of firms. In the current section
we will concentrate on the existence of myopic decision makers, while the
next and final one will consider the ability of decision makers to reverse their
information gathering processes between different markets.
In the current setting, Figure 18 illustrates the one and two signals cases,
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denoted by 1s and 2s, respectively, and the evolution of the correspond-
ing threshold values within a basic risk neutral scenario. Points C and B
identify the threshold values defined by decision makers when gathering in-
formation on a set of goods located within the unsignaled and the one signal
market, respectively. These threshold values will constitute the main refer-
ence points when defining Nash pre-commitment equilibria. However, when
studying subgame perfect equilibria, we will allow perfect foresight decision
makers to shift their information gathering processes between markets after
gathering an observation from one of them.1 In this case, the distinction be-
tween irreversible and guaranteed improvement processes becomes extremely
important. As in the Nash pre-commitment setting, the threshold point B
illustrates a guaranteed improvement over C. In addition, point A repre-
sents the irreversible case, where decision makers must forego the observation
gathered in the unsignaled market when shifting to the signaled one. This
constraint decreases the expected search utility of decision makers due to the
observation lost when shifting takes place. As a result, the corresponding
H(x1|nr) function remains below the guaranteed improvement one for all
x1 > ce1 values. Clearly, the threshold point A results from comparing the
expected utility derived from checking the second characteristic of the good
observed in the unsignaled market with that obtained from checking the first
characteristic of a good in the signaled one.
1This will be done to account for consumption inertia and habits in the information
gathering processes of perfect foresight decision makers.
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Figure 19 illustrates the same environment as Figure 18 but within a risk
averse setting, where the utilities with which decision makers are endowed
have been shifted from basic linear functions to square roots.
11.1 Basic assumptions
Given the behavior of the optimal threshold values identified above, a basic
strategic structure can be defined to model the introduction of technologically
superior products by firms among which the decision maker may search and
choose.
Consider a standard symmetric economic duopoly. The strategies avail-
able to each identical firm consist of either signaling the introduction of an
improved X2 product characteristic, S, or not signaling it, NS. The following
temporal sequence will be assumed. There are three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2.
Period zero takes place before the decision maker observes any characteristic,
while the two pieces of information are respectively gathered by the decision
maker in periods one and two. Signals can only be received during the first
two periods. That is, firms only interact strategically by trying to affect the
information gathering process of decision makers in periods zero and one.
The information acquisition incentives of decision makers are illustrated
by their expected utilities, which, at the same time, define the revenues
expected to be obtained by firms. That is, given the available distribution of
product characteristics that may be displayed by a firm, its expected revenues
depend on its ability to provide the characteristics required by the decision
109
maker.
Hence, the following terminal condition will be imposed on the infor-
mation gathering process of decision makers: if the characteristics observed
after gathering both pieces of information are not higher than ce1 + ce2, then
the decision maker will reject any available random choice. This condition is
imposed to avoid biasing the choices made by decision makers, as well as the
corresponding strategies of firms, towards the signaled market. If we were
not to impose it, and both information pieces gathered lead to an expected
utility lower than E1 +E2, then a perfect foresight decision maker would be
forced to choose randomly from the signaled market. This would provide
the signaling firm with a distinct advantage independently of its available
distribution of X1 characteristics. Moreover, we would be forcing all decision
makers to consume independently of the outcome resulting from their infor-
mation gathering processes. Thus, we will assume that for decision makers
to purchase a good it must provide them with an expected utility higher than
E1 + E2.
2
2Note that, from a formal perspective, this assumption could be considered when defin-
ing the corresponding F (·) and H(·) functions, which should be modified accordingly, as
we illustrated in the g.c.e.s. versus r.c.e.s. section. However, apart from complicating the
presentation considerably, this assumption does not alter the qualitative results obtained
through the game theoretical analysis presented in this section. Moreover, the correspond-
ing definitions of the F (x1) and H(x1) functions determine the expected payoffs received
from searching within a given market. Hence, the ability of decision makers to resort to a
randomly chosen good provides an explicit reference point against which markets may be
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Assume, finally, for analytical simplicity and consistency purposes, that
the distribution of characteristics on X1 and X2 available to each firm is
defined by a standard uniform distribution.3
Similarly to Rahman and Loulou (2001), two types of strategic equilib-
rium will be analyzed, each based on a different information transmission
structure. A Nash pre-commitment equilibrium will be defined when firms
are unable to observe the decisions made by their rivals and must commit to
their time zero signaling strategies. If subgame perfection is assumed, firms
may wait to observe the signaling strategy of the rival in period one and then
decide whether or not to signal before the decision maker gathers her first
piece of information. In this case, the interim signaling decision of the rival
would have to be anticipated and incorporated in the period zero strategies
of firms.
11.2 Nash pre-commitment equilibrium
It should be noted that through the current section of the thesis and the fol-
lowing one, the notation defining the entries of the Technological Transition
compared when defining the search strategy of decision makers.
3This assumption can be relaxed and generalized to allow for any probability function.
The corresponding results can be easily analyzed within any of the game theoretical sce-
narios presented. Note, however, that the distribution of characteristics considered by the
decision makers should be modified accordingly. Otherwise, the current thesis should be
extended to account for cheap talk, credibility and reputation scenarios.
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Matrices will be modified and adapted to provide a more intuitive charac-
terization of the [equilibrium] payoffs based on the corresponding figures.
Refer to Figures 18 and 19 and denote by E[r(k)] the expected revenue ob-
tained by each firm when both firms compete for decision makers within the
k = B,C optimal threshold framework. Similarly, E[r(B|s)] and E[r(C|ns)]
correspond to the expected revenue obtained from unilaterally signaling or
not doing so, respectively.
The technological transition matrix that results from the signaling strate-
gies available to firms within a pre-commitment environment can be defined
as follows
Technological Transition Matrix
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] E[r(B|s)], E[r(C|ns)]
NS E[r(C|ns)], E[r(B|s)] E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
Intuition suggests that, if both firms signal the improvement, they must
compete for decision makers in the corresponding market, leading to a strictly
smaller expected payoff, E[r(B)], than the one obtained in a monopolistic
environment by the firm that has signaled the improvement, E[r(B|s)]. In the
latter case, the firm not signaling the improvement, and receiving E[r(C|ns)],
would be expected to suffer a loss relative to the not signaling equilibrium
payoff, E[r(C)], as perfect foresight decision makers shift their information
gathering process to the signaled market. However, and despite the induced
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decrease in competition, unilaterally signaling leads to a stricter threshold
continuation criterion being imposed by perfect foresight decision makers.
Thus, the incentives of firms to signal a technological improvement should
depend on the relative magnitude of both these effects on their expected
revenues.
We analyze formally below the revenues that firms expect to obtain based
on the different threshold values defining the optimal information gathering
behavior of decision makers and the number of competitors existing in each
particular market.
Denote by P (f) the [subjective] probability assigned by a firm to the de-
cision maker observing a characteristic from one of its goods when competing
[for decision makers] with a rival. Within a basic duopoly scenario, the prob-
ability assigned by a firm to the decision maker observing a characteristic
from one of the goods offered by the rival equals P (r) = 1−P (f). Given the
numerical simulations presented in the previous section, the probability that
the decision maker continues gathering information on the good whose first
characteristic she has observed can be easily defined and calculated. Denote
this probability by g(k) = (xM1 − k)/(xM1 − xm1 ), for k = A,B,C.4 Similarly,
the probability that the decision maker does not continue gathering infor-
mation on the good whose first characteristic she has observed is given by
1− g(k) = (k − xm1 )/(xM1 − xm1 ), for k = A,B,C.5
4Abusing notation, we refer to k as both an information gathering threshold value and
its projection on the X1 domain.
5We have assumed that both the firm and its rival have identical uniform distributions
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The firm’s expected revenue when two pieces of information are left to
gather and firms compete with each other for decision makers at k, where
k = B,C, is given by6
E[r(k)] = P (f)[g(k)r1(k) + (1− g(k))[P (f)g(ce1)r]]+
P (r)[(1− g(k))[P (f)g(ce1)r]], (?)
where r1(k) represents the firm’s expected revenue when one piece of infor-
mation is left to gather and x1 > k, with k = A,B,C. That is,
r1(k) = h(P
+(x1))r,
where h(P+(x1)) denotes the probability assigned by the firm to the decision
maker observing x2 > ce1 + ce2 − x1 and r is the revenue obtained by the
firm from the sale of its product.
When competing with a rival, firms face a probability P (f) of having
one of their goods’ first characteristics observed by the decision maker. If
this is the case, the probability of the decision maker observing a x1 higher
than the corresponding k value equals g(k). After observing x1 > k, the
of available characteristics defined on the X1 and X2 sets. Thus, both firms face the same
continuation and rejection probabilities in both the signaled and unsignaled markets. Note,
however, that allowing for varying distributions of available characteristics between firms
would modify their expected payoffs and the resulting equilibria.
6The k = A case will be defined within the subgame perfect equilibrium setting, since it
is irrelevant within the current pre-commitment framework and requires further assump-
tions and explanations.
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decision maker will observe a x2 such that x1+x2 > ce1+ce2 with probability
h(P+(x1)), and purchase the good, leading to a firm’s revenue of r. However,
if x1+x2 < ce1+ce2, the decision maker remains without any observation left
to gather and, due to the terminal condition imposed, would not purchase
any good, leading to a revenue of zero. On the other hand, if x1 < k, an
event taking place with probability (1− g(k)), it has been assumed that the
decision maker may observe a new first characteristic from the set of goods
offered by any of the firms.7 In this case, if the decision maker observes her
final first characteristic from one of the firm’s goods, she will only purchase
it if x1 > ce1, an event taking place with probability g(ce1), where g(ce1) =
7There is not a particular formal reason to either impose such a constraint or not
doing so. Search frictions or their absence, lock-in effects or preference for diversified
information, and customer education or learning bounds [see Eng and Quaia (2009)],
could all be respectively assumed to bias the information gathering process of decision
makers in favor of the firm whose good’s first characteristic has been observed or its rival.
If the assumed constraint is not imposed, the firm’s expected revenue when two pieces of
information are left to gather and firms compete with each other for decision makers at k
would be given by
E[r(k)]′ = P (f)[g(k)r1(k)] + P (r)[(1− g(k))[g(ce1)r]], k = B,C.
The revenue loss that E[r(k)]′ imposes on a firm relative to E[r(k)] equals P (f)[(1 −
g(k))[P (f)g(ce1)r]], while gains are accounted for by P (r)[(1 − g(k))[g(ce1)r]][1 − P (f)].
Therefore, losses would be higher than gains if P (f) > P (r). In the current context, since
both firms have been assumed identical in all respects, which implies that P (f) = P (r),
no change in expected revenues would result from imposing such a constraint.
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(xM1 − ce1)/(xM1 − xm1 ).8
The second term on the right hand side of equation (?) corresponds to
the expected revenue of a firm when the decision maker gathers her first
observation from one of the rival’s goods. The firm will only be able to obtain
a revenue if the decision maker observes a x1 < k characteristic from its rival’s
good and then chooses the firm to gather her final piece of information,
observing a value of x1 > ce1.
Note, finally, that equation (?) can be simplified and rewritten as follows
E[r(k)] = P (f)r[g(k)h(P+(x1)) + (1− g(k))g(ce1)], k = B,C.
When defining the expected payoffs obtained by firms in a unilateral sig-
naling scenario, we must explicitly account for the existence of both myopic
and perfect foresight decision makers within the population of potential con-
sumers. Hence, the expected payoff received by the unilaterally signaling
firm would be given by
E[r(B|s)] = αP (f)r[g(C)h(P+(x1)) + (1− g(C))g(ce1)]+
(1− α)r[g(B)h(P+(x1)) + (1− g(B))g(ce1)],
where α denotes the proportion of myopic decision makers in the population.
Note that perfect foresight decision makers will limit their search to the
8The x1 = k case can be included within any of the ones described in the main text.
Note, however, that in the current continuous setting this event takes place with a prob-
ability of zero.
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signaled market when gathering both of their available observations.9 Thus,
if only one firm signals, it will compete with the not signaling firm for the α
proportion of myopic decision makers in terms of threshold C while serving
alone the (1 − α) perfect foresight proportion with respect to threshold B.
The expected payoff obtained by the not signaling firm is therefore given by
E[r(C|ns)] = αE[r(C)].
Clearly, E[r(B|s)] > E[r(B)] when α = 0 and E[r(C|ns)] < E[r(C)]
when α < 1. However, comparisons between E[r(B)] and E[r(C)] depend
on the relative values of the cumulative probabilities h(P+(x1)) and g(ce1).
That is, assuming a set of threshold values that are sufficiently smooth so as
to move in a continuous manner as signals are observed, we have
∂E[r(k)]
∂k
= P (f)rg′(k)[h(P+(x1))− g(ce1)]
with g′(k) < 0. Given the assumptions introduced regarding the sets of
characteristics, consider the value x1 ∈ X1 that solves the following equation
u1(x1) + u2(x
M
2 ) = E1 + E2.
9We will relax this assumption when studying the subgame perfect equilibrium version
of the game, where consumption habits and inertia will be allowed for among perfect fore-
sight decision makers. In other words, while recognizing the technological superiority of
the signaled set of goods, perfect foresight decision makers may still gather their obser-
vations from the unsignaled market due to persisting habits and inertia in consumption.
It should however be emphasized that the results obtained in the pre-commitment game
remain qualitatively unchanged by this assumption.
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Any realization of X1 below x1 prevents the decision maker from finding
a good that delivers at least as much utility as the certainty equivalent one.
Thus, h(P+(x1)) = 0 for all x1 < x1. Conversely, as we move above x1 we will
be losing combinations of X1 and X2 realizations that lead to an expected
good strictly preferred to the certainty equivalent one.
Consider, for example, the case where the observed X1 realization equals
ce1. Note that we must have x2 > ce2 for the decision maker to purchase the
good. Clearly, the probability that x2 > ce2 is lower than one, which implies
that h(P+(x1)) < g(ce1) for x1 = ce1, leading to
∂E[r(k)]
∂k
> 0. Thus, in order
for ∂E[r(k)]
∂k
< 0, i.e. for h(P+(x1)) > g(ce1), we must have x1 < ce1. Finally,
note that if h(P+(x1)) < g(ce1), then
∂E[r(k)]
∂k
> 0 for all k values.10
11.2.1 Myopic decision makers
If all decision makers are myopic, then the expected revenues obtained by
firms would be independent of their signaling strategies. In this case, all
entries composing the corresponding Technological Transition Matrix would
be, by definition, equal to E[r(C)], and transitions between technologies
become purely random events, leading to identical Nash and subgame perfect
equilibria.
10Given the uniform probability densities assumed, we have
h(P+(x1)) =
∫ xM1
x1
(
1
xM1 − xm1
)(
xM2 − x∗2
xM2 − xm2
)
dx1
where u2(x
∗
2) = E1 + E2 − u1(x1), for x1 ∈ [x1, xM1 ].
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In addition, if, as suggested by Malerba et al. (2003), signaling the exis-
tence of a technologically superior good leads to frictions [i.e. in the form of
lower quality as the product is initially introduced] decreasing the expected
utility that [myopic] decision makers derive from the product, signaling firms
would be unable to nurture a market niche where to survive and will disap-
pear from the market.
Proposition 11.2.1 If all decision makers are myopic and frictions exist
within the signaled market, no technological transition takes place either un-
der Nash pre-commitment or subgame perfection.
Proof. Consider the technological transition matrix defined within a
purely myopic setting. If, due to the induced frictions, signaling leads to
a strictly lower payoff than E[r(C)], then NS becomes a strictly dominant
strategy for both firms.
11.2.2 Perfect foresight
As we already showed in the previous technological transition sections, if all
decision makers have perfect foresight, i.e. if α = 0 and E[r(C|ns)] = 0, the
set of pre-commitment Nash equilibria will be defined by the relative values
of E[r(C)] and E[r(B|s)]. Consider first the scenario where E[r(B|s)] >
E[r(C)]. In this case, signaling in period zero constitutes the unique pre-
commitment Nash equilibrium.11
11Note that the pre-commitment Nash setting corresponds to that of a standard pris-
oner’s dilemma if E[r(B)] < E[r(C)]. We restate here the main results presented through
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Proposition 11.2.2 If all decision makers have perfect foresight and E[r(B|s)] >
E[r(C)], then signaling is optimal independently of the relative values taken
by E[r(B)] and E[r(C)].
Similarly, signaling becomes a weakly dominant strategy if E[r(B|s)] =
E[r(C)]. However, E[r(B|s)] < E[r(C)] leads to a mixed pre-commitment
Nash equilibrium based on the relative values of the matrix entries.
Proposition 11.2.3 If all decision makers have perfect foresight and E[r(B|s)] <
E[r(C)], the technological transition game has two pre-commitment Nash
equilibria, (S, S) and (NS,NS), in pure strategies.
Corollary 11.2.4 If all decision makers have perfect foresight and E[r(B|s)] <
E[r(C)], the technological transition game has a [nondegenerate] mixed strat-
egy equilibrium defined by
E[r(C)]− E[r(B|s)]
E[r(C)] + E[r(B)]− E[r(B|s)] = P
∗(S),
where P ∗(S) is the probability that a given firm signals the existence of a
technologically superior good and P ∗(NS) = 1− P ∗(S).
Clearly, ∂P
∗(S)
∂E[r(B|s)] < 0 and
∂P ∗(S)
∂E[r(C)]
> 0, implying that either an increase in
E[r(B|s)] or a decrease in E[r(C)] would lead to a larger set of P ∗(S) values
for which signaling constitutes an equilibrium strategy.
the technological transition sections in order to allow for basic direct comparisons between
the [set of] equilibria derived from perfect foresight and myopic decision-based scenarios.
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11.2.3 Myopic decision makers and perfect foresight
When both types of decision makers coexist in the market, the signaling firm
would get all the perfect foresight consumers plus a share of the myopic ones,
as defined by E[r(B|s)] for α ∈ (0, 1). At the same time, the not signaling
firm would receive an expected payoff of αE[r(C)] > 0. Thus, the set of
pre-commitment Nash equilibria depends on the relative values of E[r(C)],
E[r(B)] and E[r(B|s)].12
It should be emphasized that, in addition to the set of pre-commitment
Nash equilibria defined for the perfect foresight case, the current framework
allows for the existence of niche markets where only one of the firms signals
the existence of a technologically superior good.
Proposition 11.2.5 If the market consists of both perfect foresight and my-
opic decision makers, E[r(B|s)] > E[r(C)] and E[r(B)] < E[r(C|ns)],
the technological transition game has two pre-commitment Nash equilibria,
(S,NS) and (NS, S), in pure strategies.
The existence of these equilibria requires that E[r(B|s)] > E[r(C)] >
E[r(C|ns)] > E[r(B)]. Such a string of inequalities can be guaranteed as-
12Note that, in this setting, E[r(B|s)] is not based on all decision makers shifting their
information gathering process to the signaled market, but only a (1 − α) proportion of
them. Thus, if the signaled market were to provide a relative advantage over the unsignaled
one for the signaling firm, i.e. E[r(B)] > E[r(C)], the incentives to signal would be smaller
than in the perfect foresight case.
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suming both a value of α sufficiently close to zero and a large enough dif-
ference in payoffs between E[r(B|s)] and E[r(B)] via (1 − P (f)). These
conditions translate into requiring that a relatively low proportion of myopic
decision makers exists in the market and that sufficiently large monopolistic
rents are obtained from unilaterally signaling when compared to competing
in the signaled market. It is indeed the strength of the (1−P (f)) effect what
would guarantee that E[r(B|s)] is higher than both E[r(C)] and E[r(B)].
Note that, as was the case in the perfect foresight scenario, a relatively
high E[r(B|s)] payoff provides firms with a strong incentive to signal the
existence of a technologically superior product. In this case, both firms will
try to be the first one to signal, as if they were competing on a techno-
logical race where the winner enjoys the monopolistic rents reflected by the
E[r(B|s)] > E[r(C|ns)] inequality.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the previous analysis could be ex-
tended to study the existence of correlated equilibria and the conditions for
the creation of niche market within the current setting. However, we will be
dealing with this type of results in the following section, where more natural
conditions for the coordinated generation of niche market emerge.
11.3 Subgame perfection
We identify now the set of possible subgame perfect equilibria, which will be
based on the relative matrix entry values achieved at each signaling time
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period. Consider first the technological transition matrices that may be
faced by firms in period one, just before decision makers start gathering
information.
Guaranteed Improvement Technological Transition Matrix Period One
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] E[r(B|s)], E[r(C|ns)]
NS E[r(C|ns)], E[r(B|s)] E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
Irreversibility Technological Transition Matrix Period One
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] E[r(A− C|s)], E[r(C − A|ns)]
NS E[r(C − A|ns)], E[r(A− C|s)] E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
The strategies of the firm are described in the upper row, while the left
column corresponds to those of the rival. Both types of decision reversibility
processes can be explicitly differentiated through the (S, NS) and (NS, S)
entries of their respective matrices. In this regard, the former matrix refers to
the guaranteed improvement setting while the latter stands for the decision
irreversibility one.
Clearly, the guaranteed improvement setting highly resembles the Nash
pre-commitment one. Indeed, its set of equilibria will be determined by the
relative values of E[r(B)], E[r(C)], E[r(B|s)], and that of the α proportion
of myopic decision makers. However, subgame perfection allows firms to
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coordinate the creation of niche markets in the interim period after observing
the signaling strategy of the rival, a task significantly harder to achieve in
the pre-commitment case.
The set of outcomes derived from the decision irreversibility setting is
slightly more cumbersome. We have denoted by E[r(A−C|s)] the expected
payoff received by the signaling firm when only one of them signals and de-
cisions are irreversible, i.e. the decision maker foregoes the x1 characteristic
observed in the unsignaled market when moving to the signaled one. In
this case, the payoff received by the not signaling firm has been denoted
by E[r(C − A|ns)]. Both these payoffs will be explicitly defined to capture
consumption inertia in the information gathering process of decision mak-
ers. That is, as emphasized by Malerba et al. (2003), the introduction of a
new product within a given industry relies on the existence of experimental
consumers that may allow for its survival through the creation of specialized
niche markets. In the current setting, such an assumption implies that de-
spite the technological superiority of the set of signaled goods, even perfect
foresight decision makers may be reluctant to initially shift their information
gathering processes to the signaled market.13 As a result, perfect foresight
decision makers could still gather their first observation from the unsignaled
market and shifting may take place afterwards.
13The existence of network effects could also provide the required intuition, as it is always
challenging for decision makers to be among the first consumers of a new technology while
abandoning an already established one.
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Consider the unilateral signaling scenario from the perspective of the not
signaling firm and define its expected payoff by
E[r(C−A|ns)] = (1−α){P (f)[g(A)r1(A)]+P (r)[(1−g(B))P (f)g(A)r]}+αE[(C)]
If a [perfect foresight] decision maker gathers her first observation from
the [set of goods offered by the] not signaling firm and it is lower than A,
an event happening with probability P (f)(1 − g(A)), then she will shift
to the signaled market in order to gather her last observation, leading to
a payoff of zero for the not signaling firm. For consistency purposes, the
second right hand side term of the equation requires the last x1 gathered
from the unsignaled market to be above A for the decision maker to choose
the corresponding good and nothing otherwise.14 A similar analysis could be
performed to describe E[r(A− C|s)], where
E[r(A− C|s)] =
(1−α){P (f)[g(B)r1(B)+(1−g(B))P (f)g(ce1)r]+P (r)[(1−g(A))g(ce1)r]}+
αE[(C)].
There exists a substantial difference between the assumptions underlying
E[r(A − C|s)] and those used to define E[r(k)], with k = B,C. In both
E[r(k)] cases, if the decision maker observed a x1 < k characteristic from
14Note, however, that even if we take ce1 as the main reference point instead of A,
E[r(C − A|ns)] < E[r(B)] for α = 0, as is required in the following subsection to define
the perfect foresight subgame equilibria.
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a firm’s good, it was assumed that she could start gathering her second in-
formation piece from any of the two firms. In the current setting, perfect
foresight decision makers are not indifferent between both markets if x1 < A
in the unsignaled one. That is, once the initial inertia is overcome, decision
makers will shift their information gathering process to the signaled market if
x1 < A in the unsignaled one. However, if x1 < B in the signaled market, it
has been assumed that perfect foresight decision makers may still gather their
last piece of information from the signaled market with probability P (f).
These assumptions have been imposed to reflect the preference for experi-
mentation that perfect foresight [experimental] decision makers must exhibit
after becoming aware of the existence of technologically superior products
and despite the initial consumption inertia they may be subject to.
11.3.1 Perfect foresight
Given the set of expected payoffs defined above, three possible technological
transition matrices with their corresponding equilibria could be defined in
period zero.
If E[r(C)] is higher than E[r(B|s)] and E[r(A − C|s)], then a not
signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will not
signal in period one. In the same way, α = 0 implies that E[r(C|ns)] = 0
and E[r(C − A|ns)] < E[r(B)], which leads to
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Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)]
NS E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
The subgame perfect equilibrium depends on the relative values of E[r(B)]
and E[r(C)]. In this case, both firms will coordinate their strategies in equi-
librium by either signaling or not the existence of a technologically improved
set of goods.
In the guaranteed improvement case, if E[r(B|s)] > E[r(C)], then
a not signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival
will signal in period one, leading to
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] E[r(B|s)], 0
NS
Clearly, the subgame perfect equilibrium consists of both the firm and its
rival signaling the existence of an improved technology in period zero.
In the irreversible case, if E[r(A − C|s)] > E[r(C)], then a not sig-
naling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will signal
in period one, leading to
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Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] E[r(A− C|s)], E[r(C − A|ns)]
NS
The subgame perfect equilibrium depends on the relative values of E[r(B)]
and E[r(C−A|ns)]. Given the assumptions imposed when defining E[r(C−
A|ns)] and the fact that g(A) < g(B), it can be easily shown that E[r(C −
A|ns)] < E[r(B)], making of signaling an equilibrium strategy for the firm.15
The following results are immediate.
Proposition 11.3.1 If all decision makers have perfect foresight, E[r(B|s)] <
E[r(C)] and E[r(A−C|s)] < E[r(C)], the technological transition game has
a unique subgame perfect equilibria, (NS,NS).
Proof. If all decision makers have perfect foresight, E[r(B|s)] < E[r(C)]
and E[r(A− C|s)] < E[r(C)], then not signaling is a dominant strategy for
both firms if E[r(B)] < E[r(C)]. This is indeed the case since E[r(B|s)] >
E[r(B)] and E[r(A−C|s)] > E[r(B)] when α = 0. Thus, E[r(C)] > E[r(B)],
and not signaling constitutes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
15However, if our assumptions are modified, in particular those regarding preference for
experimentation, not signaling may become an optimal strategy, leading to the creation
of niche markets signaled by the rival.
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Proposition 11.3.2 If all decision makers have perfect foresight, E[r(B|s)] >
E[r(C)] and E[r(A−C|s)] > E[r(C)], the technological transition game has
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where both firms signal.
Note that, as in the Nash pre-commitment case, niche markets are not
generated when all decision makers have perfect foresight. The technological
transition either takes place or not, based on the expected payoffs derived
from unilaterally signaling, i.e. E[r(B|s)] and E[r(A − C|s)]. Such a result
is due to the zero payoff received by the firms that do not signal when the
rival does, which, at the same time, is due to the absence of myopic decision
makers in the market.
11.3.2 Myopic decision makers and perfect foresight
We have just illustrated how the existence of perfect foresight decision makers
helps triggering the transition towards the signaled market by penalizing
those firms that do not signal when an incentive to unilaterally doing so
exists. Consequently, the coexistence of both types of decision makers in the
market will constraint such a tendency [but also allow for the creation of
niche markets where innovative signaling firms may survive].
It should be noted that the set of equilibria obtained in the previous
subsection could also be generated in the current one. However, we will
concentrate here on highlighting the conditions required for the creation of
niche markets where signaling firms may survive and comparing the resulting
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equilibria with those introduced in the pre-commitment and perfect foresight
cases.
In the guaranteed improvement case, if E[r(B)] < E[r(C|ns)], then
a signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will
not signal in period one.16 Besides, if E[r(C)] is lower than E[r(B|s)],
then a not signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the
rival will signal in period one. The period zero matrix would be given by
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(B|s)], E[r(C|ns)]
NS E[r(C|ns)], E[r(B|s)]
As in the corresponding Nash pre-commitment case, the existence of niche
equilibria requires both E[r(B)] < E[r(C|ns)] and E[r(C)] < E[r(B|s)]. It
follows that E[r(B)] < E[r(C|ns)] < E[r(C)] < E[r(B|s)]. In this case,
since E[r(C|ns)] < E[r(B|s)], the firm has a clear incentive to be the first
one to signal and let the rival follow a not signaling strategy.
In the irreversible case, if E[r(A − C|s)] > E[r(C)], then a not sig-
naling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will signal
in period one. Besides, if E[(C − A|ns)] is higher than E[(B)], then a
signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will not
16Note that this payoff inequality is possible since α > 0, implying that E[r(C|ns)] > 0.
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signal in period one.17 The period zero matrix would be defined as follows
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(A− C|s)], E[r(C − A|ns)]
NS E[r(C − A|ns)], E[r(A− C|s)]
Given the assumptions imposed when defining E[r(C−A|ns)] and the fact
that g(A) < g(B), it can be easily shown that E[r(A−C|s)] > E[r(C−A|ns)],
making of signaling an optimal period zero strategy for a firm. Thus, as in
the guaranteed improvement case, a firm has a clear incentive to be the first
one to signal in period zero while letting the rival follow a complementary not
signaling strategy in period one. If the firm does not signal in period zero, the
rival will, generating a niche specialized market for developed technological
goods.
Note that in the current setting E[r(A−C|s)] is higher than both E[r(B)]
and E[r(C)]. That is, firms obtain the highest possible expected payoff by be-
coming sole monopolists within the niche signaled markets. The requirements
imposed to reach this equilibrium provide us with the following intuition
(i) In order for E[r(C − A|ns)] > E[r(B)] we must have both E[r(C)] >
E[r(B)] and a sufficiently high vale of α, since E[r(C − A|ns)] <
17As in the guaranteed improvement case, this payoff inequality is possible due to the
α > 0 assumption.
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E[r(B)] when α = 0. Therefore, the not signaling firm remains as a fol-
lower of the signaled market monopolist if a relatively large proportion
of myopic decision makers exists in the market and competing in the
signaled market constitutes a loss with respect to the corresponding
expected payoff obtained in the unsignaled one.
(ii) In order for E[r(A−C|s)] > E[r(C)] the effect of P (r)[(1−g(A))g(ce1)r]
has to compensate (against P (r)[(1− g(C))P (f)g(ce1)r]) for the rela-
tive loss induced by P (f)[g(B)r1(B) + (1 − g(B))P (f)g(ce1)r], which
is due to the E[r(C)] > E[r(B)] requirement. That is, the relative
loss that results from competing in the signaled market, as opposed to
the unsignaled one, must be compensated by the gain derived from the
lesser ability of the rival to provide decision makers with a x1 charac-
teristic above A when compared to point C.
The following results are immediate.
Proposition 11.3.3 If both types of decision makers coexist in the market,
improvement is guaranteed, E[r(B)] < E[r(C|ns)] and E[r(C)] < E[r(B|s)],
the technological transition game has a subgame perfect equilibrium leading
to the creation of a signaling niche market.
Corollary 11.3.4 If both types of decision makers coexist in the market,
improvement is guaranteed, E[r(B)] < E[r(C|ns)] and E[r(C)] < E[r(B|s)],
both firms have an incentive to be the first one to signal and dominate the
technological niche market under subgame perfection.
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Proposition 11.3.5 If both types of decision makers coexist in the market,
decisions are irreversible, E[r(C)] < E[r(A− C|s)] and E[r(B)] < E[r(C −
A|ns)], the technological transition game has a subgame perfect equilibrium
leading to the creation of a signaling niche market.
Corollary 11.3.6 If both types of decision makers coexist in the market,
decisions are irreversible, E[r(C)] < E[r(A− C|s)] and E[r(B)] < E[r(C −
A|ns)], both firms have an incentive to be the first one to signal and dominate
the technological niche market under subgame perfection.
Note that the incentives for the generation of market niches are identical
in both the guaranteed improvement and irreversible settings. In this sense,
the importance of the monopolistic rents derived from unilaterally signaling is
reflected by E[r(C)] < E[r(B|s)] and E[r(C)] < E[r(A−C|s)], respectively.
In addition, the incentives not to trigger additional competition in the niche
market once a firm has signaled are respectively provided by E[r(B)] <
E[r(C|ns)] and E[r(B)] < E[r(C − A|ns)].
However, a small difference between both setting exists. In the guaran-
teed improvement scenario, monopolistic rents provide firms with a signaling
incentive that dominates all other possible payoffs, i.e. E[(B)] < E[(C|ns)] <
E[(C)] < E[(B|s)]. In this case, the status quo payoff defined by E[r(C)]
constrains the joint introduction of superior technological products and it is
the existence of monopolistic rents from unilaterally signaling what promotes
their introduction through niche markets. As in the Nash pre-commitment
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case, the incentives to signal are provided by low enough α and sufficiently
large (1−P (f)) values. In the irreversible scenario, a similar type of reason-
ing would require E[r(C)] > E[r(C −A|ns)],18 an inequality that cannot be
guaranteed analytically.
18For this to be the case, it would suffice to assume that (1− g(C)) > P (r)(1− g(B)).
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Chapter 12
Supply: decision reversibility
and technological transition
Consider the numerical representations of the three types of decision pro-
cesses defined within the Climbing the Quality Ladder subsection 4.1, which
are illustrated in Figures 20 and 21. In both figures the unsignaled market is
represented by the F (ns) and H(ns) functions and decision makers receive
a credible signal indicating the existence of a set of technologically superior
products.
The guaranteed improvement case, denoted by H(fg), allows for an im-
mediate transition to the signaled market among decision makers indepen-
dently of the value of the x1 observation gathered in the unsignaled market,
since H(fg) > F (ns), ∀x1 ∈ X1. Clearly, this type of result cannot be gener-
ated by either the irreversible or the reversible decision processes, denoted by
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H(nr) and H(r), respectively. While decision irreversibility may be expected
to impose a large constraint on the information gathering process of decision
makers, decision reversibility should be expected to allow for more flexibility
when defining the transition between markets.1 Note, however, that for the
effects of market reversibility to become evident, the x1 required to be ob-
served in the unsignaled market must be relatively high. This phenomenon
is exacerbated in the risk averse case, as Figure 21 shows, where the utilities
with which decision makers are endowed have been transformed from basic
linear functions to square roots. Note also, that in both the risk averse and
neutral cases the slope of H(r) is considerably smaller than that of H(fg)
through their respective upward sloping regions. Clearly, the ability of sig-
naling firms to guarantee the x1 value observed in the unsignaled market but
a E2|θ=1 > E2 is responsible for this type of effect.
Thus, depending on the type of stochastic improvement defined, one sig-
nal may not suffice to differentiate the threshold continuation regions defined
by reversible and irreversible decision processes.2 In any case, the stochastic
1The intuition for this assertion follows from the decrease in the expected search utility
of decision makers due to the observation lost in the irreversible case when shifting between
markets takes place. As a result, the corresponding H(nr) function remains below the
guaranteed improvement one for all x1 > ce1 values.
2Indeed, a relatively small stochastic improvement may lead to identical threshold val-
ues lower than ce1 being defined for both decision processes. In this case, the analysis
presented in the game theoretical [supply] section should be modified, since both decision
processes would lead to the same expected revenue function, i.e. the reversibility effect
vanishes for threshold continuation values lower than ce1. A similar, but more complex,
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improvement defined in Section 4 will allow us to differentiate the expected
payoffs obtained by firms for all types of decision processes and will therefore
be maintained through the rest of the thesis.
In order to simplify the presentation, Figures 18 and 19 illustrate only the
guaranteed improvement and irreversible decision processes, since the latter
shares the information gathering threshold with the reversible case. Figure
18 illustrates the one and two signals cases, denoted by 1s and 2s, respec-
tively, and the evolution of the corresponding threshold values within a basic
risk neutral scenario. Points C and B identify the threshold values defined by
decision makers when gathering information on a set of goods located within
the unsignaled and the one signal market, respectively. Threshold point B
illustrates a guaranteed improvement over C, while point A represents both
the irreversible and reversible cases. Clearly, threshold point A results from
comparing the expected utility derived from checking the second characteris-
tic of the good observed in the unsignaled market, F (ns), with that obtained
from checking the first characteristic of a good in the signaled one, H(nr).
Figure 19 illustrates the same environment as Figure 18 but within a risk
averse setting, where the utilities with which decision makers are endowed
have been shifted once again from basic linear functions to square roots.
Clearly, as already stated in the previous sections, positive signals gener-
problem would also arise in the guaranteed improvement setting for small stochastic im-
provements. Note, in particular, that the slope of H(fg) after ce1 is higher than that of
F (ns), which would allow for multiple thresholds values.
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ating first order stochastic dominant beliefs lead to higher expected utility
levels for all possible x1 values. However, in doing so, signals shift the respec-
tive optimal threshold values towards higher x1 realizations in both markets.
The intuition arising from these results states that positive signals should
generate immediate herds of consumers towards the subset of goods on which
they are defined, but, at the same time, decision makers, who expect a higher
E2 value to be guaranteed from their information gathering process, become
less search averse within both markets. That is, the set of X1 realizations for
which the corresponding H(x1) function remains above F (x1) increases from
[xm1 , C] to [x
m
1 , B] when shifting to the signaled market and from [x
m
1 , C] to
[xm1 , A] if the decision maker remains within the unsignaled one. As a re-
sult, decision makers would require relatively higher realizations from the
first characteristic space in order to continue gathering information on the
observed good.
Such an effect can also be observed in the risk averse setting illustrated in
Figure 19. Note, however, once again, the increase in search aversion relative
to the linear risk neutral case. Other than that, the signal effects are identical
to those observed in the risk neutral case.
12.1 Basic assumptions
Given the behavior of the optimal threshold values identified in the previous
section, a basic strategic structure can be defined to model the introduction
of technologically superior products by firms among which the decision maker
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may search and choose.
We will repeat here several of the assumptions and environmental con-
straints that were introduced in the previous section on consumer myopia.
This is done for comparability purposes. In the current setting, a reversibil-
ity property of the information gathering process of decision makers will be
used to generate technological niche markets, as opposed to the existence
of myopic decision makers introduced in the previous section. The notation
will therefore be slightly different but the intuition basically the same. This
will particularly be the case within the Absence of niche markets subsection,
where the basic game theoretical equilibria presented in the previous section
will be restated within a setting composed exclusively by perfect foresight
decision makers. The most important changes will be introduced through
the Generating niche markets subsection, where the reversibility of the in-
formation gathering processes of decision makers determines the equilibria of
the corresponding set of technological transition games.
Consider a standard symmetric economic duopoly. The strategies avail-
able to each identical firm consist of either signaling the introduction of an
improved X2 product characteristic, S, or not signaling it, NS. The following
temporal sequence will be assumed. There are three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2.
Period zero takes place before the decision maker observes any characteristic,
while the two pieces of information are respectively gathered by the decision
maker in periods one and two. Signals can only be received during the first
two periods. That is, firms only interact strategically by trying to affect the
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information gathering process of decision makers in periods zero and one.
Consequently, we will concentrate the analysis on subgame perfect equilibria,
where firms may wait to observe the signaling strategy of the rival in period
one and then decide whether or not to signal just before the decision maker
gathers her first piece of information. In this case, the interim signaling de-
cision of the rival has to be anticipated and incorporated in the period zero
strategies of firms.
The information acquisition incentives of decision makers are illustrated
by their expected utilities, which, at the same time, define the revenues
expected to be obtained by firms. That is, given the available distribution of
product characteristics that may be displayed by a firm, its expected revenues
depend on its ability to provide the characteristics required by the decision
maker.
Hence, the following terminal condition will be imposed on the informa-
tion gathering process of decision makers: if the characteristics observed after
gathering both pieces of information do not define goods whose expected util-
ity is higher than E1 + E2, then the decision maker will reject any available
random choice. This condition is imposed to avoid biasing the choices made
by decision makers, as well as the corresponding strategies of firms, towards
the signaled market. If we were not to impose it, and both information
pieces gathered lead to goods with an expected utility lower than E1 + E2,
then decision makers would be forced to choose randomly from the signaled
market. This would provide the signaling firm with a distinct advantage in-
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dependently of its available distribution of X1 characteristics. Moreover, we
would be forcing decision makers to consume independently of the outcome
resulting from their information gathering processes. Thus, we will assume
that for decision makers to purchase a good it must provide them with an
expected utility higher than E1 + E2.
3
Assuming that the technological improvements introduced by the signal-
ing firm must be defined upon E1 + E2 instead of E1 + E2|θ=1 imposes an
important constraint on the model. In this sense, the analysis of the supply
side presented in the thesis remains unchanged when both firms are subject
to the same minimum quality constraints, i.e. both must improve upon either
E1 + E2 or E1 + E2|θ=1.
Due to the credibility of the signals and the basic dynamic structure of
3Note that, from a formal perspective and as emphasized in the previous section, this
assumption could be considered when defining the F (x1) and H(x1) [together with the
H(x1|nr), H(x1|fg) and H(x1|r)] functions, which should be modified accordingly. How-
ever, even though imposing formally such a constraint does not significantly modify the
results presented in the previous section, which were mainly based on the percentage of
myopic decision makers existing in the economy, it would indeed alter the main results
obtained within the current one, i.e. a reinterpretation of the model within a choice setting
defined by discontinuous H functions would be required. We will not consider this alterna-
tive scenario in the current thesis, though it constitutes a plausible extension. Once again,
the ability of decision makers to resort to a randomly chosen good provides an explicit
reference point against which markets may be easily compared when defining the search
strategy of decision makers. As a result, the simplified continuous version of the expected
search utilities will be maintained.
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quality ladders, we assume that improvements must take place upon the
technological level displayed by the current set of unsignaled goods, defining
a E1 + E2 reference point for all decision makers.
4 In this case, signaling
constitutes an advantage due to the credibility of the signal, since E2|θ=1 >
E2.
5 However, one of the main points highlighted in the thesis is that, despite
the relative advantage provided by a credible signal, the creation of niche
markets may not be the best option available to the signaling firm.
Assume, finally, for analytical simplicity and consistency purposes, that
the distribution of characteristics on X1 and X2 available to each firm is
defined by a standard uniform distribution.
12.2 Game theoretical setting
We identify below the set of possible subgame perfect equilibria for both firms
resulting from the demand-based strategic signaling environment. These
equilibria will be based on the relative matrix entry values achieved at each
4This assumption becomes particularly important when defining the h(P+(x1)) func-
tion within the r1(k) expression later on. Imposing different certainty equivalent con-
straints for each market would complicate the presentation and oblige us to modify the
analysis substantially. For example, inequalities such as EI [r(C−A|ns)] < E[r(B)], could
not longer be guaranteed analytically. Thus, extensions of the current model should ac-
count for the effect that different reference points have both on the optimal behavior of
decision makers and the signaling strategies of firms.
5The dual of this formulation would impose a disadvantage on the not signaling firm
for the very same reason, with both firms being assumed to improve upon E1 + E2|θ=1.
142
signaling time period.
Consider first the technological transition matrices that may be faced by
firms in period one, just before decision makers start gathering information.
Guaranteed Improvement Technological Transition Matrix [Period One]
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] E[r(B|s)], E[r(C|ns)]
NS E[r(C|ns)], E[r(B|s)] E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
Irreversible Technological Transition Matrix [Period One]
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] EI [r(A− C|s)], EI [r(C − A|ns)]
NS EI [r(C − A|ns)], EI [r(A− C|s)] E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
Reversible Technological Transition Matrix [Period One]
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] ER[r(A− C|s)], ER[r(C − A|ns)]
NS ER[r(C − A|ns)], ER[r(A− C|s)] E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
The strategies of the firm are described in the upper row, while the left
column corresponds to those of the rival. Decision irreversibility and re-
versibility processes are explicitly differentiated through the payoffs defining
the (S, NS) and (NS, S) entries of their respective matrices.
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We analyze formally below the revenues that firms expect to obtain based
on the different threshold values defining the optimal information gathering
behavior of decision makers and the number of competitors existing in each
particular market.
12.3 Absence of niche markets
Refer to Figures 18 and 19 and denote by E[r(k)] the expected revenue
obtained by each firm when both firms compete for decision makers within
the k = B,C optimal threshold framework. We describe below, both formally
and intuitively, the elements composing these expected revenues for both
firms.
Denote by P (f) the [subjective] probability assigned by a firm to the de-
cision maker observing a characteristic from one of its goods when competing
[for decision makers] with a rival. Within a basic duopoly scenario, the prob-
ability assigned by a firm to the decision maker observing a characteristic
from one of the goods offered by the rival equals P (r) = 1−P (f). Given the
numerical simulations presented in the previous section, the probability that
the decision maker continues gathering information on the good whose first
characteristic she has observed can be easily defined and calculated. Denote
this probability by g(k) = (xM1 − k)/(xM1 − xm1 ), for k = A,B,C.6 Similarly,
6Abusing notation, we refer to k as both an information gathering threshold value and
its projection on the X1 domain.
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the probability that the decision maker does not continue gathering infor-
mation on the good whose first characteristic she has observed is given by
1− g(k) = (k − xm1 )/(xM1 − xm1 ), for k = A,B,C.7
The firm’s expected revenue when two pieces of information are left to
gather and firms compete with each other for decision makers at k, where
k = B,C, is given by8
E[r(k)] = P (f)[g(k)r1(k) + (1− g(k))[P (f)g(ce1)r]]+
P (r)[(1− g(k))[P (f)g(ce1)r]],
where r1(k) represents the firm’s expected revenue when one piece of infor-
mation is left to gather and x1 > k, with k = A,B,C. That is,
r1(k) = h(P
+(x1))r,
7We have assumed that both the firm and its rival have identical uniform distributions
of available characteristics defined on the X1 and X2 sets. Thus, both firms face the same
continuation and rejection probabilities in both the signaled and unsignaled markets. Note,
however, that allowing for varying distributions of available characteristics between firms
would modify their expected payoffs and the resulting equilibria.
8Note that the value of g(ce1) defined within the signaled market must be higher
than the corresponding g(ce1) value defined within the unsignaled one. This is due to
E2|θ=1 > E2 and the fact that decision makers consider the current set of unsignaled
goods as the reference point upon which technological improvement must be defined.
Imposing such a distinction explicitly would not affect the main results obtained but
requires additional notation. Thus, while keeping the existing difference in mind, the
notation will remain unchanged through the rest of the thesis.
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where h(P+(x1)) denotes the probability assigned by the firm to the decision
maker observing a x2 value such that u2(x2) > E1 +E2− u1(x1) and r is the
revenue obtained by the firm from the sale of its product.
When competing with a rival, firms face a probability P (f) of having
one of their goods’ first characteristics observed by the decision maker. If
this is the case, the probability of the decision maker observing a x1 higher
than the corresponding k value equals g(k). After observing x1 > k, the
decision maker will observe a x2 such that u1(x1) + u2(x2) > E1 + E2 with
probability h(P+(x1)), and purchase the good, leading to a firm’s revenue of
r. However, if u1(x1)+u2(x2) < E1+E2, the decision maker remains without
any observation left to gather and, due to the terminal condition imposed,
would not purchase any good, leading to a revenue of zero. On the other
hand, if x1 < k, an event taking place with probability (1−g(k)), it has been
assumed that the decision maker may observe a new first characteristic from
the set of goods offered by any of the firms. In this case, if the decision maker
observes her final first characteristic from one of the firm’s goods, she will
only purchase it if x1 > ce1, an event taking place with probability g(ce1),
where g(ce1) = (x
M
1 − ce1)/(xM1 − xm1 ).
The second term on the right hand side of the E[r(k)] expression corre-
sponds to the expected revenue of a firm when the decision maker gathers
her first observation from one of the rival’s goods. The firm will only be able
to obtain a revenue if the decision maker observes a x1 < k characteristic
from its rival’s good and then chooses the firm to gather her final piece of
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information, observing a value of x1 > ce1.
Note, finally, that the E[r(k)] expression can be simplified and rewritten
as follows
E[r(k)] = P (f)r[g(k)h(P+(x1)) + (1− g(k))g(ce1)], k = B,C.
12.3.1 Guaranteed improvement
Within the guaranteed improvement framework, E[r(B|s)] and E[r(C|ns)]
correspond to the expected revenue obtained by a firm from unilaterally
signaling or not doing so, respectively. The expected payoff received by the
signaling firm within an unilateral signaling scenario would be given by
E[r(B|s)] = r[g(B)h(P+(x1)) + (1− g(B))g(ce1)].
In this case, due to the guaranteed improvement assumption, decision makers
will limit their search to the signaled market when gathering both of their
available observations. Thus, if only one firm signals, it will serve alone all
decision makers with respect to threshold B. The expected payoff obtained
by the not signaling firm would therefore be given by
E[r(C|ns)] = 0.
Clearly, E[r(B|s)] > E[r(B)] and E[r(C|ns)] < E[r(C)]. However, as
we saw in the previous section, comparisons between E[r(B)] and E[r(C)]
depend on the relative values of the cumulative probabilities h(P+(x1)) and
g(ce1). As a result, we will not impose any constraint on the behavior of
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∂E[r(k)]
∂k
or regarding the relative values of E[r(B)] and E[r(C)] when analyz-
ing and defining the different sets of game equilibria.
As intuition would suggest, if both firms signal the improvement, they
must compete for decision makers in the corresponding market, leading to a
strictly smaller expected payoff, E[r(B)], than the one obtained in a monopo-
listic environment by the firm that has signaled the improvement, E[r(B|s)].
In the latter case, the firm not signaling the improvement, and receiving
E[r(C|ns)], would be expected to suffer a loss relative to the not signal-
ing equilibrium payoff, E[r(C)], as decision makers shift their information
gathering process to the signaled market.
However, and despite the induced decrease in competition, unilaterally
signaling leads to a stricter threshold continuation criterion being imposed
by decision makers on the corresponding set of goods. Thus, the incentives
of firms to signal a technological improvement should depend on the relative
magnitude of both these effects on their expected revenues.
12.3.2 Decision irreversibility
The set of expected revenues derived from the decision irreversibility setting
is slightly more cumbersome than that of the guaranteed improvement case.
We have denoted by EI [r(A−C|s)] the expected payoff received by the sig-
naling firm when only one of them signals and decisions are irreversible, i.e.
the decision maker foregoes the x1 characteristic observed in the unsignaled
market when moving to the signaled one. In this case, the payoff received
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by the not signaling firm has been denoted by EI [r(C − A|ns)]. Both these
payoffs, and the corresponding ones that will be derived within the decision
reversibility scenario, will be explicitly defined to capture consumption iner-
tia in the information gathering process of decision makers. In our current
setting, such an assumption implies that despite the technological superiority
of the set of signaled goods, decision makers may be reluctant to initially shift
their information gathering processes to the signaled market.9 As a result,
decision makers could still gather their first observation from the unsignaled
market and shifting may take place afterwards.
Consider the irreversible unilateral signaling scenario from the perspective
of the not signaling firm and define its expected payoff by
EI [r(C − A|ns)] = P (f)[g(A)r1(A)] + P (r)[(1− g(B))P (f)g(A)r]
If a decision maker gathers her first observation from the [set of goods
offered by the] not signaling firm and it is lower than A, an event happening
with probability P (f)(1 − g(A)), then she will shift to the signaled market
in order to gather her last observation, leading to a payoff of zero for the not
signaling firm. For consistency purposes, the second right hand side term
9That is, as emphasized by Malerba et al. (2003), the introduction of a new product
within a given industry relies on the existence of experimental consumers that may allow
for its survival through the creation of specialized niche markets. Similarly, the existence
of network effects could also provide the intuition required to justify consumption inertia,
as it is always challenging for decision makers to be among the first consumers of a new
technology while abandoning an already established one.
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of the equation requires the last x1 gathered from the unsignaled market to
be above A for the decision maker to choose the corresponding good and
nothing otherwise.10
More precisely, the choice of threshold value within the final right hand
side term allows for the following possibilities.
Assume that the decision maker observes a x1|θ=1 < B characteristic and
shifts her information gathering process to the unsignaled market. In this
case, observing a x1 > A characteristic leads to a higher expected utility
than the one derived from the unsignaled certainty equivalent good. Besides,
it also implies that the decision maker would rather continue gathering ad-
ditional information on the observed unsignaled good than start gathering
information on any of the [remaining] goods available in the signaled market.
Therefore, A seems a reasonable candidate to consider as threshold value.
Similarly, observing a characteristic located within (ce1, A) implies that even
though the expected utility derived from this observed good is above that
of the certainty equivalent one defined within the unsignaled market, the de-
cision maker would rather shift her information gathering process to the
signaled market. In this case, the conflicting incentives faced by the decision
maker could allow us to conclude that she does not purchase any good. On
the other hand, we could also state that since information gathering decisions
10Note that, even if we take ce1 as the reference point instead of A, we get EI [r(C −
A|ns)] < E[r(B)], as is required in the following subsection to define the irreversible
subgame equilibria.
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are irreversible and the good observed in the unsignaled market satisfies the
certainty equivalent requirements imposed by the decision maker, she pur-
chases it. This would be the case despite the better expectations on the
set of X2 characteristics resulting from a random choice within the signaled
market. As a result, ce1 should act as the corresponding threshold value.
A similar analysis could be performed to describe EI [r(A− C|s)], where
EI [r(A−C|s)] = P (f)[g(B)r1(B)+(1−g(B))P (f)g(ce1)r]+P (r)[(1−g(A))g(ce1)r].
There exists a substantial difference between the assumptions underlying
EI [r(A − C|s)] and those used to define E[r(k)], with k = B,C. In both
E[r(k)] cases, if the decision maker observed a x1 < k characteristic from
a firm’s good, it was assumed that she could start gathering her second in-
formation piece from any of the two firms. In the current setting, decision
makers are not indifferent between both markets if x1 < A in the unsignaled
one. That is, once the initial inertia is overcome, decision makers will shift
their information gathering process to the signaled market if x1 < A in the
unsignaled one. However, if x1 < B in the signaled market, it has been
assumed that decision makers may still gather their last piece of informa-
tion from the signaled market with probability P (f). These assumptions
have been imposed to reflect the preference for experimentation that decision
makers must exhibit after becoming aware of the existence of technologically
superior products and despite the initial consumption inertia they may be
subject to. Similar assumptions will hold in the decision reversibility setting.
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However, the ability of decision makers to reverse their information gathering
process back to the unsignaled market will introduce several modifications
when defining the corresponding expected payoffs of firms.
12.3.3 Equilibria and results
Given the set of expected payoffs defined above, three possible technological
transition matrices with their corresponding equilibria could be defined in
period zero.
If E[r(C)] is higher than E[r(B|s)] and EI [r(A − C|s)], then a not
signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will not
signal in period one. Similarly, since E[r(C|ns)] = 0 and EI [r(C −A|ns)] <
E[r(B)], we have
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)]
NS E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
The subgame perfect equilibrium depends on the relative values of E[r(B)]
and E[r(C)]. In this case, both firms may coordinate their strategies in equi-
librium by either signaling or not the existence of a technologically improved
set of goods. However, it immediately follows that
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Proposition 12.3.1 If E[r(B|s)] < E[r(C)] and EI [r(A−C|s)] < E[r(C)],
the technological transition game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium,
(NS,NS).
Proof. If E[r(B|s)] < E[r(C)] and EI [r(A − C|s)] < E[r(C)], then not
signaling is a dominant strategy for both firms if E[r(B)] < E[r(C)]. This
is indeed the case since E[r(B|s)] > E[r(B)] and EI [r(A− C|s)] > E[r(B)].
Thus, E[r(C)] > E[r(B)], and not signaling constitutes the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium.
In the guaranteed improvement case, if E[r(B|s)] > E[r(C)], then
a not signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival
will signal in period one, leading to
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] E[r(B|s)], 0
NS
Clearly, the subgame perfect equilibrium consists of both the firm and its
rival signaling the existence of an improved technology in period zero. Note
that a relatively high E[r(B|s)] payoff provides firms with a strong incentive
to signal the existence of a technologically superior product. In this case,
both firms will try to be the first one to signal, as if they were competing on
a technological race where the winner enjoys the monopolistic rents reflected
by the E[r(B|s)] > E[r(C|ns)] inequality.
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In the irreversible case, if EI [r(A − C|s)] > E[r(C)], then a not
signaling strategy from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will
signal in period one, leading to
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] EI [r(A− C|s)], EI [r(C − A|ns)]
NS
The subgame perfect equilibrium depends on the relative values of E[r(B)]
and EI [r(C−A|ns)]. Given the assumptions imposed when defining EI [r(C−
A|ns)] and the fact that g(A) < g(B), it can be easily shown that EI [r(C −
A|ns)] < E[r(B)], making of signaling an equilibrium strategy for the firm.11
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 12.3.2 If E[r(B|s)] > E[r(C)] and EI [r(A−C|s)] > E[r(C)],
the technological transition game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
where both firms signal.
Clearly, niche markets are not generated within any of these settings. In
both cases, technological transition either takes place or does not, depending
11Note that, if our assumptions are modified, in particular those regarding preference for
experimentation, not signaling may become an optimal strategy, leading to the creation
of niche markets signaled by the rival. We will however maintain the current behavioral
assumptions to emphasize the fact that the same set of constraints may lead to the creation
of technological niche markets when decision reversibility is allowed for.
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on the relative values attained by E[r(B|s)] and EI [r(A − C|s)]. We will
illustrate in the following section how the absence of niche markets within the
previous settings is mainly due to the relative [expected] payoff loss suffered
by the firms that do not signal when the rival does.
12.4 Generating niche markets
Decision reversibility allows firms to coordinate the creation of niche markets
in the interim period after observing the signaling strategy of the rival, a task
significantly harder to achieve in the previous decision settings.
The reversible case follows a similar logic to the irreversible one. However,
as we will show below, ER[r(C − A|ns)] > EI [r(C − A|ns)] and ER[r(A −
C|s)] < EI [r(A−C|s)], which would allow for the generation of technological
niche markets if ER[r(C −A|ns)] > E[r(B)] and ER[r(A−C|s)] > E[r(C)].
Note that, given the behavioral implications derived from [and the assump-
tions imposed on] the rational information gathering process of decision mak-
ers, this type of equilibrium does not arise in the previous scenarios, since
E[r(C|ns)] < EI [r(C − A|ns)] < E[r(B)]. Thus, the ability of decision
makers to reverse their information gathering processes becomes a necessary
condition for technological niche markets to emerge.
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12.4.1 Decision reversibility
Consider the reversible unilateral signaling setting from the point of view of
the not signaling firm and define its expected payoff by
ER[r(C − A|ns)] = P (f)[g(A)r1(A)] + P (r)[(1− g(B))P (f)g(A)r]+
g(ce1 − A)γ(x1|θ=1 < x∗1|θ=1)r,
where γ(x1|θ=1 < x∗1|θ=1) denotes the probability of the decision maker observ-
ing a x1|θ=1 in the signaled market lower than x∗1|θ=1, which is the x1|θ=1 value
required for her to be indifferent between the good in the signaled market and
that observed in the unsignaled one, i.e. u1(x
∗
1|θ=1) = u1(x1) + E2 − E2|θ=1.
Note that the set of goods defining this additional term are preferred to the
certainty equivalent one since x1 must be located within the (ce1, A) inter-
val for this case to be considered, where g(ce1 − A) is the probability of
x1 ∈ (ce1, A).
A similar analysis could be performed to describe ER[r(A−C|s)], where
ER[r(A− C|s)] = P (f)[g(B)r1(B) + (1− g(B))P (f)g(ce1)r]+
P (r)[(1− g(A))g(ce1)γ(x1|θ=1 > x∗1|θ=1)r].
The only difference with the irreversible case is the addition of γ(x1|θ=1 >
x∗1|θ=1) to the P (r) expression on the right hand side of the equation. In this
case, the signaling firm must not only provide an improvement over ce1 when
the decision maker shifts her information gathering process, but also over
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whatever observation gathered in the unsignaled market and located within
the (ce1, A) interval that may lead to a higher expected utility than the
x1|θ=1 observed in the signaled market. Note that, if γ(x1|θ=1 > x∗1|θ=1) = 1,
∀x1 ∈ (ce1, A), then ER[r(A−C|s)] = EI [r(A−C|s)]. However, if γ(x1|θ=1 >
x∗1|θ=1) < 1, then ER[r(A− C|s)] < EI [r(A− C|s)].
12.4.2 Equilibria and results
The set of reversible equilibria depends on the relative strength of the re-
versibility effect, given by the value of the γ(x1|θ=1) function within the
ER[r(C −A|ns)] and ER[r(A−C|s)] expressions. Reversibility constitutes a
gain over EI [r(C − A|ns)] for the not signaling firm, while imposing a loss
relative to EI [r(A− C|s)] on the signaling one if γ(x1|θ=1 > x∗1|θ=1) < 1.
Given the set of expected payoffs defined in the previous section, four
possible technological transition matrices, with their corresponding equilib-
ria, could be defined in period zero.
If E[r(C)] is higher than ER[r(A−C|s)], then a not signaling strategy
from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will not signal in period
one. At the same time, the reversibility effect prevents us from being able to
guarantee that ER[r(C − A|ns)] < E[r(B)], which leads to either one of the
following matrices
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Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero (I)
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)]
NS E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero (II)
S NS
S
NS ER[r(C − A|ns)], ER[r(A− C|s)] E[r(C)], E[r(C)]
The subgame perfect equilibrium in (I) depends on the relative values
of E[r(B)] and E[r(C)]. In this case, as in the guaranteed improvement
and irreversible ones, both firms may coordinate their strategies in equilib-
rium by either signaling or not the existence of a technologically improved
set of goods.12 On the other hand, not signaling becomes the unique dom-
inant strategy for both firms in (II). Thus, the absence of unilateral sig-
naling incentives together with a sufficiently large reversibility effect within
ER[r(C − A|ns)] would prevent technological transition from taking place.
12Note that, in the decision irreversibility setting, the unique equilibrium of the game
was given by a common not signaling strategy, since E[r(C)] > EI [r(A−C|s)] > E[r(B)].
However, within the current reversibility scenario we have E[r(C)] > ER[r(A − C|s)] <
EI [r(A−C|s)], which prevents us from guaranteeing that E[r(C)] > E[r(B)] and defining
a unique not signaling equilibrium.
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However, if ER[r(A − C|s)] > E[r(C)], then a not signaling strategy
from the firm in period zero implies that the rival will signal in period one,
leading to either one of the following matrices
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero (i)
S NS
S E[r(B)], E[r(B)] ER[r(A− C|s)], ER[r(C − A|ns)]
NS
Technological Transition Matrix Period Zero (ii)
S NS
S ER[r(A− C|s)], ER[r(C − A|ns)]
NS ER[r(C − A|ns)], ER[r(A− C|s)]
The subgame perfect equilibrium in (i) depends on the relative values
of E[r(B)] and ER[r(C − A|ns)]. Once again, and contrary to the other
scenarios, we cannot guarantee that ER[r(C − A|ns)] < E[r(B)] [note that
the reversibility effect prevents us also from guaranteeing that ER[r(C −
A|ns)] < ER[r(A−C|s)]]. As a result, signaling does not necessarily become
a dominant equilibrium strategy for both firms. This would only be the case
if ER[r(C − A|ns)] < E[r(B)]. However, if ER[r(C − A|ns)] > E[r(B)], the
resulting market [niche] equilibria are illustrated in (ii).
The subgame perfect equilibria described in (ii) can be analyzed as two
separate subcases defined by the relative values of ER[r(C − A|ns)] and
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ER[r(A−C|s)]. Technological niche markets emerge naturally in both cases
but the incentives to participate as the signaling firm vary between them.
Clearly, if ER[r(C−A|ns)] < ER[r(A−C|s)], both firms will try to signal in
the first place and become technological monopolists within the niche mar-
ket, as is the case in standard technological race models. The generation
of first mover advantages requires a relatively low payoff loss imposed by
γ(x1|θ=1 > x∗1|θ=1) on the signaling firm as well as a relatively low gain from
reversibility, via γ(x1|θ=1 < x∗1|θ=1), for the not signaling one. Therefore, low
reversibility effects coupled with the existence of monopolistic rents, derived
from ER[r(A−C|s)] > E[r(C)] and ER[r(A−C|s)] > E[r(B)], provide firms
with the incentives required to signal and become sole technological monop-
olists, even if these firms are already incumbents in a given niche market.13
An example of this type of behavior is given by Apple’s leapfrogging strategy
in the introduction of the iPod Nano, even before newcomers could pose a
serious threat within the market developed by the iPod Mini, creating and
monopolizing its own technological niche market, see Li and Jin (2009).
13Note that nothing prevents a firm from sending two or more consecutive signals if
further technological improvements are available; refer to Figures 18 and 19 for a numerical
illustration of the two signals’ case. In this case, an incumbent firm may consider sending
a second signal if it expects a rival to signal and access its current niche market, which
would lead to a relative payoff of E[r(B)] for both firms. As a result, given the expected
payoff received if both firms compete within the current niche market, the incumbent may
have an incentive to signal again and distance itself from the current niche market by
climbing a second quality ladder.
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However, if ER[r(C−A|ns)] > ER[r(A−C|s)], and even though both firms
are better off within a technological niche market, the signaling firm would
be suffering an expected payoff loss with respect to its [not signaling] rival.
That is, the reversibility risk involved in signaling decreases the expected
payoff derived from such a strategy while increasing that of the not signaling
rival.14 This type of “second mover advantage” requires a relatively large
gain from reversibility via γ(x1|θ=1 < x∗1|θ=1) for the not signaling firm as
well as a relatively large payoff loss imposed by γ(x1|θ=1 > x∗1|θ=1) on the
signaling one. In this sense, those firms whose set of available goods provides
them with a large reversibility advantage [due, among others, to lock-in,
bandwagon, network and reputation effects]15 have an incentive to let their
rivals signal and monopolize a new technological niche market.
12.5 Quality ladders and the Arrow effect
The history friendly analysis of the evolution of the computer industry pre-
sented by Malerba et al. (1999, 2001) displays the latter type of equilibrium
pattern. These authors show how the advances in component technologies
driving the evolution of the computer industry were developed by newcomer
14Note that, if decisions are irreversible EI [r(C −A|ns)] < EI [r(A− C|s)], ∀x1 ∈ X1.
15Regarding reputation and consumer education and their importance for the acquisition
of newly developed products see Eng and Quaia (2009). Bandwagon and network effects
are formally discussed and incorporated by Malerba et al. (2003) in their behavioral
evolutionary model.
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firms that managed to survive by supplying experimental consumers in tech-
nological niche markets. This innovation process was never undertaken by
the incumbent firms dominating the existing component technology. In this
regard, Malerba et al. (2003, 2007) emphasize the substantial uncertainty
faced by incumbents when identifying the set of possible competing players.
Indeed, these authors highlight the fact that the descriptive literature has
shown how incumbents are subject to cognitive biases and organizational
factors that play a major role in accounting for the fatal lag in their response
when the new technology succeeds in getting a foothold, a phenomenon whose
explanation is set aside by rational choice models; see Malerba et al. (2003:
6). As a result, they distance themselves from standard game theoretical
settings when analyzing this type of phenomenon in favor of a behavioral
evolutionary approach.
Our latter subcase illustrates how the “stylized facts” described by Malerba
et al. (1999, 2001, 2003, 2007) may be derived as a subgame perfect equilib-
rium between competing duopolists when decision makers behave as perfectly
rational utility maximizers. Note that this type of behavior differs substan-
tially from the one dictated by the Arrow effect, considered by Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and the subsequent literature on quality ladders to be
the mechanism triggering the introduction of technologically superior prod-
ucts. In their setting, incumbents expect lower profits relative to newcomers
from developing the next innovation. This difference incentivates newcom-
ers to develop the next innovation and collect the benefits derived from the
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corresponding technological monopoly. In our latter setting, incumbents and
newcomers, both of which have already developed the next innovation, expect
the next innovation to constitute a drawback for the signaling firm, which
explains their reticence to signal its existence and create a niche market.
This is indeed the case despite the fact that, given the available supply of
products, creating a technological niche market is a [subgame perfect] Nash
equilibrium based on the rational information gathering process and choice
behavior of decision makers.
The emergence and prevalence of technological niche markets within the
reversible game theoretical environment can be intuitively justified in several
ways.
First, the assumption of symmetry defining both duopolists and leading
to identical reversibility effects could be relaxed and a combination of the
previous reversible subgame scenarios considered. In other words, inexpe-
rienced newcomers may be subject to the payoff constraints defined in (ii)
[with ER[r(A − C|s)] < ER[r(C − A|ns)]] when deciding whether or not to
signal while a reputed incumbent may play under those defined in (i) [with
ER[r(C − A|ns)] < E[r(B)]]. That is, if the newcomer decides to signal
first, the existence of large reversibility effects would benefit the not signal-
ing incumbent. However, a sufficiently low reversibility effect generated by
the incumbent’s signal would force the newcomer to wait and coordinate its
signaling strategy at B.16
16Similarly, the strength of the signal, which determines the location of points A and
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Second, an incorrect estimation of the gains derived from reversibility
[loses imposed on the signaling firm] by the incumbent firm, i.e. miscal-
culating the payoffs and, therefore, the stability of the technological niche
market, could lead to the creation of stable technological niche markets by a
newcomer. It should be emphasized that accounting for network and band-
wagon effects, as well as for future possible signals, requires defining several
additional subjective probability functions, which may greatly differ between
firms and significantly modify the entrances [subjective expected payoffs] of
the corresponding transition matrices.
Finally, the existence of vintage effects, see Bohlmann et al. (2002), im-
plies that later entrants utilizing improved technology can face lower costs
and reach higher quality levels than the pioneer signaling firm. These au-
thors show that pioneers in categories with high vintage effects tend to have
lower market shares and higher failure rates. Moreover, they find key rela-
tionships between the magnitude of the pioneer advantage [or disadvantage]
and the consumer valuation of product attributes such as variety and qual-
ity. In particular, their empirical results illustrate how pioneers do better in
product categories where variety is more important and worse in categories
where product quality is more important. That is, when variety becomes an
B, could be assumed to be a function of the firm signaling. These scenarios could be
further developed to explain, for example, why Microsoft waited for Sony to introduce its
Playstation 2 before launching the Xbox, instead of competing directly within the existing
Playstation market, see Li and Jin (2009) for an alternative theoretical proposal.
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important characteristic the reversibility effects should decrease, promoting
unilateral signaling strategies and the emergence of niche markets. However,
quality considerations relate intuitively to [consumer] inertia-based frictions
and should increase the relative importance of the reversibility effects, which
would justify the reticence of firms to signal and create technological niche
markets, despite the assumed credibility of the signals.
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Chapter 13
Conclusion and extensions: the
way from here
The importance of demand based industrial dynamics is a phenomenon
becoming increasingly evident, see Klepper and Malerba (2010). Demand
may influence technological evolution via the direct induction of innovations
or indirectly through their diffusion processes. The current thesis has pre-
sented a decision theoretical model of [rational expected utility-based] de-
mand for technologically superior products that provides a compatible per-
spective with the results obtained by the behavioral evolutionary economic
literature.
We have illustrated how, after the observation of positive credible sig-
nals, decision makers become more prone to start a new search for a good
better than the one whose first characteristic has been observed within the
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corresponding signaled market. One of the main conclusions to be derived
from this thesis is that positive signals do not only affect the calculation of
certainty equivalent values but also the willingness to search of rational de-
cision makers. That is, as the number of positive signals received increases,
decision makers become more prone to start a new search for a good better
than the one whose first characteristic has already been observed. At the
same time, absent market frictions and myopia, the increase in expected val-
ues generated by positive signals triggers immediate herds among decision
makers, who would only consider searching the goods belonging to the set
on which the biggest number of signals is received.
Market frictions, coupled with full rationality, have been shown to be
able to cause a slow-down in the adoption of both the currently available
technology and the newly introduced superior one. In particular, we have
shown how the presence of consumption inertia and search frictions may pre-
vent immediate herds to the signaled market while inducing decision makers
to require a much higher X1 realization from the unsignaled one in order
to remain gathering information on the sets of goods offered by the firms
operating within it.
We have also analyzed the [strategic] consequences derived from the ex-
istence of path dependence phenomena by explicitly accounting for the pro-
cess of information diffusion among decision makers and the emergence of
bandwagon and network effects that may take place after firms signal the
availability of a technologically superior set of goods.
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It should be noted that the information acquisition incentives of decision
makers have been defined through their expected search utilities, which, at
the same time, define implicitly the revenues expected to be obtained by
firms. That is, given the available distribution of product characteristics
that may be displayed by a firm, its expected revenues depend on its abil-
ity to provide the characteristics required by decision makers. In this sense,
we have assumed that market signals correspond to truthful fully credible
reports. However, an immediate extension of the thesis should account for
different possible types of strategic market interactions, since decision mak-
ers do not generally observe the real distributions of characteristics. That
is, a principal may always issue signals so as to manipulate the choice of
uninformed but perfectly rational agents. It should be emphasized that pref-
erence manipulation may occur even if the information transmitted is fully
verifiable by the decision maker, see Di Caprio and Santos Arteaga (2011).
Indeed, a single signal suffices to generate the herding mechanism described
by Banerjee among decision makers. Thus, the strategic nature of the in-
formation transmission process should be explicitly analyzed in fields that
do not currently account for it, such as knowledge management (Holsap-
ple, 2003). This is particularly important at the organizational level, where
relatively small sets of decision variables are generally considered (Gaines,
2003).1 Similar remarks apply to the design of decision support systems and
1In this regard, the model could be used to extend in an heterogeneous direction papers
such as that of Li and Zhu (2009), where a group of homogeneous experts must be hired,
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information dashboards that guide the process of managerial decision making
(Adam and Pomerol, 2008).
In addition, the results obtained allow for a formal treatment of the op-
timal acquisition of information and choice processes considered by the con-
sumer choice literature, where the strategic side of information transmission
is rarely formalized (Ariely, 2000; Bearden and Connolly, 2007; Diehl, 2005;
Novemsky et al., 2007).
From a supply perspective, we have identified the requirements neces-
sary for the emergence of niche markets where firms signaling the availability
of technologically superior goods may survive. We have designed a gen-
eral equilibrium environment where rational consumers compose a demand
driven system determining the selection of technologies when firms decide
strategically whether or not to signal the existence of an already developed
technologically superior set of goods. The concept of [endogenously defined]
performance thresholds of Adner and Levinthal (2001) has arisen quite natu-
rally within our environment and allowed us to analyze how consumer prefer-
ences influence the introduction of existing disruptive technologies, see Adner
(2002). We have illustrated how, after the observation of positive credible
signals, [perfect foresight] decision makers become more prone to start a new
search for a good better than the one whose first characteristic has already
been observed in the corresponding signaled market. Besides, as was also
either simultaneously or sequentially, to forecast the stochastic market demand for a new
product that is about to be introduced.
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the case in Ireland and Stoneman (1986), perfect foresight has been shown
to cause a slow-down in adoption of the currently available technology rel-
ative to myopia. That is, even in the presence of consumption inertia and
irreversible decisions, we have seen how perfect foresight decision makers re-
quire a much higher X1 realization from the unsignaled market than myopic
ones to remain gathering information on the sets of goods offered by the
corresponding firm.
The micro-oriented approach to technological demand provided by the
thesis complements macro-oriented evolutionary approaches such as that of
Dolfsma and Leydesdorff (2009) when analyzing how technological processes
may break-out of a trajectory. In particular, these authors include politi-
cal decision-making processes as co-evolvers along trajectories together with
markets and technologies. Following this type of reasoning within the cur-
rent setting should help shedding some light on policy considerations, ranging
from the public acquisition of technology to consumer education programs.
That is, it seems natural to assume that less risk averse decision makers
are more experienced and educated [in technological terms] than more risk
averse ones, which makes them more experimental and less search averse
than the less educated ones. Similarly, the ability of decision makers to ob-
serve and interpret signals may be assumed to depend on their experience
and [technological] education. As a result, the existence of myopic [less ed-
ucated] risk averse decision makers increases the probability of suboptimal
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locking-in phenomena.2 In this sense, myopic decision makers could be used
to study the prevalence of local monopolies supplying technologically infe-
rior products within developing countries and the failure of the latter ones to
generate enough demand pull to foster further technological introductions.
The main results obtained through the game theoretical setting defin-
ing the supply side of the technological market when allowing for decision
reversibility in the information gathering process of decision makers can be
summarized as follows.
Consider an environment where decision makers are allowed to compare
the characteristics of the goods observed in both markets, the signaled and
the unsignaled one, before making a purchase. This setting leads to two
main types of possible subgame perfect equilibria for the firms when deciding
whether or not to introduce technologically superior products in the market.
First, a technological race where firms try to become the main monopo-
listic force within the corresponding niche market and a loss is inflicted on
those firms that are unable to cope with the innovation, a result compatible
with the findings of Buenstorf and Klepper (2010). In this case, the devel-
2Harty (2010) illustrates through several case studies how demand heterogeneity does
not only affect the implementation and use given to a technology but also the expectations
and requests placed on its future developments. An economic perspective is provided
by van den Ende and Dolfsma (2005), who demonstrate how “the emergence of new
technological paradigms can also be enabled by demand factors, whereas developments in
technological knowledge may also exert influence within the boundaries of a paradigm”
(pg. 85).
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opment of technological niche markets reinforces the dominant position of
the innovator, as is the case in the standard industrial organization litera-
ture. Thus, firms will signal the existence of a set of technologically superior
products as soon as they are developed.
On the other hand, we have obtained equilibria where the generation of
niche markets is suboptimal for the signaling firm, which should try to wait
for the rival to signal the existence of the products first.3 In this case, the
retreat strategy defined by Adner and Snow (2010), where the decision to
stay with the old technology is a strategic choice made by the managers
of a given firm, is formally obtained. However, and despite the rationality
involved in the choice made by managers, Adner and Snow (2010) do not
suggest that such a strategy is a dominant one to deal with technological
change, while in our case it is.
Finally, note that the model introduced in this thesis has been designed
with the highest possible degree of generality in mind. We are aware of the
fact that important differences in consumer preferences, degrees of risk aver-
sion, budget constraints and information gathering frictions arise depending
on the markets and technological sectors under consideration. The current
model should therefore be extended to account for these and other possible
environmental effects affecting the information gathering and choice processes
of decision makers.
3It should be noted that this type of “waiting races” have also been formally derived
within the standard neoclassical literature, see Kapur (1995).
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Appendix: numerical simulations 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Evolution of optimal threshold values given risk neutral utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
Evolution of optimal threshold values given risk averse utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Risk neutral environment as in Figure 1. 
Same positive signal observed as the case in Figure 1. 
Example of search and matching frictions:  
H0.5(1s|2g/10g) represents the original H(1s) function weighted down by a  
binomial distribution ψ(m, l, f) with the following coefficients: m = 10, l = 2, f = 0.5.  
That is, we shift the f binomial coefficient from 1 to 0.5.  
At the same time, the number of sufficiently diffused goods required by the decision maker  
to become available during the search process must be of at least two out of ten. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
Risk neutral environment as in Figure 1 
Same positive signal observed as the case in Figure 1. 
Example of search and matching frictions: same as in Figure 3. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
Risk neutral environment as in Figure 1 
Same positive signal observed as the case in Figure 1. 
Example of search and matching frictions: same interpretation as in Figure 3. 
In this case, H0.6(1s|4g/10g) overlaps with H0.5(1s|3g/10g).  
The latter has not been explicitly identified in the figure.   
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
Risk averse environment as in Figure 2 
Same positive signal observed as the case in Figure 2. 
Example of search and matching frictions:  
H0.5(1s|2g/10g) represents the original H(1s) function weighted down by a  
binomial distribution ψ(m, l, f) with the following coefficients: m = 10, l = 2, f = 0.5.  
That is, we shift the f binomial coefficient from 1 to 0.5.  
At the same time, the number of sufficiently diffused goods required by the decision maker  
to become available during the search process must be of at least two out of ten. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
Risk averse environment as in Figure 2 
Same positive signal observed as the case in Figure 2. 
Example of search and matching frictions: same interpretation as in Figure 6. 
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Figure 8 
 
 
 
Risk neutral environment as in Figure 1 
Same positive signal observed as the case in Figure 1. 
Basic diffusion with a centralized source. 
Example of network and diffusion effects:  
ΨH(1s) represents the original H(1s) function weighted by a Ψa(t) diffusion process  
with a coefficient α = 0.1 and a duration of 50 time periods. 
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Figure 9 
 
 
 
Risk neutral environment as in Figure 1 
Same positive signal observed as the case in Figure 1. 
Basic diffusion with [word of mouth non-centralized] multiple sources.  
Example of network and diffusion effects:  
ΨH(1s) represents the original H(1s) function weighted by a Ψa(t) diffusion process with coefficients  
β = 0.1, N = 10, Ψa(0) = 0.01 and a duration of 50 time periods. 
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Figure 10 
 
 
 
Optimal threshold value given risk neutral utility functions and uniform risk distributions 
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Figure 11 
 
 
 
Guaranteed versus refused certainty equivalent scenarios:   
threshold values and information gathering intervals  
given risk neutral utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
Note that the H(x1|rf) function is discontinuous. The vertical line joining both sections  
has been included to simplify the comparisons made between the g.c.e.s. and the r.c.e.s.  
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Figure 12 
 
 
 
Refused certainty equivalent and multiple signals:   
threshold values and information gathering intervals  
given risk neutral utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
Note that the H(∙) functions are all discontinuous. The vertical lines joining their respective sections  
have been included to simplify the comparisons made between the g.c.e.s. and the r.c.e.s. 
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Figure 13 
 
 
 
Refused certainty equivalent, signals and decision irreversibility:   
threshold values and information gathering intervals  
given risk neutral utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
Note that the H(∙) functions are both discontinuous. The vertical lines joining their respective sections  
have been included to simplify the comparisons made between the g.c.e.s. and the r.c.e.s. 
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Figure 14 
 
 
 
Optimal threshold value given risk averse utility functions and uniform risk distributions 
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Figure 15 
 
 
 
Guaranteed versus refused certainty equivalent scenarios:   
threshold values and information gathering intervals  
given risk averse utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
Note that the H(x1|rf) function is discontinuous. The vertical line joining both sections  
has been included to simplify the comparisons made between the g.c.e.s. and the r.c.e.s. 
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Figure 16 
 
 
 
Refused certainty equivalent and multiple signals:   
threshold values and information gathering intervals  
given risk averse utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
Note that the H(∙) functions are all discontinuous. The vertical lines joining their respective sections  
have been included to simplify the comparisons made between the g.c.e.s. and the r.c.e.s. 
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Figure 17 
 
 
 
Refused certainty equivalent, signals and decision irreversibility:   
threshold values and information gathering intervals  
given risk averse utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
Note that the H(∙) functions are both discontinuous. The vertical lines joining their respective sections  
have been included to simplify the comparisons made between the g.c.e.s. and the r.c.e.s. 
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Characteristic spaces: [ ]10,51 =X , [ ]10,02 =X  
Error! Bookmark not defined.Utility functions:  111 )( xxu = ; 222 )( xxu =  
Probability densities: both continuous and uniform 
11 Xx ∈∀ , 5
1)( 11 =xµ ;  22 Xx ∈∀ , 10
1)( 22 =xµ  
 
 
Figure 18 
 
 
Evolution of the optimal threshold values given risk neutral utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
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Figure 19 
 
 
Evolution of the optimal threshold values given risk averse utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
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Figure 20 
 
Market transition thresholds for the different types of decision processes  
given risk neutral utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
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Figure 21 
 
Market transition thresholds for the different types of decision processes  
given risk averse utility functions and uniform risk distributions. 
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Amplio resumen de la tesis:   
Un modelo de cambio tecnológico en equilibrio general basado en la demanda 
 
Resumen Principal 
Esta tesis estudia como la capacidad de adquisición de información de los individuos afecta la 
tendencia de innovación tecnológica, estableciendo una conexión explicita entre la demanda de 
mercado, las empresas y la evolución de la dinámica tecnológica. Se examinan los efectos que 
diversas estructuras teóricas de demanda tienen en los incentivos de las empresas para señalar la 
existencia e introducir productos tecnológicamente superiores. Por ejemplo, se ilustra como, tras 
observar una señal creíble y positiva, las fricciones existentes en el mercado pueden retrasar la 
adopción de la ambas tecnologías, la actual y la recién introducida y superior. Las consecuencias 
derivadas de la existencia de fenómenos de dependencia acumulativa se analizan teniendo en cuenta 
explicitamente el proceso de difusión de información entre individuos y la generación de efectos de 
red que pueden tener lugar después de que las empresas señalen la disponibilidad de grupos de 
productos superiores tecnológicamente. También se ilustra como la generación de nichos 
tecnológicos de mercado depende de la habilidad de los individuos para revertir sus procesos de 
adquisición de información y comparar los productos observados en diversos mercados antes de 
tomar una decisión. Ademas, se obtienen situaciones de equilibrio donde la introducción de 
productos superiores tecnológicamente y la subsecuente creación de nichos de mercado es 
suboptima para la empresa que envía la señal correspondiente. Este resultado describe la idea 
central de la tesis, la cual, mediante la utilización de un marco teórico lo suficientemente cercano al 
de equilibrio general, permite generar conexiones con la perspectiva económica ortodoxa en materia 
de innovación tecnológica. Finalmente, se introducen simulaciones numéricas para ilustrar todos los 
resultados teóricos obtenidos.    
Objetivos 
La tesis actual tiene como objetivo principal la modelizacion del cambio técnico desde el punto de 
vista de la demanda. La literatura económica tiende a analizar el cambio técnico y la introducción 
de nuevos productos desde el punto de vista de la oferta, mientras que la demanda permanece 
aislada como un mero recipiente de innovaciones las cuales son siempre adquiridas tan pronto como 
son reconocidas. Este equilibrio parcial determinado por los movimientos en la oferta constituye un 
limite importante a la hora de analizar la introducción de nuevos productos y la generación de 
nichos de mercado, ambos fundamentales en la evolución de la oferta tecnológica. De hecho, la 
mayoría de las mejoras tecnológicas que tienen lugar últimamente en el mercado tienen a la 
demanda tecnológica como un factor fundamental en su desarrollo, como es por ejemplo el caso de 
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la demanda de Iphones. Por lo tanto, la integración de la demanda como parte del modelo de 
equilibrio general que determina la evolución de la tecnología en el mercado actual es fundamental 
y a la vez necesaria para entender el proceso de evolución tecnológica. 
Metodología 
La tesis actual desarrolla un modelo normativo de demanda racional que tiene en cuenta la 
incertidumbre implícita en el proceso de adquisición de información y elección de los individuos. 
Por lo tanto, un modelo matemático basado en los axiomas de expectativas racionales se desarrolla 
junto con la capacidad limitada de los individuos para asimilar información. Como todo modelo de 
equilibrio general,, el lado de la demanda es complementado por el de la oferta cuando este ultimo 
tiene en cuenta la generación de expectativas y elecciones de los individuos al decidir si introducir o 
no un nuevo producto tecnológico en el mercado. La simulación numérica de todos y cada uno de 
los resultados basados en un amplio espectro de posibilidades constituyen el apoyo y la intuición 
requeridas para desarrollar el modelo. 
Resultados 
Los resultados obtenidos indican un comportamiento hasta ahora no identificado en la elección 
racional de los individuos cuando se les presenta con mejoras tecnológicas en los productos 
disponibles. En concreto, la tesis actual ilustra como los individuos pueden ser racionalmente 
reticentes a asimilar y adquirir nuevas tecnologías aunque estén convencidos de su valor como 
innovaciones tecnológicas. Cuando se consideran simultáneamente el lado de la oferta y la demanda 
el modelo desarrollado en esta tesis concluye que las empresas pueden ser reticentes a la 
introducción de mejoras tecnológicas en sus productos debido a dichas fricciones, un fenómeno que 
no ha sido reconocido por la literatura económica a pesar de preguntarse continuamente por la 
tardanza en la difusión de innovaciones tecnológicas entre agentes racionales dentro del mercado. 
Otros resultados emergen dentro del modelo actual que indican el camino para futuros desarrollos 
basados en la demanda dentro de modelos de equilibrio general. 
Extensiones 
La extensión mas evidente consiste en desarrollar la capacidad de adquisición de información y 
asimilación de los individuos y ver como afecta a la introducción de productos cada vez mas 
complejos tecnológicamente y a los mercados de búsqueda como Internet. Desarrollando las 
capacidades de asimilación de los individuos de forma diversa en cada situación, el modelo actual 
permite desarrollar nuevos equilibrios y analizar diversas situaciones de asimilación de información 
que permanecen ocultas y no estudiadas dentro del contexto actual de la teoría económica. 
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Large summary of the Ph.D. Thesis:   
A general equilibrium demand-based approach to technological change 
 
Main Summary 
This thesis analyzes how the information acquisition capabilities of decision makers affect the 
patterns of technological innovation, establishing a explicit link among market demand, firms and 
the evolution of technology dynamics. We examine the effects that different decision theoretical 
driven demand structures may have on the incentives of firms to signal the existence of and 
introduce technologically superior products. For example, we illustrate how, after the observation of 
a positive credible signal, market frictions may cause a slow-down in the adoption of both the 
currently available technology and the newly introduced superior one. The consequences derived 
from the existence of path dependence phenomena will be analyzed by explicitly accounting for the 
process of information diffusion among decision makers and the emergence of bandwagon and 
network effects that may take place after firms signal the availability of a technologically superior 
set of goods. We also illustrate how the generation of technological niche markets depends on the 
ability of decision makers to reverse their information gathering processes and compare the goods 
observed in different markets before making a choice. In addition, we obtain equilibrium situations 
where the introduction of technologically superior products and subsequent generation of niche 
markets is suboptimal for the signaling firm. This result embodies the main idea of the thesis, 
which, by using an environment sufficiently close to the general equilibrium framework, allows for 
bridges to be built with the economic orthodox perspective on technological innovation. Further, 
numerical simulations are introduced to illustrate all the theoretical results obtained. 
Objectives 
The current thesis has as a main objective the modelization of technological change from the 
demand point of view. The economic literature tends to analyze technological change and the 
introduction of new products from the point of view of the supply, while the demand remains 
isolated as a mere recipient of innovations that are always acquired as long as they are recognized 
by decision makers. This partial equilibrium determined by movements in the supply side 
constitutes an important constraint when analyzing the introduction of new products and the 
generation of niche markets, both of which are fundamental in the evolution of technological 
supply. Indeed, most of the current technological improvements taking place in the market have the  
technological demand as a fundamental factor in their development, i.e. the demand for Iphones. As 
a result, the integration of demand as an active part of the general equilibrium model determining 
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the evolution of market technology in the current state of the world is fundamental and essential to 
understand the process of technological evolution. 
Methodology 
The current thesis develops a normative model of rational demand that accounts for the implicit 
uncertainty in the information acquisition and choice processes of decision makers. As a result, a 
mathematical model based on the axioms of rational expectations is developed together with the 
limited ability of decision makers to acquire and assimilate information. Like any other general 
equilibrium model, the demand side is complemented by the supply side when the latter one 
accounts for the generation of expectations and choices made by decision makers when deciding 
whether or not to introduce a new technological product in the market. The numerical simulation of 
each and every one of the results based on a wide spectrum of possibilities constitute the support 
and intuition required to develop the model.   
Results 
The results obtained indicate a behavior that has remained unidentified until now in the rational 
choices made by decision makers when presented with technological improvements in the products 
available. In particular, the current thesis illustrates how decision makers may be rationally reticent 
to assimilate and acquire new technologies despite being convinced about their worthiness as 
technological innovations. When the supply and demand sides are considered simultaneously, the 
model developed in the current thesis concludes that firms may be reticent to introduce  
technological improvements in their products due to the aforementioned frictions, a phenomenon 
that has not been recognized in the economic literature despite the fact that it constantly wonders 
about the delays in the diffusion of technological innovations among rational agents within a given 
market. Other results arise from the current model that open the way for future developments based 
in the demand within a general equilibrium environment. 
Extensions 
The most evident extension consists of developing the information acquisition and assimilation 
capacities of decision makers in order to see how they affect the introduction of products that 
become technologically more complex within search markets such as the internet. By developing 
the capacities of decision makers in different ways based on each particular situation, the current 
model allows for the generation of new equilibria and the analysis of different information 
assimilation situations that remain hidden in the current economic theoretical context. 
 
 
 
